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ABSTRACT
PROJECTING POWER IN THE DAWNLAND: WEAPONIZING SETTLEMENT IN
THE GULF OF MAINE WORLD, 1710-1800
Alexandra L. Montgomery
Daniel K. Richter

After the British “conquest” of the French colony of Acadia in 1710, the British
Empire sought ways to transform what was in practice the sovereign homeland of several
Wabanaki nations into a loyal Protestant colony. In addition to subduing French and
Indigenous populations militarily, British plans centered on increasing the number of
loyal, white, Protestant settlers. These settlers, however, proved stubbornly illusive,
forcing British imperial and colonial governments to turn to experimental strategies
which ranged from using Parliamentary money to pay for settlers’ transportation,
provisions, and land to encouraging private speculative companies. This study examines
these colonization schemes in the far northeast of North America from 1710 to 1800. It
makes two key interventions. The first is to bring state power into the discussion of settler
colonialism and expansion in the colonial era. My research shows that rather than an
unstoppable herd of white settlers that only incidentally overwhelmed Native
communities, white Protestant expansion was a process actively pursued from the top
down as early as the first decade of the eighteenth century. The second argument is that
government officials and others in a position to plan settlements were well aware of the
disruptive and dispossessive power of settlers. Throughout the eighteenth century, British
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men in power tried to deploy planned settlements of “loyal” settlers in an attempt to
control or eliminate “non-loyal” populations — Indigenous, French, and, later, citizens of
the nascent United States. I refer to this vision of state-directed expansion as weaponized
settlement. Weaponized settlement is an approach to colonization that is directed from the
top down, rather than led by settlers themselves, and that sees settlers as a means to
achieve greater geopolitical goals. Despite a large expenditure of money and effort,
however, these schemes were almost all failures until after the American Revolution.
Ultimately, the cost of a loyal British northeast would be the majority of the British North
American empire. For Wabanaki people, it would be far higher.
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Introduction
Kluskap, the man from nothing, didn’t create the world, or even human life; but
he did create the Dawnland. 1 Stories told from Southern New England to Cape Breton
tell of his interactions with land, people, and animals, and how in the process he molded
the earth around him into the familiar coastline of eastern North America. In Nova Scotia,
he was said to live on or inside Cape Blomidon, and many of the geographic features in
the Bay of Fundy were created or altered by him. 2 Spencer’s Island was his kettle for
cooking meat, which, in some versions, he overturned when he left the land in disgust at
the actions of newly-arrived Europeans. 3 According to Penobscot stories, one of
Kluskap’s first hunting expeditions with his dog was responsible for the geographic
features around Cape Rosier. There, he turned the guts of his kill, his kettles, and even his
dog into stone to mark the event.4

1

“Kluskap” represents the modern orthography for this figure’s Mi’kmaq name; in in
Nova Scotia, where he still figures prominently in tourism campaigns, the name is
rendered, after Rand, as Glooscap. In modern Maliseet-Passamaquoddy orthography, his
name is “Koluskap.” In Penobscot, Joseph Nicolar refers to this same figure as “Klosekur-beh,” or Kəloskαpe in modern orthography. “Man from nothing” is following
Nicolar’s explanation of the name in Joseph Nicolar, The Life and Traditions of the Red
Man (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007), 100–101.
2
Trudy Sable and Bernie Francis, The Language of This Land, Mi’kma’ki (Sydney, NS:
Cape Breton University Press, 2012), 43–48.
3
Sable and Francis, Language of This Land, 46; Silas Tertius Rand, Legends of the
Micmacs (New York and London: Longmans, Green, and Co, 1894), xlvi.
4
Nicolar, The Life and Traditions of the Red Man, 132–133. Stories recorded in Nova
Scotia similarly involve Kluskap turning his dogs into stone and used as landmarks; see
for example Sable and Francis, Language of This Land, 46.

2
Kluskap stories are just one of many shared cultural features that bring together
the First Peoples of what is now Northern New England and Atlantic Canada. 5 First on
the continent to greet the rising sun, the area's original inhabitants called the region "the
Dawnland." Indeed, "Wabanaki" and "Abenaki," the general terms most often used to
describe the people of the region, derives from the terms for "dawn" or "white" in the
several eastern Algonquian dialects spoken by the people who lived—and still live—in
the region.6 Bordered roughly by the French settlements on the St. Lawrence River,
Iroquoia, and Puritan Southern New England to the west and south and otherwise
surrounded by the Gulf of Maine, Atlantic Ocean, and Gulf of St. Lawrence, seventeenthand eighteenth-century Wabanakiak was a maritime-oriented world of bays, rivers, and

5

Archeologist David Sanger argues that the region northeast of the Kennebec constituted
a "natural culture area" with a "high level of cultural commonality" during the preEuropean and early-European eras. British colonial administrators agreed, referring to the
whole area northeast of Cape Anne as "the Eastward" and its inhabitants as "the Eastern
Indians.” David Sanger, “Pre-European Dawnland: Archaeology of the Maritime
Peninsula,” in New England and the Maritime Provinces: Connections and Comparisons,
ed. Stephen Hornsby and John G. Reid (Montréal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s
University Press, 2005), 15, 31. For eighteenth-century administrators referring to the
area as the Eastward, see for example, Orders of the Massachusetts Bay Council to
Cyprian Southack, 8 May 1702, folder 1, Cyprian Southack Collection, New York Public
Library.
6
Some scholars, including myself in other writings, have taken to calling the region
Wabanakia, presumably following the increasingly-familiar "Iroquoia." Following
eastern Algonquian grammatical structure, the proper term for the region would end in
"kik" or "ki" rather than "ia"; for example, the Western Abenaki term for the region is
"Wôbanakik" and the Mi'kmaw homeland is generally referred to as "Mi'kma'ki"; For
Wôbanakik, see Frederick Matthew Wiseman, Reclaiming the Ancestors: Decolonizing a
Taken Prehistory of the Far Northeast (Lebanon, NH: University Press of New England,
2005); For "Wabanakia," see Matthew R. Bahar, “People of the Dawn, People of the
Door: Indian Pirates and the Violent Theft of an Atlantic World,” The Journal of
American History 101, no. 2 (September 2014): 401–26. For “Wabanakiak,” see Ian
Saxine, “Properties of Empire: Indians, Colonists, and Land Speculators on the Maine
Frontier, 1713-1763” (Ph.D., Northwestern University, 2016).
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gulfs, where agriculture was limited by short growing seasons and unforgiving soil, and
the ability to navigate waterways and seas was a central aspect of everyday life for both
Natives and newcomers. 7
Although the Dawnland was one of the first sites of European and Indigenous
contact and trade, it was one of the last places on the Atlantic coast to be colonized by
Euramerican people. Until the eve of the American Revolution, Wabanaki people
remained able to set policy in their homelands and maintain their sovereignty and
territorial base. Wabanaki power in their homelands persisted not because of a lack of
Euramerican interest in settlement, but despite it. From the late seventeenth century on,
European governments, companies, and individuals — particularly associated with the
British Empire — spent untold sums of money attempting to transform the far northeast
into a settler colony like those that extended down the coast from Massachusetts to South
Carolina. For generations, they failed.

This study examines these colonization schemes in the far northeast of North
America from 1710 to 1800. It makes two key interventions. The first is to bring state
power into the discussion of settler colonialism and expansion in the colonial era. My
research shows that rather than an unstoppable herd of white settlers that only
incidentally overwhelmed Native communities, white Protestant expansion was a process
actively pursued from the top down as early as the first decade of the eighteenth century.
The second argument is that government officials and others in a position to plan

7

For a particularly strong statement of Wabanaki maritime orientation, see Bahar,
“People of the Dawn, People of the Door.”

4
settlements were well aware of the disruptive and dispossessive power of settlers.
Throughout the eighteenth century, British men in power tried to deploy planned
settlements of “loyal” settlers in an attempt to control “non-loyal” populations —
Indigenous, French, and, later, citizens of the nascent United States.
I refer to this quixotic vision of state-directed expansion as weaponized
settlement. Weaponized settlement is an approach to colonization that is directed from the
top down, rather than led by settlers themselves, and that sees settlers as a means to
achieve greater geopolitical goals. Throughout the eighteenth century, a significant subset
of British and Euramerican politicians were convinced, I argue, that wars and territory
could be won by the strategic placement of ostensibly peaceful settler families just as it
could be won by armed combat.
This mindset was not unique to Nova Scotia and the northeasternmost reaches of
empire. The idea of “buffer colonies” and militarizing frontiers by settling disbanded
soldiers in planned communities dates from at least the Roman Empire. For the British,
the best immediate precedent was probably the Ulster Plantation. However, the role of
the state in facilitating settler expansion in eighteenth century North America has been
almost entirely neglected. Instead, historians have examined how, elsewhere in North
America, the arrival of too many settlers, and the inability of colonial governments to
control them, created conflict between Native people and newcomers and put a strain on
settler-imperial relations. Focusing largely on the Ohio country and interior
Pennsylvania, these narratives often center on the Proclamation Line of 1763, which

5
banned white settlement west of the Appalachians in an attempt to prevent conflicts with
Native people and control Anglo-American settlement. 8
In contrast, by shifting attention to the fringes of the Atlantic coast, my work
reveals a region where such settlers were actively desired by colonial and imperial
authorities, in part because of their power to dispossess and disempower the Indigenous
inhabitants of the area. It therefore contributes to our understanding of imperialism,
settler colonialism, and the contested meanings of settler expansion more generally.
Additionally, by highlighting intra-imperial conflict and debate over both the control and
meaning of Anglo-American settlement, my work places our understanding of the
imperial conflict and American Revolution in a new light and helps explain why some
regions remained loyal and others joined the Revolutionary cause.
While the mindset of weaponized settlement was never unique to greater Nova
Scotia, it was, perhaps, uniquely ubiquitous during the period covered by this study. The
rocky shores and difficult weather of the far northeast made it a much less tantalizing
destination for farm families than, for example, the Ohio Country. This drastically limited
the amount of “natural,” unregulated expansion. At the same time, because it was seen as

8

For books that focus on the problem of Anglo-American settlement in the Ohio country
and Pennsylvania and argue that this created unsurmountable tensions with both Native
people and the Imperial state, see Eric Hinderaker, Elusive Empires: Constructing
Colonialism in the Ohio Valley, 1673-1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1997); James Merrell, Into the American Woods: Negotiators on the Pennsylvania
Frontier (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1999); Jane T. Merritt, At the
Crossroads: Indians and Empires on a Mid-Atlantic Frontier (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 2003); Peter Silver, Our Savage Neighbors: How Indian War
Transformed Early America (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2009); David L.
Preston, The Texture of Contact: European and Settler Communities on the Frontiers of
Iroquoia, 1667-1783 (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2009).

6
key to controlling both the rich north Atlantic fishery and access to the interior via the St.
Lawrence River, many British planners felt that full control of the region was a political
necessity. These factors combined to make weaponized settlement a particularly central
concept in the far northeast. As a result, studying Nova Scotia in its broadest sense —
which I take to include all of modern Maritime Canada and parts of northern Maine —
provides crucial insight into this way of thinking that also, I argue, spilled over into
considerations of and plans for more populous colonies and as-yet unconquered lands.

This dissertation begins during a crucial period in the history of eastern North
America. The closing decades of the seventeenth century saw the maturation of the
British and French settlement colonies that ringed the Atlantic coast and St. Lawrence
River. The field of imperial competition narrowed as Dutch, Swedish, and, to a lesser
extent, Spanish competition was removed from mainland North America. A series of
violent, racially-tinged wars between settlers and Indigenous nations climaxed in the third
quarter of the century, most notably the French-Iroquois wars of the 1660s, King Philip’s
War (1675-1678), and Bacon’s Rebellion (1676-1677), ensuring that the way forward
would very likely not be marked by any significant degree of native-newcomer
intermixing. In the aftermath of these conflicts, and in response to the belated realization
that the colonies might be very profitable, both French and British imperial officials took
new interest in their previously neglected colonies from the 1660s on. 9 The overall result

9

For the renaissance of imperial interest in North American holdings, see, for example,
Owen Stanwood, The Empire Reformed: English America in the Age of the Glorious
Revolution (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011); Steven Pincus, 1688:
The First Modern Revolution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011); Stephen

7
was a shift from the multi-polar political climate of the early- and mid-seventeenth
century to a world in which all political conflict—including with Indigenous nations—
was increasingly understood as part of an imperial struggle between the French and the
English.
Weaponized settlement, which understood control over settler bodies to be part of
a larger struggle for geopolitical dominance, was a vision perfectly suited to this
polarizing world. Calls to add, remove, or otherwise manipulate populations soon became
part of many British plans for seizing control of the continent. One early expression of
weaponized settlement can be found in Scottish adventurer and imperialist Samuel
Vetch’s 1709 pamphlet Canada Surveyed. Although barely a handful of European traders
and missionaries lived in the North American interior at this time, Vetch claimed that
French settlements on the Mississippi were "hemming in betwixt them and the sea all the

Saunders Webb, 1676: The End of American Independence (New York: Knopf, 1985);
Dora Mae Clark, The Rise of the British Treasury: Colonial Administration in the
Eighteenth Century (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960); William R. Miles, “The
Newfoundland Convoy, 1711,” Northern Mariner / Le Marin Du Nord 18, no. 2 (April
2008): 61–83; Douglas Bradburn, “The Visible Fist: The Chesapeake Tobacco Trade in
War and the Purpose of Empire, 1690-1715,” The William and Mary Quarterly 68, no. 3
(July 2011): 361–386; Jenny Hale Pulsipher, Subjects Unto the Same King: Indians,
English, and the Contest for Authority in Colonial New England (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005); Patricia U Bonomi, The Lord Cornbury
Scandal: The Politics of Reputation in British America (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1998); Charles McLean Andrews, The Colonial Period of American
History, vol.4, England’s Commercial and Colonial Policy (Yale University Press,
1938); Daniel O’Connor and United Society for the Propagation of the Gospel, Three
Centuries of Mission: The United Society for the Propagation of the Gospel, 1701-2000
(London: Continuum, 2000). There is comparatively less literature on an imperial turn in
the French context, but see James Pritchard, In Search of Empire: The French in the
Americas, 1670-1730 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), which, although
arguing against a coherent French imperial plan, nevertheless demonstrates increased
imperial involvement in the colonies post-1670.

8
British Empire on the Continent of America."10 Vetch argued that removing French
people and power from the continent would transform the Indigenous inhabitants of the
continent into “hundreds of nations of new subjects,” “intirely obedient” to British law.11
Nova Scotia took on new and special meanings in this era of imperial wars. On
the most basic level, it was the first French territory on the continent that the British were
able to claim as theirs by right of conquest, and only the second region conquered by
intra-European warfare after New Amsterdam a few decades before. 12 What is now Nova
Scotia and Maine had passed back and forth between the English and French several
times by the beginning of the eighteenth century. However, the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713
made British possession of the colony permanent. In European eyes, the British crown
now had de jure control of the entire eastern seaboard from the Gulf of St. Lawrence to
South Carolina.
The far northeast was also important to British planners because of where it was
on the map. Marking the division between the Atlantic coast and the Gulf of St.
Lawrence, ships headed to both New France and the northern British colonies had to pass
close to peninsular Nova Scotia. Additionally, two of the three primary overland routes
between New France and the British colonies—the Penobscot and St. Johns routes—
passed through the claim. Controlling the region, then, was seen as crucial for the safety

10

“Canada Survey’d,” pp.46-53, Samuel Vetch Letterbook, Museum of the City of New
York (hereafter Vetch Letterbook).
11
Ibid, 50-58
12
The British also claimed the region by virtue of right of discovery and royal patent;
however, as will be discussed in later chapters, the claim of right by conquest had
important repercussions for understandings of Native title in Nova Scotia.

9
of the already-established settler colonies and in order to check potential French
expansion.
In this context, British setters were also imagined as not just a way of securing
British claims, but the means by which the French would be removed. Massachusetts
governor Joseph Dudley expressed a variation of this idea, writing to the Board of Trade
in March 1709 that the British colonies
stand in need of nothing to make them such as your Lordships would have them,
but a good [defense] against the incursions of the Indians and French by land
which would be done at once by a Colony of tenn thousand North Britains, who
might peaceably enter upon a better land than their [own] with all advantages of
trade, fishing and lumber, and be in a readiness to assist the removal of the French
from Québeck and Port Royal.13
Dudley argued that this buffer colony of Scots located in Acadia would not only be
cheaper than a full-scale military force, it would achieve the same ends simply by natural
increase in a strategic location. The targeted settlement of British subjects was seen,
therefore, as the long-term, peacetime equivalent of the repeated attempts to conquer
French Canada which were the centerpiece of every imperial war from the 1690s to (in a
modified form) the American Revolution.14
In addition to its key geopolitical importance, the Dawnland was also a favored
location for settlement schemes because of its coastal nature. Observing the exploding
growth and high birth rates of their supposedly dependent colonies, as the eighteenth

13

Joseph Dudley to the Board of Trade, 1 March 1709, fol. 22, CO 5/856, The National
Archives, Kew [TNA].
14
For the evolution of this “glorious enterprise,” see W.D. Schuyler-Lighthall, The
“Glorious Enterprise:” The Plan of Campaign for the Conquest of New France; Its
Origin, History and Connection with the Invasions of Canada (Montreal: C.A. Marchand,
For the Nuministic and Antiquarian Society of Montreal, 1902).

10
century wore on some officials in Great Britain began to fear that the colonies would
threaten the preeminence of the British Isles or even become independent. In this context,
attempting to keep settlement confined to the coasts where settlers could theoretically be
better controlled by an Atlantic economy and political network became an increasingly
popular proposal through the middle of the eighteenth century. In the late 1740s, for
instance, one author expressed anxiety that
The British Empire in America is of that large extent, already settled so many
Leagues backwards from the Coast; daily encreasing and emproveing, by the
Numbers yearly born there, and by new Settlers from Europe, that it is become of
the utmost Consequences to regulate them, that they may be usefull to, & not rival
in Power and Trade their Mother Kingdom. 15
Within this framework, the “empty” coastal lands in what is now northern New England
and the Canadian Atlantic Provinces took on especial importance as an appropriate place
to channel colonial growth and European emigration.

The issue, from 1710 on, was that the British had no de facto control over the
region.
For most of the period covered in this dissertation, the far northeast had more in common
with better-studied interior areas such as the Pays d’en Haut or the Ohio Country. The
power players were, as they had been for centuries, Indigenous polities, and Europeans
could only operate successfully by negotiating with them. As historian Jeffers Lennox
has argued, to discuss Nova Scotia and Acadia in the eighteenth century – and, I would
add, the Sagadahock Country and most of the Province of Maine – “is to engage in an act

15

“Some Considerations relating to the present Condition of the Plantations,” n.d. [c. late
1740s], fols. 313-317, CO 5/5, TNA.

11
of imagination.” 16 In practice, deep into the eighteenth century, the region was much
more accurately described as Mawooshen, Peskotomuhkatik, Wolastokuk, Mi’kma’ki,
Panawahpskek, the land of Kluskap, and other Wabanaki names for their homelands that
have since been lost.
A few words, then, about the Indigenous political landscape in the far northeast.
Following noted University of Pennsylvania anthropologist Frank Speck, many historians
have understood the region south of the US-Canada border and north of the Piscataqua
River to be home to a series of independent bands defined by, and named for, their
residence in different river valleys, such as the Penobscot, Passamaquoddy, and
Kennebec. 17 Many historians also recognize a division between Eastern and Western
Abenakis; however, just which groups are "eastern" and which "western" seems to
change from scholar to scholar, as do the names and locations of nations. This in part
reflects the fragmentary nature of the evidence, but the lack of consensus about tribal and
ethnic divisions make the landscape difficult to understand. 18
Although the division still appears in many monographs, specialist work since the
late 1980s has rejected the Eastern/Western Abenaki division and instead sought to
rehabilitate the early ethnographic writings of Samuel de Champlain. In the early

16

Jeffers Lennox, Homelands and Empires: Indigenous Spaces, Imperial Fictions, And
Competition for Territory in Northeastern North America, 1690-1763 (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2017), 3.
17
This is, for example, the approach taken in Bruce Trigger, ed., Handbook of North
American Indians, vol. 15, Northeast (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1978).
18
Emerson W. Baker and John G. Reid, “Amerindian Power in the Early Modern
Northeast: A Reappraisal,” William & Mary Quarterly 61, no. 1 (January 2004): 79 n9;
Emerson W. Baker, “Finding the Almouchiquois: Native American Families, Territories,
and Land Sales in Southern Maine,” Ethnohistory 51, no. 1 (Winter 2004): 73–74.

12
seventeenth century, Champlain described the inhabitants of the Wabanakiak as being
part of three major ethnic groups: the horticultural Almouchiquois west of the Kennebec,
the Etchemin between the Kennebec and the St. John, and the Souriquois east of the St.
John and into modern Nova Scotia.19 While the Souriquois are generally assumed to be
synonymous with the Mi'kmaq, the identity of the Etchemin and Almouchiquois has
proved more contentious. Bruce Bourque argues that most of the river-based bands in
Maine and New Brunswick described by Speck and others were Etchemins who had
moved in response to European incursions, and that the term "Abenaki" originally
referred to a distinct group of people who lived in the interior.20 Emerson Baker attempts
to sort out the even more mysterious Almouchiquois, using land deeds to argue that they
were indeed an ethnic group that lived between the Kennebec and Cape Anne through at
least the late seventeenth century.21 While these approaches have great promise for
reinterpreting ethnic formations and re-formations in the northeast, they have not made
much headway in the more general literature, which tends to still describe northern New
England's native people as either all Abenakis or autonomous residents of different river
valleys. 22
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The ethnographic confusion evident in the literature on southern Wabanakiak
stands in contrast to work focused on modern Atlantic Canada, where ethnic lines are
perceived to be stable and clearly drawn. The communities living in the St. John River
Valley are always described as Maliseet or Wolastoqiyik (the term preferred by the
modern First Nations community and now widely used by Atlantic Canadian scholars). 23
The people to the Northeast are Mi'kmaq. 24 Building on late nineteenth century
ethnographic work among Mi’kmaq by missionaries Silas Tertius Rand and Father
Pacifique, Mi'kma'ki, the land of the Mi'kmaq, is often described as constituting a series
of autonomous districts united under a Grand Chief. 25 This district organization is
accepted by many specialists, and finds support in documents produced by Europeans
from the seventeenth and eighteenth century. 26 Recent work by Trudy Sable, Bernie
Francis, and Roger Lewis suggests that the districts system which was effectively
codified by the late nineteenth century reflected earlier divisions based on important
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drainage systems and resource extraction areas, much like what has been proposed for
their cousins to the south in modern Maine. Despite this evidence that Mi’kmaw political
life was, in normal times, much more centered on smaller geographic units, the use of the
blanket term Mi’kmaq to describe all the region’s inhabitants has the effect of making the
ethnic and political organization of northern Wabanakiak seem much more settled and
orderly than in the south, further reifying the modern border.

Figure 1. Map of traditional districts of Mi'kma'ki. (From Sable and Francis, The Language of
This Land, 21.)
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Figure 2. Map of Wabanaki homelands. Map by Stephen Bicknell, Department of Anthropology,
University of Maine.

Taken as a whole, then, the evidence seems to suggest that the most immediately
relevant community beyond the level of the family for most Wabanaki people was
centered on a particular river or drainage system, and that these communities and,
particularly, their leaders, were what interloping Anglo-Americans identified as “tribes,”
“nations,” and “chiefs” on first encounter. Following literature on the Mi’kmaq, this
dissertation will refer to these groupings as districts, a term meant to imply both a certain
level of political cohesiveness and their potential to belong to much larger ethnic and
political groupings. At one point, these smaller nations may have identified themselves
with the three broader ethnic groupings identified by Champlain; in the case of the
Mi’kmaq, this identification intensified, and continued on to the present day. While
perhaps belonging to the early contact groups referred to by Champlain’s guides as the
Almouchiquois and Etchemin, the Kennebec, Penobscot, Passamaquoddy, and Maliseet/
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Wolastoqiyik have tended to either be addressed on a district level or lumped together
under the heading of Eastern Abenakis or Wabanakis. Re-drawing the map of
Wabanakiak to highlight the districts on both sides of the modern border will help
address some of the issues introduced by the modern historiography and provide a more
accurate framework through which to understand the complexities of politics, geography,
and community in Wabanakiak (see figure 3).

Figure 3. Unified map of Wabanakiak, c.1750. By author.

The districts, shaped as they were by geography and resource availability, were
not the only way Wabanaki people organized themselves, nor were they in any way
static. Like many other Algonquian-speaking peoples, the Wabanaki communities of the
far northeast in the early era of European interaction had elastic political traditions and
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multiple sources of power which facilitated a great deal of mobility within and across
districts. Individuals, families, and whole communities drew on carefully cultivated
kinship connections and physical mobility to form (and dissolve) larger political
confederacies as needed, cross ethnic and national boundaries, and claim multiple
identities for themselves in ways which baffled and frustrated European observers. In
1793, John Allan, who had been Superintendent of Indian Affairs for the Americans
during the Revolution, reported that
you'll see families in the course of a year, go through the greater part of this extent
[Wabanakiak]. This of course brings on a nearer connection by intermarriages,
which has now become universal…so much that I well know, numbers whom I
had in the war are now residing in Canada and other distant parts, and many from
thence now living at St Johns, Passamaquoddy, and Penobscot: thus connected,
there is no distinction in the right on the several hunting grounds, for all by some
lye or other have an equal claim, are full domesticated as if natives of the
district 27
As Allan suggests, the connections between the different communities of Wabanakiak
were made closer by the shared experience of war and settler encroachment that
characterized the eighteenth century. What Allan saw, however, drew on a much longer
tradition of political mobility and strategies of incorporation evident from the earliest
records we have for Wabanaki people. 28
The best example of larger-than-district confederacies in Wabanakiak comes from
Mi’kma’ki, where modern Mi’kmaw communities continue to recognize both the
autonomy of individual districts and the overall authority of the Grand Chief located in
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Cape Breton. On an even larger scale, the period covered by this dissertation marks the
rise of the illusive “Wabanaki Confederacy,” a broad umbrella under which the otherwise
autonomous groups known to the English as Kennebecs, Penobscots, Passamaquoddies,
Wolastoqiyik/Maliseet, and Mi’kmaq came together as a single unit. The confederacy is
well documented in the nineteenth century; whether it existed in the seventeenth and
eighteenth century has been debated. However, at least by the 1760s, there is ample
evidence that Wabanaki leaders and households were regularly meeting in the St. John
River Valley and elsewhere, and Allan’s testimony in the 1780s and 1790s suggests that
he saw the Native communities from Nova Scotia to Massachusetts as acting more or less
in harmony, or at least in regular conversation.
Evidence of many other Wabanaki confederacies, however, can also be found.
Records from the early seventeenth century suggest that communities in the Saco,
Kennebec, and Penobscot districts were united in a confederacy under a figure named or
titled Bashabes, and that the land of the confederacy was known as Mawooshen or
Maosson. 29 Within a few generations, however, Mawooshen had collapsed. It was
replaced by smaller political units, but dominated by the figure of Madockawando, who,
although he appears to have been from Machias or Passamaquoddy, had his seat of power
at Penobscot. 30 Although his confederacy does not seem to have been as extensive as
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Mawooshen, he had strong ties in the Kennebec and Passamaquoddy districts and, at least
for a time, commanded considerable respect. What can be reconstructed of
Madockawando’s career is also illustrative of the limits of Wabanaki sachems. Like
leaders in most North American Indigenous communities, Wabanaki sachems held power
at the sufferance of their communities. In 1694, after he signed off on a massive land
grant without the consent of his community, Madockawando swiftly fell from power and
was forced to retire to Wulustuk, where he died four years later. 31 Later in the eighteenth
century, leaders in Penobscot continued to try to act as the speakers for other Wabanaki
districts, particularly Kennebec, although the existence of a formal confederation is
unsure.
The modern US-Canada border has also made an outsized impression on the
general historiography on the eighteenth-century far northeast. Indeed, the literatures on
New England and the Canadian Maritimes are almost entirely separate from one another,
and works tend to anachronistically confine themselves to one side of the border or the
other. This is further complicated by the fact that the region as a whole has been
neglected by the national historiographies of both Canada and the United States. Nova
Scotia and Maine are often mere footnotes in larger synthetic works on eighteenth
century history.
Within the specialized literature on Nova Scotia, little attention has been paid to
efforts to settle the province with white Protestants prior to 1780s. Most work on the
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eighteenth century has focused on two main topics. There is a robust literature on the
French Acadians, their social history, and their tragic deportation. This literature,
understandably, focuses on the pre-1755 era and emphasizes the isolated nature of
Acadian life on the one hand and conflicts with the British government after 1710 on the
other. 32 The second major body of work, much of it now fairly old, focuses on the arrival
of the American loyalists, who dramatically changed the demographics of the province. 33
Recent work, particularly by Jeffers Lennox, has brought much-needed attention to
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interactions between Indigenous peoples and European governments in Nova Scotia. 34
However, Lennox’s book ends just as efforts to settle the province with Protestants began
in earnest.
Other than studies of the loyalists, then, there has been surprisingly little detailed
work on British expansion or settlement in the region, particularly in the middle part of
the eighteenth century. Perhaps the most developed literature is that on the so-called
“New England Planters” of Nova Scotia, roughly 8,000 migrants who arrived in the
province between 1759 and 1761. This historiography, however, is largely limited to the
proceedings of six conferences, published between 1988 and 2012 as edited volumes. 35
Unsurprisingly, given the genre, the studies are narrowly defined—if often very rich—
case studies focusing on specific townships and families. As a result, while much has
been published on the social history of New England transplants in the 1760s, there are
almost no modern monographs or attempts to place them more systematically into their
broader imperial world. The two major books on the Planter era that are still often cited
in synthetic works today, John Bartlett Brebner’s Neutral Yankees and Gordon Stewart
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and George Rawlyk’s A People Highly Favored of God, are both significantly out of date
and have been largely discredited by modern experts. 36
Settlement in Maine, on the other hand, is barely accounted for outside of town
histories. While forthcoming works address settlement and expansion in what became
Maine up to the outbreak of the Seven Years’ War, and Alan Taylor’s Liberty Men and
Great Proprietors remains the standard work for the post-Revolutionary period, almost
no detailed work on the crucial middle period of the 1760s and early 1770s has been
published. 37 The greatest exception—as well as one of the only works to explicitly put
Maine and Nova Scotia into conversation in these years—is Elizabeth Mancke’s Fault
Lines of Empire.38 Mancke argues that structural elements in the founding of Nova Scotia
and Massachusetts in some ways predestined Nova Scotia’s loyalty in the later eighteenth
century. While her case studies are useful and her conclusions are provocative, Mancke’s
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comparative approach obscures the many connections between the two regions and is
generally uninterested in the role of Native people.
Those connections and the centrality of Native peoples provide the analytical
framework for what follows. Chapter One, “Inventing Nova Scotia,” discusses attempts
to transform the rickety seventeenth-century European idea of a colony into robust
reality. As historians such as John Reid and Emerson Baker have argued, the far northeast
in the seventeenth century stands out as an example of European failure in what is
otherwise understood as an era of relentless colonization. 39 I argue, however, that these
failures paradoxically made later European claims more potent and enabled the beginning
of actual European political control. Charles I’s 1621 grant of “Nova Scotia” to William
Alexander, for example, was almost immediately an abject failure and produced no
lasting settlements or any meaningful Scottish/English presence in the region. However,
the mere fact that the grant had been made allowed the English and, later, British to stake
a claim to the region that was understood and accepted by other Europeans. The skeletons
of failed projects were, as the eighteenth century progressed, re-imagined into a narrative
of unbroken European control.
This narrative of failure masquerading as success continued in the decades
immediately following the so-called British conquest of Acadia in 1710. Despite the
theoretical removal of French power — which had long been blamed for the feeble state
of the northern Massachusetts settlements in what is now Maine — European settlement
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made few if any advancements into the Dawnland. Outside of the Acadian heartland,
where French Catholic settlers made moderate gains in population and territory, no new
land came into practical European control until perhaps the 1740s. Indeed, in Maine,
settlers were unable to even reclaim old seventeenth century borders until the 1720s. As
had been the case for centuries, actual on-the-ground power remained with Wabanaki
people, who made clear the extent to which they would tolerate Euramerican settlement
and effectively policed those boundaries.
Tensions between British pretentions to settler domination and the realities of
Wabanaki power came to a head in 1722. The conflict known variously as “Dummer’s
War,” “Father Rale’s War,” or simply “the Fourth Anglo-Abenaki War” engulfed the
whole region from New Hampshire to Nova Scotia. This is commonly understood to
mark the end of Wabanaki power in Massachusetts territory. 40 While this argument holds
some weight with the benefit of hindsight, at the time the peace treaty which ended the
war was interpreted by Wabanaki nations throughout the region as a recognition of prewar boundaries and a promise that the British would not make new settlements in
Wabanaki territory without their explicit consent.
Practical Wabanaki control of the boundaries of Euramerican settlement, then,
continued to be the norm in the far northeast for decades following the British acquisition
of the territory from the French. By the 1740s, it was clear to British officials that the
process of “natural” expansion — a process akin to what we might now define as settler
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colonialism — was not working in the territories of Maine and Nova Scotia. If a
significant European settler presence was desired, the state would need to take on a far
more direct role. In Chapter Two, “The Halifax Plan,” I argue that this is precisely what
happened. During the War of the Austrian Succession (1740–1748), New England forces
(raised largely by Maine landowners) captured the supposedly impregnable fortress town
of Louisbourg. The peace treaty that ended the war, however, returned the fortress and
the colony of Ile Royale (modern Cape Breton) to the French. The Nova Scotian
peninsula had always been considered a strategic asset in the colonial wars between Great
Britain and France, and the gain and loss of Louisbourg was a potent reminder of this
fact.
Newly aware both of the importance of the far northeast and their practical
inability to control it, members of the planning class — a hodgepodge of London-based
officials, colonial government functionaries, and aspiring land barons — dramatically
increased efforts to promote settlement. Unprecedented amounts of public money poured
into schemes meant to bring settlers from Europe and the other North American colonies
and place them in areas of strategic import. The most grandiose of these plans was that
spearheaded by Board of Trade president George Montagu Dunk, the Second Earl of
Halifax. Drawing on ideas that had been circulating through London and New England
for some time, Halifax proposed transforming Nova Scotia by directly recruiting 2,000–
5,000 Germans and New Englanders and transporting them to the colony. In addition to
founding a new capital town on the Atlantic coast, these settlers would also be
strategically seeded among Acadian populations.
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Halifax and the other planners of this era operated under the assumption that once
a critical mass of loyal settlers had been placed in a given territory, the “natural”
settlement patterns of the southern colonies would be replicated. Through high birth rates
and intermarriage, Protestant settlers would quickly overwhelm French and Native
inhabitants, and transform the problematic regions of Nova Scotia and Maine into secure,
governable colonies without the expense of war. This scheme of weaponized settlement
met with fierce resistance from Wabanaki people, who saw it as an illegal violation of
Dummer’s Treaty. Penobscots and their allies in Maine largely continued to use the
containment strategies they had been using since the 1720s, targeting settler homes and
livestock rather than people, and complaining directly to the General Court in Boston. In
Nova Scotia, however, Mi’kmaw people took up arms almost immediately, preventing
the full execution of Halifax’s plan and limiting new British settlement to the new capital
at Halifax and the small German town of Lunenburg.
French-backed Wabanaki resistance to the Halifax plan, as well as parallel efforts
by some French colonial officials to use the same logic of weaponized settlement against
the British, fed directly into the massive conflagration that was the Seven Years’ War.
The balance of power in the region was forever changed by the removal of the French
political presence. The deportation of the French Acadian population beginning in 1755
reflected British frustrations with their inability to fully enact the Halifax plan, turning to
weaponized removal when settlement failed to work. These two factors upended
Wabanaki politics and rendered many of their traditional strategies of settler management
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untenable. What was worse, the near constant warfare from 1740-1760, combined with a
catastrophic outbreak of smallpox, left them weaker than they had been in a century.
I explore the aftermath of the Seven Years’ war from the perspective of Wabanaki
country in Chapter Three, “The Invasion of the Dawnland.”. Although now emphasizing
government-subsidized land companies instead of direct settler recruitment, efforts to
enact the Halifax plan continued after the final capture of Louisbourg in 1759. New
waves of settlers poured into the Dawnland, largely recruited from New England but also
from the middle colonies and England. These new incursions extended significantly
beyond 1725 borders in both Maine and Nova Scotia. Wabanaki people, lacking the
support they had once received from the French and badly weakened by warfare and
disease, were forced into new treaties that did not protect old boundaries. Penobscot and
Passamaquoddy people were subject to a direct “conquest,” which Massachusetts
officials interpreted as a total forfeiture of their land rights. Faced with these challenges,
Wabanaki nations engaged in new debates over political realignment in their efforts to
find new ways to manage an old problem.
Chapters Four and Five examine these same crucial years from the perspective of
colonial and imperial planners and officials. New questions about what a post-1763 North
American empire should look like re-opened old fissures between the government in
London on the one hand and colonial people on the other. Nova Scotia, as a strategically
valuable region that the Board of Trade was actively promoting, became a flashpoint of
opposing ideas about governance, settlement, and the balance of power. Chapter Four,
“Contesting the Imperial Future in the Great Nova Scotian Land Boom,” explores these
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dynamics. As the Board of Trade turned the project of settlement over to private
companies, there soon emerged a split between companies who sought to develop Nova
Scotian land along the lines of the southern settler colonies and those who instead looked
to re-create a feudal hierarchy. As champions of an empire of small freeholders and one
of baronial landlords clashed, Nova Scotia — with its history of direct imperial
management and a government propped up entirely by parliamentary funds — became a
stand-in for everything that now seemed corrupt and problematic in the era of the
Imperial Crisis. Directly sponsored settlement, once a way to bring the colony in line
with a settler colonial vision, was now seen as an unnatural intervention and even a threat
to colonial liberties.
Clashes between imperial and colonial governments also manifested in a revived
conflict over who controlled the region between the Penobscot and St. Croix rivers,
explored in chapter five, “Crown v. Colony: Struggle in the Sagadahock.” This region
was claimed by both Massachusetts and Nova Scotia. A series of land surveys in the
mid-1760s compounded the issue. Perhaps intentionally guided by Passamaquoddy
leaders, Massachusetts and Nova Scotia developed opposing official opinions on the
location of the St. Croix River, leaving a the 35-mile stretch of coastline and several large
islands that were most actively used by both Passamaquoddy inhabitants and
Euramerican fishers in an administrative gray zone. As tensions between the Crown and
the province of Massachusetts increased, the Board of Trade and others explored ways to
stymie Massachusetts settlement efforts and wrest control of the Sagadahock from the
hands of the troublesome colony. These efforts culminated in the short-lived colony of
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New Ireland, the first imagined loyalist colony, created and abandoned within the years
of the American Revolution.
Chapter six, “Loyalist Colonies and Native Dispossession,” explores the
aftermath of this conflict in terms of its effect on both Wabanaki sovereignty and the
politics of weaponized settlement that had dominated the region for the proceeding seven
decades. Taking advantage of the thousands of loyalist refugees who had been promised
re-settlement, the Halifax plan — although no longer understood as such — was finally
completed, as new settlements sprang up and the demographic balance of Nova Scotia
finally tipped in favor of Euramerican settlers. Faced with both a lack of outside
European allies and Euramerican monopolization of coastal resources, Mi’kmaw people
were forced into a new position of dependence. This was compounded by an informal
government policy of neglect, as the government at Halifax proceeded to almost entirely
ignore the presence of Indigenous peoples until the outbreak of the Napoleonic wars.
Perhaps the most striking example of British manipulation of loyalist refugees to
attain geopolitical ends occurred in the Sagadahock territory, where settler families were
used to forcibly remove the confusion that had dominated the previous decades. Because
no European powers could agree on where the agreed border at the St. Croix river
actually was, British officials were able to determine its location by building a large town
on the east bank of the Schoodic river within three months of the Treaty of Paris. Once
the settlement of St. Andrews was laid out and occupied, there was practically nothing
that American or Passamaquoddy negotiators could do to move it without re-opening
military action. This move was also possible by cynical British manipulation of a
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leadership dispute within the Passamaquoddy nation, courting an exiled claimant to the
sachemship to essentially dispossess the Passamaquoddy of their most important
waterway and split their land between two different countries. The eighteenth century,
then, ended with the fulfillment of the dreams British planners had begun the century
with: settler dominance of the northeast, and a successful enactment of weaponized
settlement for geopolitical ends. The cost had been the majority of their North American
empire. For Wabanaki people, it had been far higher.

31
Chapter One: Inventing Nova Scotia
Nova Scotia was invented in 1621. In that year, William Alexander, First Earl of
Stirling, obtained a grant from King James covering all the land northeast of
Passamaquoddy Bay, from the Atlantic coast to the Gulf of St. Lawrence. In the formal
Latin of early modern European power, the grant declared that the region “shall in all
future time bear the name of New Scotland [Novae Scotiae] in America.” These vast
lands, which held not a single individual or family that swore fealty to the Scottish or
English crown, and that no one involved in the grant had ever laid eyes on, was erected
into a barony and attached to the county of Edinburgh. Four years later, James’ son King
Charles I granted the barony an official coat of arms: the red and yellow lion of the
Scottish royal arms in the center of the blue and white cross of St. Andrew, supported by
the Scottish unicorn and an equally fantastical representation of a Native American man.
The name, the coat of arms, and the rough geographical outlines have persisted. New
Scotland’s crest, unchanged since the early seventeenth century, now greets visitors to the
modern Canadian province of Nova Scotia on the official flag and government buildings,
not to mention all manner of souvenir merchandise from mugs to stuffed lobsters. The
casual observer could be forgiven for interpreting this as an unbroken history of
Hibernian-flavored European dominance over the region, stretching from the early
seventeenth century to the modern era.
Yet Alexander’s attempt at to actually make good on his grant by transporting
settlers was an immediate and complete failure.41 Early English colonization attempts in
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the Dawnland met the same fate, transforming the Atlantic coastline into a graveyard of
colonial ambition.42 Indeed, using the other North American colonies as a model,
historian John G. Reid has described the far Northeast in the period before 1690 as “an
example of European failure in America.”43
This seventeenth century pre-history of European power in the Dawnland,
however, had a surprisingly potent afterlife. The claims and counter-claims made by
Europeans—many of whom never stepped foot in the region—had very little effect on
life on the ground in Wabanakiak other than providing new, short term, opportunities for
trade. But as Europeans gained more and more power through the following century,
these old borders and assertions began to take on meanings they never had at the time
they had been granted. The existence of these old and practically meaningless claims
allowed European colonizers to give legitimacy to their actions, transmuting a legacy of
failure and Native dominance into an unbroken history of European control.
Nevertheless, the period immediately after the capitulation of Acadia in 1710
must have looked, initially, like a repeat of recent history. Despite high hopes, plans, and
significant financial outlay, Anglo-Americans were unable to successfully colonize any
additional Wabanaki territory until perhaps the 1740s; indeed, in what is now Maine,
settlers lost significant amounts of previously-claimed territory and were unable to reclaim seventeenth-century borders until the late 1720s. 44 But these failures masked an
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unprecedented level of interest in transporting Protestant settlers to the far northeast. In
parlors in Boston and London, groups of businessmen and politicians remained
convinced that transforming greater Nova Scotia into a settler colony was both practical
and beneficial. In Massachusetts, seventeenth century claims were revived and combined
to create land companies laying claim to hundreds of acres of land, which would persist
into the nineteenth century. In London, the Board of Trade wrote memorials and actively
solicited plans for the settlement of Nova Scotia, presenting it as a cornerstone of
imperial policy. Both these groups engaged with ideas about weaponized settlement,
either as the reason to great new settlements of Protestants or as a justification. While
they were by and large unsuccessful in the face of powerful Native coalitions and
political intransigence, these efforts laid the material and ideological groundwork for the
swell of projects beginning in the 1740s.

The Dawnland was one of the earliest sites of European-Indigenous contact and
negotiation. European fishers are well documented in the area by the sixteenth century,
with some suggestion that the fishery could even predate Columbus’ voyages. 45 As the
age of European trade slowly transformed into an age of European colonization, the
Dawnland remained a focus. Both the French and English attempted early colonies there,
and a permanent—if feeble—French presence in the region was established by the second
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decade of the seventeenth century. It remained a key region as warfare between European
powers became endemic in the latter part of that century, and the European colonial
construct variously known as Nova Scotia and Acadia changed hands on paper multiple
times before the final paper conquest of 1710. Although types and frequency of contact
varied from region to region, by the eighteenth century Wabanaki people in general
should be thought of as savvy political actors, familiar with Europeans and their ways
and already experienced with European forms of land transfer and trade.
Wabanaki people were also well familiar with short-lived European settlements.
Stirling’s abortive effort was simply one of many. An English settlement at the mouth of
the Kennebec River known as the Sagadahock or Popham Colony barely lasted a year,
from 1607-1608.46 Most early settlements, however, were French. For example, in 1604,
Passamaquoddy Bay was the site of one of the first French overwintering settlements in
the Americas under an expedition led by Pierre Dugua, Sieur de Mons and Samuel de
Champlain, the founder of Québec. They named the island they camped on that first
winter “St. Croix,” either as a reflection of the cross-shaped conjunction of the rivers
around it or as a reflection on the party’s hopes of using the site as a base for converting
the local population. The French quickly abandoned the island, however, after a
disastrous winter the left nearly half the colonists dead. 47
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The longer-lived French effort at Port Royal on the Bay of Fundy was somewhat
more successful, and laid the foundation for the French colony of Acadia. However, it
was frequently abandoned during the seventeenth century, first in 1607, and then again in
1613 after a raid from Virginia led by Samuel Argall. 48 The site was still uninhabited by
the time Alexander’s handful of settlers arrived there in 1628. 49 The French reclaimed the
site in 1632, but a short-sighted decision to divide the territory and install two new
governors led quickly civil war. One of the two governors, Charles St-Étienne de La
Tour, counterintuitively turned to the English for support. As a result, in 1643, Port Royal
was attacked again, this time by a joint company of French and Massachusetts soldiers. 50
Much more successful than the creation of permanent settlements was the creation
of trading zones. Thomas Temple, an Englishmen from a minor aristocratic family, took
advantage of the fractured Acadian political situation in the 1650s to obtain a grant
endorsed by both Oliver Cromwell and the geopolitically flexible de La Tour to the
whole of Acadia in 1656.51 Interestingly, the grant defined Acadia as only the western
part of the peninsula, from Meriligouche (modern Lunenburg) through to Penobscot Bay
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and 100 leagues inland, leaving out the western half of the peninsula and Cape Breton
entirely. Clearly written only with trade and military defense in mind, the grant did not
mention settlers, and focused primarily on ensuring that Temple and his colleagues would
be solely financially responsible for the territory and that any furs and other trade goods
they acquired would be sent directly to England. 52
Temple and his associate William Crowne attempted to make good on this grant.
They divided Acadia into two broad spheres of influence, Temple theoretically
controlling the Nova Scotian South Shore and Bay of Fundy to the St. George River, and
Crowne taking the area around Penobscot Bay. Temple, however, secured the
governorship of the colony from the Protectorate. Temple, already in financial disarray at
the time of the grant, was unable to leverage this grant into any kind of monetary gain. In
true seventeenth-century fashion, his claim was also not free from competitors, even
coming from the same source. Boston merchant Thomas Breeden, who had acted as
Temple’s agent in London during the Protectorate, acquired a commission for the
governorship of the province from Charles II shortly after the restoration, much to
Temple’s chagrin.53 Temple was able to have this decision reversed, but he faced
additional competition from the Kirke and Alexander heirs of the New Scotland project

52

Reid, Acadia, Maine, and New Scotland, 137. Reid identifies this as the moment when
“Acadia” and “Nova Scotia” became separate geographical concepts in the English
world.
53
Commission to Thomas Breedon, 4 Dec 1661, no.92, CO 1/15, TNA. For Breedon as
Temple’s agent, see for example Thomas Temple, “Instructions given unto Capt Thomas
Breedon…” 27 Dec 1658, no.60, CO 1/13, TNA.

37
and others.54 Temple’s fortunes were permanently sunk when Acadia was turned back
over to the French after the Treaty of Breda in 1667. 55
Temple’s claim, however, continued on through his nephew John Nelson.
Ignoring the stipulations of the treaty — or perhaps taking a gamble on the political
fluidity of the northeast — Temple had appointed Nelson, aged only 16, as his Deputy
Governor in 1670.56 Although he had lost a great deal of money in Nova Scotia, Temple
had never been there, and had rather quickly settled into life as a Bostonian, content to
make whatever money he was able to by the sale of trading and fishing rights to New
Englanders. Nelson, on the other hand, grew up to be a decidedly more swashbuckling
figure and seems to have had far more practical experience in the Dawnland. Born in
London to Temple’s sister Mary and Robert Nelson, John Nelson immigrated to
Massachusetts around the time he was made Temple’s deputy. Just four years later,
Temple died, leaving Nelson as his heir.57
During these same years, New Englanders and other Europeans began to create
new settlements in what is now New Hampshire and Southern Maine that had more
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staying power than the Popham Colony. Most of this settlement was concentrated in
around the Piscataqua river, where Native populations had been decimated by the same
epidemics that had transformed Wampanoag and Massachusett country into graveyards.
Some isolated families and small fishing communities, however, could be found in the
Kennebec district and as far north as Casco Bay. By 1691, Massachusetts had formally
annexed the colony of Maine, a political situation that continued, with few disruptions,
until Maine was granted statehood in 1820. Following the Treaty of Breda, there was also
a significant expansion of French settlement in peninsular Nova Scotia. This period saw
the arrival of the seed population that was, in time, to become the distinct cultural group,
the Acadians. In the absence of strong control over their colonies from either England or
France, New Englanders and Acadians quickly created deep, and lopsided, economic
bonds as Boston, not Québec, emerged as their main commercial locus. 58
Nelson was keen to use his uncle’s grant to take full advantage of this emerging
economic partnership. While his activities between 1670 and 1682 are obscure, it is clear
he spent that period building strong financial and political connections in Acadia. In
1682, Nelson was even given authority by Acadian governor Michel Leneuf de la
Vallière to sell fishing licenses. 59 Initially, officials in Boston saw his strong ties to the
French in as an asset. Nelson, for example, was sent by Massachusetts to Québec in 1682
to address complaints made by Canadian Governor-General Louis de Buade, comte de
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Frontenac, over the activities of New England fishermen in theoretically French waters. 60
Nelson’s ability to navigate between New England and Acadia was ideally suited to the
1670s and early 1680s. As Owen Stanwood has argued, however, the later 1680s were
characterized by increasing anti-French and anti-Catholic feeling within the colonies, and
this friendly, trade-based relationship among the European inhabitants of the Dawnland
was eroding quickly.61
Alongside the slow boil of anti-Catholic sentiment that presaged the age of
imperial wars to come, the 1670s and 80s saw the beginnings of another theme that
would characterize the political state of the Dawnland for the next century: conflict
between colonial and imperial claims to control the northeast. In 1674, Charles II—either
forgetting or not particularly caring about his previous confirmation of Temple’s right,
not to mention the claims of the Alexander heirs—had granted the region between the
Kennebec and St. Croix, a region known to the English as the Sagadahock Country, to his
younger brother James, Duke of York. It was only the northeasternmost part of a massive
grant to James, whose new proprietary also included the former Dutch colony of New
Netherland, present-day Delaware, and the islands off the coast of Massachusetts.
Following the revocation of Massachusetts’ charter, the tie between New York and the
far northeast was further strengthened when, in 1686, the colonies of New England were
merged with New York to form the ill-fated Dominion of New England. Edmund
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Andros, the governor of the new Dominion and former governor of New York, was eager
to extend control over the disputed region east of New Hampshire and enforce his vision
of imperial management to a region that had effectively been self-governed for the
proceeding half century. 62
Tensions between the Duke of York and Nelson grant began even before the
creation of the Dominion. In 1683, a rumor was floating around the northeast that, during
his trip to Québec, Nelson had been given a commission by Frontenac not just to trade,
but to settle the Sagadahock Country. Alarmed, New York governor Thomas Dongan
wrote a sternly written letter to Nelson asserting his own jurisdiction as the leading
official in the Duke’s proprietary lands. Claiming that he could “scarcely believe such a
report,” he ordered Nelson to desist immediately. Dongan asserted that he had employed
people already to address the issue of populating the far northeast with Englishmen. His
obvious concern that a settlement at Sagadahock under Nelson would negatively affect
his efforts speaks to the perception that, at least where the far northeast was concerned,
settlers were a zero-sum game, and settlement needed to be tightly controlled to ensure
that new families arrived—and stayed—in the proper places. 63
The capitulation of Port Royal in 1710, then, came at a time when the far
northeast had begun integration into a British Atlantic market economy, but all efforts at
settlement by Europeans had been either abject failures or only modest successes. Indeed,
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transforming the Dawnland into a Protestant bulwark was not the original reason for the
war that ultimately brought Acadia under de jure British control. The men responsible for
the North American theatre of the War of Spanish Succession had little interest in the far
northeast at all. The expeditions planned by Samuel Vetch and Francis Nicolson were
originally planned to conquer all of French Canada and extend to “the southern parts of
the continent.”64 The 1709 plan didn’t even target Acadia; instead, a land force was to
march north to Montreal from Albany, while a naval expedition from Boston was to sail
at the same time for Québec. 65
The “glorious enterprises” against Canada and Acadia planned during Queen
Anne’s War were pitched as a kind of colonial war to end all wars. 66 In a letter to the
governor of Connecticut, for example, Vetch and Nicholson wrote that “driv[ing] the
French wholly out of the continent of America” would “deliver you for-ever from the
calamity of war.” 67 Although statements such as these are often interpreted in narrowly
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political ways as a desire to remove the French imperial apparatus from power,
contemporaries also clearly understood the removal of the French would require both
military and settler power. In the early stages of planning what was hoped would be a
general invasion of New France, for example, Massachusetts governor Joseph Dudley
wrote to the Board of Trade that all the colonies north of Pennsylvania needed to thrive
was “a good [defense] against the incursions of the Indians and French by land that
would be done at once by a Colony of tenn thousand North Britains.” 68
Dudley may have gotten this idea from Scottish transplant Vetch. In his Canada
Surveyed, written to persuade the British government to support an expedition against the
French, Vetch argued that the best way to hold on to conquered French territory would be
to deport French settlers. In their place, Vetch suggested his own countrymen, arguing
that Canada would be “a noble colony exactly calculate[sic] for the constitutions and
genius of the most northern of the North Brittains.” 69 1709 also saw one of the first
actual experiments in the creation of the kind of buffer colony called for by Dudley and
Vetch, when 600 largely German-speaking “Palatines” were resettled in the Hudson
River Valley. In promoting this project, the Board of Trade expressed its hope that the
new settlers would be
a good barrier between Her Majesty’s subjects and the French & their Indians in
those parts, and in process of time by intermarrying with the neighbouring Indians
(as the French do) they may be capable of rendering very great service to Her
Majesty’s subjects there 70
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This language of French displacement and Native amelioration through the importation
of appropriate bodies, therefore, ran through the entire project of invading Canada and
Acadia and was already deeply embedded in the minds of imperial planners.
The grand plans of 1709, however, were not to be. The land forces did march
from New York, but they became bogged down in the mud in the upper Hudson. Then,
the fleet that had been promised for the naval attack on Québec was diverted to Portugal.
Suddenly, Vetch and Nicholson found themselves downgraded to an attack on Acadia. 71
The loss of the troops in New York and the lateness of the season then postponed even
this exploit to the next year.72 The failure of the 1709 expedition was serious enough that
not even the spectacle of the visit to London of the so-called “Four Indian Kings”—
actually three Mohawks and a Mahican sympathetic to Protestantism and the British—
could get the full expedition re-approved for 1710. 73
Chastened, downsized, and pushed dangerously late in the year, the Acadian
expedition, began with a whimper in late September of 1710. Although it was
significantly less glorious than Vetch had initially hoped, it was nevertheless one of the
biggest examples of both direct imperial interventions in colonial warfare and pan-
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colonial cooperation in the pre-Seven Years’ War era. The expedition, for example,
included troops from Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Connecticut and Rhode Island, as
well as four ships from the Royal Navy and a detachment of Marines.74
There was also a heavy Indigenous presence on both sides of the conflict. The
expeditions occurred at a moment of transition for Native peoples of the Northeast. After
decades of being uneasy neighbors with the English colonists, the Native polities of New
England had nearly been wiped in out in 1675-1676 by the bloody conflict of King
Philip's War. Many had been forced from their homes, either as refugees or as slaves
shipped to the West Indies.75 Some at the invitation of Andros, settled in the Hudson
River Valley at Schaghticoke, where they lived under the joint guardianship of the
Iroquois and the New York government. 76 Several of these so-called “Schaghticoke
Indians” had been recruited for the 1709 and later 1711 expeditions. Other New England
Natives went north, to join with the Wabanaki northeast of the Kennebec or in the
mission villages of New France. 77 Those who remained in New England lived in
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confined towns with limited autonomy, faced with increasing debt and often forced into
positions of indentured servitude.78
Members of this Southern New England diaspora now found themselves on
opposite sides of the conflict. The Massachusetts regiment in the 1710 siege of Port
Royal included a significant component of Wampanoag men recruited from former
Plymouth colony. Many of these men were whalers, and had been specifically sought out
for their skill at sea. Whaling and fishing had become popular occupations for Native
New England men in the years after King Philip’s War. Particularly before the growth of
offshore whaling, shore whaling allowed Native men in coastal areas of Massachusetts to
capitalize on traditional skills in a way that granted a fair amount of flexibility and
allowed them to preserve greater spatial mobility.79 Military service offered a similar
path for Native men in New England to maintain traditional patterns of life and work in
an increasingly constricted world. 80 It also allowed them to maintain traditional skills and
gain prestige. For communities, it functioned as a bargaining chip with colonial officials
that could be used to justify special favor, compensation for lost land, and add weight to
attempts to keep what land they still had.81
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At least in the minds of some recruiters, there was significant overlap between
Native men who worked on the sea and men who would enlist on scouting expeditions.82
They were specifically recruited for the expedition, as well as the earlier and later
expeditions against Canada. In 1709, after a conference with Indian recruiter Charles
Church, Vetch wrote London that the native whalers "were very dexterous and nimble
upon the water" and that they and their boats would prove invaluable to the expedition.83
In 1711, the Massachusetts Assembly ordered that Church attempt to locate 110 Native
men in the whaling counties, “having no respect to the challenge of their being servants,
or under other obligation, or on pretence of debt.”84
Although many men enlisted, there are conflicting accounts of the readiness with
which Native New Englanders signed up for service. Benjamin Church claimed that the
infamous 1704 French and Native raid on Deerfield, which had left 56 colonists dead and
an additional 112 carried to Canada, had radicalized New Englanders of all races. As a
result, he claimed that his earlier expeditions “had not, nor needed, a pressed man.” 85 On
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the opposite end of the spectrum, Pennsylvania Quaker William Rakestraw recounted in
his anti-expedition pamphlet Tribute to Caesar that Nantucket Indians were called before
the Massachusetts Council and asked if they would participate in the expedition. They
reportedly responded that
if Canada Indians and French are premised to come down upon us, we will go out
and meet them, and capitulate with them, and see if we can perswade them not to
hurt us, for, and because, we are an innocent people, and ne'er intended to hurt
them. …But whether they will hear or forbear, we know not, but will trust in our
God; for he is able to deliver us. 86
Certainly, men were not recruited quite so easily as Benjamin Church suggested. Charles
Church complained bitterly at the cost he incurred “raising and encouraging the Indians,”
a task that required “the best of [his] cunning.”87 Even Benjamin Church had complained
seven years earlier that the Indians “were a people that need much treating” before
agreeing to participate in military expeditions.88
On the other side of the conflict, Mi’kmaw people were heavily involved in the
defense of Port Royal. Unlike the Indigenous inhabitants of Southern New England, the
Mi’kmaq retained nearly all of their ancestral land and had a generally productive
relationship with the French. It is difficult to tell how involved other Wabanaki districts
were in the siege, and most historians have assumed—probably correctly—that the
majority of Native defenders at Port Royal were Mi’kmaq. There was clearly some
involvement, however, of other Wabanakis; Acadia, after all, was also understood to
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include the Penobscot and Passamaquoddy districts, then home to many Southern New
England refugees. The Franco-Wabanaki Baron Bernard-Anselme d’Abbadie de SaintCastin, whose mother was a daughter of famed Penobscot sachem Madockawando, was
involved in the action to some degree. He was captured in a ketch supposedly sailing
from Passamaquoddy to Port Royal, presumably alongside allied warriors, although how
many and where they were from is not recorded other than they “fled into the woods”
after driving the boat onshore.89 Further highlighting the Native dimensions of the
conflict, Saint-Castin’s ketch was taken by a group that included at least one Indigenous
Southern New Englander, explicitly identified as a “saylor,” who died during the ensuing
skirmish. 90 Saint-Castin later met with Nicholson, although what they discussed was not
recorded.91
The surviving records of the Port Royal siege, unsurprisingly, are framed in a way
that obscures both Native actions and views of the event. There are, however, a few
fleeting moments that emerge in the records. For example, during the initial British
approach on the fort, “Major Livingston and his Indians” were singled out by the “French
and Indians,” the former calling out to the latter to “come over.” 92 The meaning of this
action is difficult to discern, but highly evocative. What did the Mi’kmaq think about
what had befallen the nations of Southern New England? Did they see them as worthy
opponents, or a sad and conquered people? It is impossible to tell from this brief recorded
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interaction. However, it may offer a glimpse into an alternative understanding of the
siege as a Native-Native conflict, occurring alongside the imperial drama that dominates
the surviving records.
The siege lasted little more than a week and ended in a British victory. Although
Nicholson, Vetch, and the other planners had no idea if the conquest would extend to the
rest of Acadia or even survive the war, they acted quickly to consolidate their power
through attempts to manipulate the French settler population of Acadia. Although they
did not call for their wholesale deportation, the articles provided passage to French
territory in Canada and Newfoundland for any civilians, and made staying within cannon
shot of the fort for the next two years contingent on signing a loyalty oath to the British
Queen. 93
Echoing Vetch’s pre-expedition writings, the documents produced by the council
of war immediately after the capitulation demonstrate a clear assumption that the British
could only hold Acadia if there were British—or at least reliably loyal—inhabitants.
Writing to the Queen to give their opinion on what should be done with the remaining
French settlers, Nicholson, Vetch, and the rest of the council of war recommended that,
unless they converted to Protestantism, they should be deported as soon as possible. In
their place, they recommended Protestant families from Great Britain and Ireland. They
also suggested giving encouragement to families from elsewhere in British North
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America who wanted to move to the region to pursue the fur trade and fishery. 94 As
justification for uprooting thousands of residents or forcing them to convert, the council
cited the necessity of “bringing the native Indians intirely[sic] under your Majesty’s
subjection” and converting them to Protestantism. 95 In the minds of Nicholson, Vetch,
and their compatriots, then, there was a clear link between practical control of Indigenous
subjects and the culture and religion of the non-Native settler population, and this was in
turn linked to bigger questions of how the British could exert true control over this barely
conquered territory.96 Acadia, its resources, and its Native population could only be
controlled if the right kinds of settlers lived there.
In Massachusetts, the new geopolitical situation created by the French loss of
Acadia, also signaled a change in the settlement of what is now Maine. The war, and,
specifically, French and Native raiding during the war, had resulted in the abandonment
of nearly all of Massachusetts’s frontier towns. Settlement contracted to the Piscataqua
settlements, as it had done during King William’s War in 1688-1697. Following the end
of the war in 1713, the General Court took the opportunity to attempt a full accounting of
land claims in the Eastward. This was done in an attempt to resolve some of the
confusion over titles that had been the legacy of the previous century. The practical result
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of this effort was a temporary ban on new settlement east of York and the creation of the
Eastern Land Claims Committee, which was meant to record all claims held to these
lands. 97
The Committee, however, was by no means a neutral body. Oliver Noyes, Edward
Hutchinson, Adam Winthrop, and Samuel Phipps were powerful men who already had a
strong interest in the Dawnland, and it seems likely that they used their position to
identify dormant claims and parcels ripe for purchase. 98 Indeed, between 1714 and 1716,
the men of the lands committee and their associates bought up a considerable amount of
eastern real estate. According to surviving deeds registered in York County, the
company of Oliver Noyes and Adam Winthrop, along with Thomas Hutchinson, New
Hampshire governor John Wentworth, David Jeffries, John Watts, Stephen Minot, and
John Ruck bought up eight tracts of land or rights to land at Small Point in Casco Bay. 99
These same men, along with Stephen Minot, bought several other parcels in the same
area along the lower Kennebec. Alongside claims these men had already acquired, these
purchases would make up the lands of the Pejepscot Company, one of the earliest
proprietary companies of the type that would come to control the area between Casco and
Penobscot Bays over the coming decades. 100
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Historians have often treated the Pejepscot Proprietors as a private company,
which of course it was. However, in the first years of its existence the proprietors worked
so closely with the General Court as to be practically indistinguishable from a
government project. Indeed, the creation of the company, and particularly its first major
township project at Brunswick, were the direct result of the General Court’s creation of
the Eastern Land Claims Committee, of which Noyes, Winthrop, and members of the
Hutchinson family were members. In April and May of 1715, Winthrop, Minot, and
Wentworth accompanied the land claims commission to view lands at Pejepscot and “see
and report if they were proper places for new townships to be laid out and settled.”101 The
result of this trip, as well as the culmination of the claims committee’s mandate to settle
new towns on the eastern frontier, was a favorable vote on a settlement proposal written
by the Pejepscot Proprietors to the General Court. The approved proposal paved the way
for the townships of Brunswick and Topsham. 102
At least for the first few years following the end of the war, it is perhaps more
accurate to think of the Pejepscot Proprietors as the active wing of the claims committee
rather than its own entity. The committee’s report on the Pejepscot proposals is an
especially clear example of the cozy partnership between them and the General Court.
The report claimed that the Pejepscot Proprietor’s plans for Brunswick and Topsham
were the only two serious settlement proposals to come out of the claims process – a
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practically inevitable outcome considering the overlap between the two bodies. 103 The
report also recommended that the province fund the restoration of Andros’ old fort near
the falls, and provide a garrison of fifteen men “for the protection and assistance of the
new settlements.” 104 The new townships were also given a tax abatement for five years to
further encourage the growth of the towns. Within a month of the report, the
proprietors—who, again, were themselves members of the government—proposed that if
the province would provide fifteen men for the garrison and £500, they would foot the
rest of the bill for the creation of a stone, rather than wooden, fort. 105 Further
underscoring the connection between military and civilian life on the frontier, the
Pejepscot Proprietors attempted to combine garrison and settler recruitment by
advertising that men who enlisted could obtain one hundred acres of land after six months
of service.106
The authors of the report justified these settlements as a quasi-government project
by drawing on the language of weaponized settlement. They focused especially on the
potential for properly planned and located settlements to break or remove Wabanki
people from their lands. “A strong settlement” at Pejepscot Falls, they wrote, “will
greatly tend to dislodge the Indians from their principall fishery, keep them from chief
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carrying places, and possibly be a means of removing them further from us, if another
war should happen.”107
A later petition by European inhabitants of the region described the area of
Brunswick as having been for “time without mind . . . the place of the annual rendevouze
of all the tribes,” further underlining the geographic importance of the site they had
chosen to colonize. 108 Both these documents and those produced by the council of war
following the capitulation of Acadia share the same logic. Although the proprietors and
General Court were more concerned with Indigenous people than a civilian French
population, both groups of planners shared the same belief that self-reproducing
settlements, intentionally placed and controlled, could be another front of the ongoing
military struggle over the future of the region.109 Of course, as an often fractious
representative body, the Massachusetts General Court cannot be said to have a single aim
or understanding. Nevertheless, the repeated use of this kind of language suggests that it
was a potent and well-understood line of argument.
The Pejepscot Proprietors weren’t the only group with new interest in the
Eastward following the “conquest” of Acadia. Starting in 1717, Nelson attempted to have
his uncle’s claim, defunct since the Treaty of Breda in 1667, revived. 110 Working with his
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(distant) cousin Robert Temple, Viscount Cobham, Nelson attempted to have the grant
confirmed so he could profit off the new push for settling the northeast. Reflecting the
new flurry of interest in the eastward after the withdrawal of the French, Cobham wrote
worryingly to William Tailor that the King in Council was entertaining several
applications for land in Nova Scotia “in order to the planting and establishing collonys
thereon.” 111 The Temple-Nelson boosters had the support of none other than Francis
Nicholson, still fresh from the conquest.112
Despite the flurry of activity, these companies had little practical success.
Between 1717 and 1719, the Pejepscot proprietors sold 25 of 50 available lots at
Brunswick; only 20 settler families ultimately built on their lots, and of those, a mere 13
stayed longer than three years. 113 About 11 families moved to Topsham in the same
period. After 1720, the proprietors made only two additional grants.114 Assuming an
average family size of five, this suggests a total population of about 120 settlers by the
early 1720s. Two decades later, in 1737, the proprietors wrote a petition to governor
Jonathan Belcher on behalf of 20 families a Brunswick, 24 families at Topsham, and 15
“circumjacent” families, suggesting a population just shy of 300, many of whom were
outside the proprietors control. Summing up the general mood, about 1731 one of the

111

Viscount Cobham to William Tailor, 18 Aug 1719, Thomas Temple Correspondence
Concerning Nova Scotia.
112
Francis Nicholson to William Tailor, 14 Sept 1719, Thomas Temple Correspondence
Concerning Nova Scotia.
113
Brunswick Township Book, Ledger 3, p.34, PPP.
114
Based on an examination of the Brunswick Township Book.

56
proprietors produced a document appropriately titled “a list of settlers to be at Topsham
(some of whom came).”115
The scant success of the Pejepscot projects was due in part to Native strength.
Estimates from 1726 put the Indigenous population of the Kennebec district at
approximately 200 people, with an additional 850 to the east in Penobscot, Machias, and
Passamaquoddy districts, numbers that do not take into account the large mission
populations at St. Francis that continued to make use of their traditional Maine
homelands. 116 The area was both a crucial fishing site for Kennebec people and a crosstribal gathering place. A 1737 petition from Euramerican inhabitants of the region
complained that the local Indigenous population
look upon us as unjust usurpers and intruders upon their rights and priviledges,
and spoilers of their way of living. They claim not only the wild beasts of the
forest, and fowls of the air, but also fishes of sea and rivers, and so with an ill eye
looks upon our salmon fishery.117
Wabanaki people understood control of land in terms of access to resources. By asserting
these rights in the strongest possible terms, local Wabanaki leaders made it clear that the
Pejepscot projects were unwelcome and illegitimate.
Tensions in the northeast erupted into violence not long after Brunswick and
Topsham were founded. The conflict variously known as “Dummer’s War,” “Father
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Rale’s War,” or simply “the Fourth Anglo-Abenaki War,” began in 1722 and lasted
another five years. The many names given to the conflict, however, fail to truly capture
the nature of the war. It was, among other things, the first war with Native people to erupt
outside the context of a European war since King Philip’s War nearly fifty years earlier.
Much more than previous or future “imperial” wars, this was a direct conflict between
New England and its Native neighbors over who would control the land of the far
northeast. 118 The theatre of war extended from southern Maine to Nova Scotia,
embroiling the entire Dawnland in violent conflict against British settlers and
representations of British power. Brunswick was burned to the ground, and the Maine
frontier was abandoned yet again.119
The war also provides an early glimpse of cooperation between the Native nations
of northern New England and Nova Scotia. Although the Nova Scotian theatre of the war
has been described as a “parallel war,” it, too, was a direct reaction against expanded
British power after 1710. 120 Even if examined as separate wars, both conflicts arose over
British and Anglo-American refusal to ask permission for land use and participate in the
Wabanaki culture of reciprocity. 121 It is also clear that there was coordination and
communication between the Mi’kmaq and their southern Wabanaki neighbors. Mi’kmaw
delegates were able to accurately describe Wabanaki actions against British settlers to the
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French that preceded the formal declaration of war. 122 Maine Wabanakis also participated
in Mi’kmaw raids against British forts in Nova Scotia, and coordinated their attacks to
coincide with raids on Maine towns. 123 Mi’kmaw warriors used their formidable skill as
sailors to harass the New England fishery, temporarily destroying New England’s most
profitable industry.124 Taken in tandem with accounts of Penobscot-Mi’kmaq cooperation
during Queen Anne’s War, the Fourth Anglo-Abenaki War provides evidence of
increasing pan-Wabanaki cooperation.
The result of the war was, essentially, a draw. In Maine, Wabanaki warriors held
the upper hand for most of the conflict, but lacked the numbers or French support to gain
decisive victory. 125 The successful British attack on the Kennebec village of
Norridgewock in 1724, where Massachusetts militiamen killed as many as 60 villagers
and burned their homes and cornfields, was devastating, though it did not end the war. 126
In Nova Scotia, Mi’kmaq held the advantage throughout the conflict, and as late as 1725
British officials there were concerned that they would refuse peace overtures. 127
Nevertheless, a peace was negotiated at Boston in 1725, which included both Mi’kmaw
delegates and representatives from the British foothold in Nova Scotia.128 The treaty was
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finally ratified in a protracted process culminating in a treaty signed at Annapolis Royal
in 1726 by Penobscot, Passamaquoddy, Wolastoqiyik, and Mi’kmaw delegates. 129
The question of boundaries, and specifically where Wabanaki people would
tolerate British settlement, was the primary concern of the peace talks. Disagreements
between Wabanaki and British negotiators as well as inter-Wabanaki negotiations meant
that the peace process dragged out until 1727. Maine Wabanakis wanted the British to
withdraw from the Kennebec. Penobscot sachem Loron (also known as Saugaaram)
insisted that the Penobscots had not sold any land east of Pemaquid and that the British
refusal to leave the area occupied after 1710 was the primary reason that peace had not
been concluded. 130 Eventually, the Penobscots agreed to a boundary at St. George’s
River, fifty miles east of the Pejepscot settlements. 131 As for the Mi’kmaq, legal historian
William Wicken has persuasively argued that the 1726 treaty was interpreted as a
recognition of a certain British, rather than French, jurisdiction in Mi’kma’ki, but not a
submission and certainly not a land cession. 132 Moving forward, Mi’kmaw leaders
assumed, the British would enter into proper negotiations with them if they desired to
expand beyond Annapolis Royal and Canso. How Passamaquoddy and Wolastoqiyik
interpreted the treaty is unclear, but it was likely along similar lines. The peace was also
never universal: in 1727, the perpetrators of a Mi’kmaq/Acadian raid on a New England
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fishing vessel claimed that they did not know a treaty had been signed, and Mi’kmaw and
“Abenaki” delegates met with the governor of the French colony of Ile-Royale and
requested that they maintain their ties of friendship and alliance.133
That the British did not interpret the treaty as a check on further settlement was
made clear almost immediately. The King appointed David Dunbar, an obscure colonel,
as Surveyor of the King’s Woods in 1728. This position was not new, and was intended
to enforce the Crown’s claim to the northeastern forests, which had been declared a
partial reserve for the use of the Navy in 1710. Although the Crown claimed all the white
pine and oak northeast of New York, Dunbar’s orders from the King directed him to
perform a survey of Nova Scotia and police illegal lumbering northeast of the Piscataqua
settlements. 134
Other than this, however, Dunbar had been given very little direction. Indeed, just
fourteen days out from his originally scheduled departure for North America, Dunbar still
had not received any official instructions from either the King in Council or the Board of
Trade.135 Nervously, he wrote requesting “any Acts of Parliament, or other papers” that
would help him do his job.136 He was also not well supported in other ways;. he had paid
out-of-pocket for all the “assistants and instruments” he was bringing.137 And his duties
were as unclear as the geography to which he was about to travel. He had been given a
commission for Nova Scotia, but it was unclear to him—as it was to many—what exactly
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that meant. In particular, he singled out the murky European status of the Sagadahock. “I
beg to be informed of the limits of Nova Scotia,” he wrote, “because there is a large
country lying waste” between and New England. Dunbar had been told that the best
available mast trees grew in this region, and needed clarification from the Board whether
or not the Sagadahock was part of his Nova Scotian commission. 138
These questions about jurisdiction and managing the current inhabitants soon
transformed into a much broader discussion about settling the region. Dunbar himself
was initially cool to the idea. As late as February of 1728, he suggested that the Board of
Trade should issue a circular to colonial governors instructing them not to grant land in
the area to British Protestant families—in particular, Irish families—“without
lycence.” 139 Following letters from his brother and deputy Jeremiah Dunbar, however, he
grew concerned about an existing settlement of Irish families living near the Kennebec
River. Initially, he wrote the Board of Trade simply for instructions on how to proceed
and whether the Irish settlers were under the government of Nova Scotia or
Massachusetts. This correspondence, however, soon gave birth to a much bolder option:
creating an entirely new colony between Nova Scotia and New England, and actively
seeking European Protestant families to settle it.140
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The plan was laid out in a report to the Privy Council in May 1729. In it, the
Board claimed that Nova Scotia had jurisdiction over everything east of the Kennebec.
Because of its distance from Annapolis Royal, however, the authors suggested that the
land between the Kennebec and St. Croix Rivers be “erected into a new province by the
name of Georgia, and a distinct government established there.” 141 The first settlers would
be the Irish families Dunbar had been concerned about, who were willing to move to the
east side of the Kennebec River. The report also suggested recruiting large numbers of
German families, and specifically mentions that 500 Palatine families had petitioned for
township land in the same area.142 Dunbar would be made governor of this new
colony. 143
The idea of a separate political or geographic subdivision corresponding to the
proposed Georgia colony in fact pre-dates the conquest. The 1691 Massachusetts Charter,
which re-defined the borders of that colony, contains a clear vision of the different
jurisdictions between Cape Cod and the Gulf of St. Lawrence. In addition to Plymouth,
Massachusetts Bay proper, and New Hampshire, British observers also recognized a
distinct “Province of Maine” that stretched from Piscataqua to the Kennebec, Nova
Scotia, and a separate—although poorly defined—region that lay in-between the two that
corresponds to Georgia. Representatives from Massachusetts had previously asked that

141

Ibid., p.195.
The Board had first considered having both populations moved to the Annapolis area,
but this was rejected as inconvenient and unpopular. Anticipating the government
sponsored settlement projects of the 1740s-60s, they proposed sending an agent to recruit
German families specifically for Annapolis, at the government’s expense: Ibid., p.193.
143
Ibid., p.196.
142

63
all of this territory, including New Hampshire, the Province of Maine, and Nova Scotia,
be annexed to Massachusetts Bay. 144 The Crown granted part of this wish. Through the
charter, Plymouth and Province of Maine were annexed fully to Massachusetts.
Massachusetts was also given dominion over the rest of the northeast with the exception
of New Hampshire.145
Massachusetts’ control over the area east of the Kennebec River, however, was
restricted. The charter went on to specify that no grants of land “lying or extending from
the River of Sagadehock [i.e. Kennebec] to the Gulph of St: Lawrence and Canada Rivers
and to the main sea northward and eastward” would be legally recognized unless
specifically approved by the crown.146 Historians such as Jane Burbank and Fred Cooper
have argued that this kind of layered and ad-hoc delegation of power is entirely typical of
how empires function, and the flexible approach built into the charter allowed England
and Great Britain to be able to claim continuous control over the far northeast and its
people without the trouble of attempting to govern it directly. 147 However, particularly
after Nova Scotia was erected into a distinct province and removed from Massachusetts’
control, the issue of who could claim the power to “settle” the land in the Country.
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The Georgia project, however, was seemingly doomed from the start. Seven
months after the Board’s report to the Privy Council, and months after Dunbar had sailed
west, the Georgia proposal was still floating aimlessly around Whitehall with no official
approval or financial support. 148 Partially in response to worries about jurisdiction, the
Privy Council vetoed Dunbar’s governorship, and along with it any serious chance for the
creation of Georgia, in March of 1730.149 Dunbar was to proceed with the plans to settle
the Irish families somewhere between the Penobscot and St. Croix rivers, but he would
do so under the authority of Richard Philipps, the governor of Nova Scotia.150
Dunbar, then, rather than arriving in North America as a royal governor backed
by the power of a commission, was sent with only vague instructions and no way to
enforce his authority. He was not even able to offer land grants to the Irish families who
had agreed to settle in the Sagadahock. Instead, all he could offer was the promise of land
grants from the Nova Scotian governor at some unknown future date.151 He was also
unable to take further steps to settle the region because of a requirement that he first
finish the survey of the Nova Scotian woods.152 Nevertheless, at least 44 Irish families
contracted with Dunbar and agreed to settle at Pemaquid, modern Bristol, Maine. 153
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Dunbar’s real troubles began after this. The proprietors of the Maine land
companies organized in the wake of the Acadian conquest were immediately alarmed by
what they saw as a threat to their land claims. By absorbing everything east of the
Kennebec into Nova Scotia, where land could be granted and organized by Royal decree,
Dunbar’s settlement efforts threatened most of the land claimed by the new companies.
Even more fundamentally, while some parts of the proprietary land claims were based on
crown grants made in the early seventeenth century, many more relied on grants from
Massachusetts and purchase from Wabanaki sachems and confirmed by the colonial
legislature. In the eyes of Dunbar and the Board of Trade—and, indeed, according to the
terms of the Massachusetts charter—such forms of title were invalid. British officials
argued that only grants directly from the Crown could have any legal meaning, leaving
the future and investments of the proprietary companies hanging in the balance.154
This struggle over who had the right to develop the Eastward led to a formal
petition in 1731 by Massachusetts to the King’s attorney and solicitor general in England,
asking them to intervene in the activities of the Board of Trade. 155 It was not good news
for Dunbar. The King’s lawyers found the colonial petitioner’s grants to be in good
standing, invalidating the Crown’s claim to the Pemaquid area and scuttling the already
downgraded settlement efforts. It was not, however, a clear win for the proprietors either.
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The lawyers found in favor of their claims not on the strength of their chain of title—as
would be the case in England—but rather on “possession,” the fact that the petitioners
could show they were actively attempting to settle their lands at the time of Dunbar’s
arrival. 156 Additionally, despite what the proprietors and some Massachusetts officials
would claim later, the decision did not confirm Massachusetts’ rights to settle and govern
the eastward. Instead, the lawyers emphasized the Royal confirmation provisio from the
charter. The proprietary grants, they argued, stood only because they all claimed an origin
predating the 1691 charter.157 In practice, this meant that no one British governmental
body could claim ownership over the Sagadahock.
As representatives from different British jurisdictions quarreled over their own
boundaries, Wabanaki people remained very clear about theirs. In conversations with
Dunbar shortly after his arrival, Penobscot district representatives reiterated their
understanding of the 1725/6 treaty, stating that they would not tolerate any settlements
east of St. George’s River. 158 If Dunbar was merely “settling the old settlements… not to
exceed the old boundaries of Pemaqud,” they would consent to the arrival of a new
community of Irish families.159 However, if any of them settled beyond St. George’s
River, they warned, “we shall not think them to be our frinds.” 160
But just a decade later, an ambitious and ruthless land baron named Samuel
Waldo arrived, seemingly out of nowhere, at the very river in question. Waldo had
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several dozen Scots-Irish families in tow, many of them poached from Dunbar’s abortive
settlement. Waldo had plans to erect two towns where none had been before. Most
concerning, his claim was based not on any forms of land transfer recognized by the
Penobscot, but on a hundred-year-old Royal patent and an Indian deed that Penobscots
had repeatedly denounced as fraudulent. 161 Penobscots were unanimous in rejecting what
they saw as a baseless land grab. While there was evidently division among the
community about the appropriate way to respond, they eventually came to a compromise
position: Penobscots would allow Waldo’s new towns so long as the settlers remained on
the west side of the Wessaweskeeg River and below the falls of the St. George, a much
smaller area than Waldo’s Scots-Irish settlers had been promised and that Waldo felt he
was entitled to.162
Once they had come to this decision, Penobscots went about enforcing the new
border between settler and Indian country with precision. Much like colonial surveyors
laying out townships or the limits or particular plots, Penobscots marked trees to indicate
the geographic limits of their willingness to tolerate Waldo’s settlers. In addition to
deploying a physical language of land ownership that the settlers would understand,
Penobscot representatives also issued warnings and precise deadlines for settlers who
were found outside the bounds. For example, within months of the arrival of the settlers,
two Penobscot men arrived at the St. George blockhouse and informed the men there that
“in case any of the Irish people who are setteled by Mr Waldo…should cut any hay on
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the eastern side of Wessaweskeeg River that the Indens would burn the same.” 163 True to
their word, in August of 1736 several younger Penobscot men burnt all the hay mown by
settlers on the east side of the river, and continued to do so whenever new hay was found.
Around the same time, Penobscots also gave all those Irish who had built houses above
the falls a one month deadline to move themselves and their goods and pull down the
structures they had built. At least three settler families were forced to dismantle their
houses, but besides some threats to livestock no more was done, and the boundary was
maintained peacefully for several more years. 164
Pan-Wabanaki resistance to British attempts at expansion — which had been, in
many cases, specifically intended to break Wabanaki power and undermine their
sovereignty — successfully prevented British and Anglo-American attempts to colonize
the Dawnland after 1710. These efforts bled into the next round of warfare in the
northeast. In Europe, a disagreement over who should hold the throne of Austria became
a general war between the British and French and provided the opportunity for the
tensions in North America to once again explode into armed conflict. This was nothing
new; in many ways, it was simply a repeat of the earlier King William’s War and Queen
Anne’s War. However, the end of this war would signal a massive shift in the far
northeast. Backed by an unprecedented amount of direct governmental support, the vague
plans of the early 1700s would give birth to the most significant British experiments in
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weaponized settlement to date, a process that would forever change the Dawnland for all
its inhabitants.

70
Chapter Two: The Halifax Plan
Against the light of the setting sun, a lone French officer navigated the churned
earth between the French fortress town of Louisbourg and the batteries and trenches of
the besieging New Englanders. The flag of truce he carried announced that what had once
been unthinkable was now coming to pass: the French were surrendering. Two days later,
the triumphant New England troops marched into the city, “colours…flying the drums
beating trumpets sounding flutes and viols playing.” 165
This moment of jubilation, however, was not to last. William Pepperell’s New
England troops met the new year in squalor and agony. Squeezed into the inadequate
shelter of the Louisbourg fort without a reliable source of food or firewood, the
assortment of smallholding farmers and fishermen that made up the garrison faced the
cruel winters of Cape Breton with the bare minimum of supplies and comfort. Even more
alarmingly, a camp fever raged through the ranks with no sign of slowing. As early as
June, illness struck, and by September soldiers wrote home that it was a “sickly and
dying time.”166 In November, Pepperell and Warren reported that 300 to 400 men had
been lost, at an alarming rate of eight to fourteen dead per day. 167 By January of 1746,
500 more men had died, and another 1,100—well over half the camp—were ill. 168
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Contemplating the sorry scene around him and the rough seas that effectively prevented
any ships from coming or going, Warren commented that if the sickness did not end
soon, “God only knows…who among us will survive ‘till next spring." 169 Adding to a
sense of defeat, Ile Royale was given back to the French at the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle
in 1748, returning the northeast to status quo antebellum and effectively erasing the
efforts of the New England troops.
Nevertheless, the capture of Louisbourg was a watershed in the history of
European settlement in the Dawnland. The return of the fortress, which raised the specter
of an even stronger French military presence in the region, re-opened the question of
settlement in Nova Scotia at a time when the British Board of Trade and imperial
apparatus were keen to listen. The result was that for the first time, the idle talk and
baseless dreams that had characterized the European history of the region for over a
century crystalized into concrete action. In the immediate aftermath of the return of
Louisbourg in 1748, British officials, led by the energetic new head of the Board of Trade
George Montagu-Dunk, Second Earl of Halifax, developed a blueprint for Nova Scotian
settlement that would be more or less followed for the next three decades. In a reversal of
nearly 150 years of British policy, the Halifax plan called for direct state intervention into
the process of settlement and colonization. Targeted settlement, sponsored by the
government, became the primary means by which European powers pressed their claims
to territorial ownership. The justifications and frameworks created in this era laid the
groundwork for the creation of settler colonies in the Dawnland.
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While links between larger loyal populations and sovereignty had been a key part
of settlement schemes in the 1710-1740 era, by the middle of the 1740s—and especially
from 1748 on—British and colonial officials became increasingly willing to directly
recruit settlers for contested land in the Eastward. Indeed, many important British and
colonial officials understood the process of Anglo-European settlement as not just a
demographic phenomenon, but as the peacetime equivalent of battles and sieges. Planting
strong settlements filled with reproducing family units deep into contested land would not
only expand British territory, but even more importantly, would restrict or even eliminate
enemy populations—in particular, French settler and Native communities. These
weaponized settlements were state projects intended to change the balance of power in
strategically important regions.
While the rhetoric of weaponized settlement became more pronounced following
the treaty of Aix-le-Chappelle, the years immediately before the outbreak of the War of
Austrian Succession had already seen a spike in efforts to recruit new settlers for the
Dawnland, laying the groundwork for the post-war boom. In 1742, for example, Samuel
Waldo began efforts to add more settlers to his claims by recruiting them directly from
the German States. A boat with 140 prospective settlers landed at Marblehead in October
of that year. 170 Massachusetts governor William Shirley directly recruited an interpreter
for Waldo.171 The settlers were taken to the St. George River, a zone of particular
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bitterness for Penobscots who asserted that Waldo’s claim was based on a fraudulent
deed. 172
In the competitive environment of the German States, Waldo and his agent
Sebastien Zouberbuhler had made big promises. In addition to an already laid-out town,
a minister, schoolmaster, and doctor, settlers had been promised generous provisions for
the first year as well as a cow, calf, sow, and basic farming implements. 173 As would
often be the case, however, they were somewhat less than impressed with what was
presented to them on their arrival at Broad Bay. A petition drafted by the settlers the
following year recounted that they had sailed to the Eastward only to find “an
inhospitable shore and a waste wilderness” that had “few necessities and none of the
accommodations of life.” 174 Without the shelter or supplies that had been promised them,
many had died in the bitter winter. Appealing to the governor and council and evoking
their special position as appropriate bodies, they pled in their petition that “the fathers of
this land were Protestant strangers” much like themselves. 175 They asked to be
transported away from their wilderness hell to the more populated parts of the province,
where “they may be employed in such business as they are capable of for the support of
themselves and their wives and children.”176 The council, after consulting with Waldo,

172

See previous chapter.
These rations, for example, were significantly better than those offered to German
settlers in Lunenburg a decade later, with two additional pounds of beef per week, plus an
additional grade of flour and the addition of Indian corn. Petition of the Palatinate Settlers
of Broad Bay, 25 May 1743, vol 15a, pp.33-34, MAC.
174
Petition of the Palatinate Settlers of Broad Bay, 25 May 1743, vol.15a, p.34, MAC.
175
Ibid.
176
Ibid., p.35.
173

74
ordered the petition dismissed, though the non-concurrence of the House insured that the
settlers had a second hearing.177 Perhaps unsurprisingly, the committee appointed in this
second hearing sided with Waldo, although it did requisition some government funds to
pay for the settlers provisions for the following winter.178
At the same time as Waldo’s experiments, the Board of Trade also entertained
similar proposals to populate other areas of the Eastward. Just six days after the Palatine
settlers of Broad Bay drafted their petition, the Board considered another scheme from
foreign Protestants forwarded to them by the Privy Council. Likely unaware of the
struggles of their countrymen in Penobscot Country, a group of 143 “Switzers, Germans,
and others” petitioned the King for permission to settle a tract of “crown lands lying
waste and uncultivated” between the 44th and 48th parallel—the so-called Sagadahock
Country that lay between Nova Scotia and Massachusetts. These settlers promised to
defend themselves from any enemy attacks, and somewhat vaguely suggested that
increasing settlement in the region would be of benefit to the Crown by “increasing the
trade and navigation of your kingdoms and of Your Majesty’s revenues; and
otherwise.” 179
While Waldo’s project and the 1743 foreign Protestant petition were not
undertaken explicitly for the purpose of strengthening the Empire, a second plan
considered by the Board of Trade in May 1743 had much more political overtones.
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Thomas Coram, a Georgia trustee and noted London philanthropist who had proposed
several projects in Nova Scotia in the 1730s, put forward a proposal to use children taken
in by his London Foundling Hospital for the service of the Empire. He first proposed that
the “strongest and most robust male children” should be put to sea once they came of age,
a plan he suggested would ensure that both merchants and the Royal Navy would have
enough seamen—a perpetual worry in an empire increasingly invested in a maritime
identity.180 Like the “Germans and Switzers” of the previous petition, whom he had also
written to support, Coram had his eye on the Sagadahock lands. As a reward for good
service in the Royal Navy, Coram proposed offering former foundlings grants of land
between New England and Nova Scotia. To make his orphans even more useful, he
further suggested giving grants there of half the size to any adult graduates of the
hospital, male or female, “provided they behave[d] well and serve[d] faithfully” prior to
coming of age. 181 He also suggested extending the offer to foreign Protestant seamen, as
a further way to expand Britain’s maritime presence.
Coram’s belief that potentially idle persons should be made useful to the “benefit
of the publick” was typical of the general attitudes towards settlement at the time. Coram,
however, was also clearly interested in increasing the power of the Crown to control
settlement in the contested Northeast. Nearly half of his petition is a recitation of the
Crown’s right in the Sagadahock lands, and a strong recommendation that they be
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removed from Massachusetts control, “as Nova Scotia hath long since been,” and erected
into a new colony under the proprietorship of the Duke of Cumberland. 182 Coram’s plan
thus elegantly combined a remedy to the problem of London’s idle poor, a means of
strengthening Britain’s naval power, and a way to bring the rich mast timber lands, deep
harbors, and large fishery of the Sagadahock into the hands of the Royal Family.183
Coram’s combination of private interest and a concern for strengthening the power of the
Crown and empire through settlement makes his 1743 plan an ideal bridge between the
concerns of an earlier generation of schemers and the high period of state intervention in
settler recruitment in the years between the War of the Austrian Succession and the Seven
Years’ War.
It was in this context of increased interest in the Eastward that the Louisbourg
campaign took place. Indeed, to a significant extent, it can be thought of as an extension
of New Englander’s renewed interest in eastern lands following the fall of Acadia.
Samuel Waldo’s significant involvement in the recruiting and military control of the
expedition, for example, is very telling. Waldo was a major force in both the planning
and execution of the campaign. Historian George Rawlyk argues that Waldo’s
involvement was primarily an attempt to force the British state to accept his decidedly
dodgy claim to Nova Scotian land, which he had purchased from John Nelson in 1730.184
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Waldo also drew heavily on his own tenants at the Eastward in attempting to man the
mission. Thomas Henderson, a tenant in one of Waldo’s St. George settlements, declared
that Waldo had “signified to them his Intention of going [to Louisbourg], and desired that
such of them whose circumstances would admit of it should enter into the service.”185 A
total of 34 men from the two St. George towns and the German settlement at Madomock
joined the expedition. As the three settlements had at most 143 households, this meant
that about one in four families sent someone to the siege. The number was significant
enough that the absence of these men was blamed for the devastation of the Wabanaki
attacks on the settlements in 1745-1747. Most of the surviving men from these attacks
then joined their neighbors in the garrison at Louisbourg. 186
Even apart from Waldo’s tenants, the rank and file soldiers were to a significant
extent residents of Massachusetts’ eastern province. 187 News of the siege dominated the
social lives of those who remained behind. For example, Mary Bulman of York, the wife
of a regimental surgeon, wrote to her husband Alexander at Louisbourg thanking him not
just for news of himself, but of “our friends and neighbors” who were also part of the
ongoing siege. The Euramerican population east of Piscataqua, already small, also bore
the brunt of the high death toll in the camps. Bulman, for example, on hearing that her
brother had fallen ill, lamented that she did not “expect to se all the faces of my frinds

185

Declaration of Thomas Henderson, 18 Feb 1747, #GLC02437.10409, HKP.
Declaration of Thomas Henderson, 18 Feb 1747, #GLC02437.10409, HKP;
Declaration of William Burns, 26 Feb 1747, # GLC02437.10410, HKP.
187
Rawlyk, Yankees at Louisbourg, 45; Troop Enlistment Documents, John Storer Papers
Concerning the Louisbourg Campaign, Houghton Library.
186

78
again.” 188 Her letter paints a picture of a town and region intimately connected to the
siege, where individual letters were passed around and became communal efforts to
divine God’s hand in the events unfolding to the east. Like many of his neighbors and
relatives, Alexander never made it home, succumbing to the sickness he had worked to
combat. 189
These tight connections between northern New England and the siege, as well as a
renewed emphasis on settlement, can be clearly seen in plans for what to do with
Louisbourg after it was captured. In the same letter to the Secretary of State that
Pepperell and Warren announced the capitulation of the fortress town, they insisted that
the next course of action should be to do whatever was necessary to attract loyal
Protestants come and settle. To that end, they proposed the immediate erection of a free
port and civil government, including a governor with instructions to “grant lands upon the
easiest terms.” Only these steps, they claimed, would ensure “the security of this
important garrison and territory.”190 These plans emphasized New Englanders as the best
potential settlers. Governor Shirley for example argued that steps should be taken to
attract fisherman and other residents of Massachusetts, a course that he claimed was the
“best prospect of effecting a speedy settlement.” 191 Others suggested giving free passage
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to the wives and families of married soldiers in the garrison, exchanging permanent
settlement on the island in exchange for an exemption from “the severest fatigues of
duty.” 192
In contrast to Coram’s call to re-annex the Sagadahock, the aftermath of
Louisbourg reveals the extent to which many in Massachusetts took seriously the
inclusion of everything between the Piscataqua and the Gulf of St. Lawrence in their
charter. This was in part a matter of security: that New England—and the eastern
settlements in modern Maine in particular—could never be safe so long as the French had
a toehold in Atlantic Canada was by this point a truism, and was the basis on which
Shirley justified the expedition.193 Shirley also foresaw Massachusetts having a crucial
role in the administration of post-conquest Cape Breton, much as it did in Nova Scotia.
Announcing the conquest to the Board of Trade, Shirley argued not only that New
Englanders would be the best settlers for Cape Breton, but also that Massachusetts’
“affinity to the new planted colony might be of advantage to it in its growth, trade, and
support.” He pointed to Massachusetts’ timely intervention in the attack on Annapolis
Royal the previous year as well as “the reduction of this island itself by forces sent
chiefly from this province” as proof of the special relationship between the two
colonies. 194 Elsewhere, he claimed that acting Nova Scotia governor Paul Mascarene and
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the Council had “commit[ed] themselves to [his] care.” 195 Warren went so far as to
openly advocate for Shirley as the governor of Cape Breton. 196
The return of Louisbourg to the French was, therefore, in some ways a
repudiation of New England’s special dominion over greater Nova Scotia. Indeed,
bitterness over this seeming rejection of colonial efforts to directly contribute to the
empire was to become a major sticking point in Revolutionary-era pamphlet literature a
generation later. 197 However, the return of Louisbourg and Île Royale, interpreted by
many colonists as a humiliation, in fact stoked interest in developing northeastern land in
Great Britain. The unexpected capture of what had previously been believed to be an
impregnable fortress, combined with the specter of increased French power after its
return, popularized the idea of securing Nova Scotia through concentrated settlement
efforts. For the first time, serious interest in developing and sponsoring settlement
schemes spread far beyond New Englanders and a scant handful of military figures to
become a general call.
The generality of this interest was reflected in a flurry of published and
unpublished plans for the settlement of Nova Scotia that emerged between 1746 and
1748. The London-based periodical The Gentleman’s Magazine, for instance, serialized
eight articles promoting the settlement of Nova Scotia between 1746 and 1748. Many of
these publications articulated arguments that Thomas Coram would have heartily agreed
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with. The rich fishing banks stretching northeast from St. George’s Bank in the Gulf of
Maine to the Canso Bank near Cape Breton were at that point exploited primarily by
migrant New Englanders and the Acadian fishing communities in southeastern Cape
Breton. In the pages of the Gentleman’s Magazine, however, readers were presented with
arguments positioning the banks as an important origin point for Britain’s naval might.
By making Nova Scotia’s fishery more accessible, and thereby increasing the number of
fishermen, Britain would also see “its finest nursery for seamen enlarged.” Further,
asserting British rights to Nova Scotian fishing grounds would greatly reduce the French
ability to participate in the cod fishery, assuring British domination of the trade. The
authors favored by the Gentleman’s Magazine expanded on the imperial and especially
naval benefits of Nova Scotia’s material resources in other areas. The abundant woods of
Nova Scotia, for example, were re-imagined as timber for ships and ships’ masts that
would extend the power of Britain’s naval fleet, consistent with the theoretical
designation of the northeastern forests as “the King’s Woods.”
Echoing Coram’s concerns about the idle poor, many authors immediately
following the end of the War of Austrian Succession touted Nova Scotia as an ideal place
to settle recently discharged and out of work military men. In the wake of the Treaty of
Aix-le-Chappelle, many naval vessels were decommissioned, throwing thousands of
unemployed men onto an already depressed job market. 198 The elite readers of The
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Gentleman’s Magazine clearly understood this as a potential destabilizing factor within
British society. One anonymous serialized author wrote in 1748 that
The approach of peace, amidst all the joy which it naturally produces, has raised
not only compassion, but terror in many private gentlemen...who consider well
the consequences of discharging so many men from their occupations in the army,
the fleet, and the yards for building and repairing the navy. As one half of these
poor men will not be able to get employment, there is great, and just
apprehension, that necessity will compel them to seize by violence what they can
see no method to attain by honest labour 199
The only solution, the author argued, was for the government to ameliorate these
conditions was by providing relief or, especially, providing labor. Proposed “make-work”
projects included establishing a new fishery in Scotland, populating the island of Rattan,
building new harbors in England and, most importantly, settling Nova Scotia and
establishing a large fishery there. The benefits of Nova Scotia were twofold: firstly, it
would remove a source of potential discontent from England, preserving domestic
harmony; secondly, it would keep navy men on the sea, ensuring that there would be a
continued base for recruitment to the navy should war break out again, as it inevitably
would. 200 This scheme ensured British glory by keeping the domestic situation calm and
maintaining a skilled body of seamen.
While recognizing that New Englanders had long called for subduing Nova Scotia
in the name of their own security, the authors in The Gentleman’s Magazine were much
more interested in checking French ambition more generally. While recognizing that
settlement was “earnestly wish'd by all the colonies on the New England continent,” the
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authors of the magazine conceived of settlement in terms of how it would help further
Great Britain’s anti-French aims rather than how it would aid colonists. 201
Like most British thinkers, the authors in the Gentleman’s Magazine assumed that
the Acadian and Mi’kmaq populations were an automatic source of French strength in the
region. 202 By actively settling the area with loyal subjects, the British would be able to
check French strength. One author even predicted that if gains in the region could be
consolidated the French would simply wither away, “If we hold [Nova Scotia] in its
antient extent, and preclude the French from Newfoundland and Cape-Breton,” he wrote,
“Canada will of course come to nothing as it is so remote, its navigation at best very
difficult, and half the year impracticable.” Nova Scotian settlement therefore served as a
means for ensuring British dominance in European affairs: even without war, a secure
hold on Nova Scotia and assertion of other British land claims would serve to slowly
strangle the French from the continent.
One of the authors excerpted by the Magazine was New Englander Otis Little,
who penned a strident tract in 1748 laying out the argument for settling Nova Scotia.
Lightly fortifying and heavily settling Nova Scotia, incentivized through promotion of the
fishery and importation of Nova Scotia produce, he argued, would give Great Britain “all
the advantages that could have arose from the possession of Louisbourg, at a less expence
than would have been requisite for keeping so large a fortress in repair, and defending it
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with a proper garrison.” 203 Arguing somewhat dubiously that the French always paid for
the passage and provisions of settlers immigrating to French colonies, Little proposed
that Great Britain should do that same in order to settle Nova Scotia with Protestants. 204
Little proposed settlements in places he thought were most likely to isolate
Acadians and Wabanakis from the French. For example, he proposed planting a British
settlement at the mouth of the St. John River—more or less on the site of modern St.
John, New Brunswick—in order to gain control of the choke point created by the high
Bay of Fundy tides and to cut off communication between the region and Québec during
times of war. 205 He proposed further settlements at Canso, Chebucto, Tatamagouche,
Chignecto, and within the dense Acadian settlement zone on the Bay of Fundy, all
supported by military power.206 Indeed, Little did not shy away from advising open
displays of force against Acadian and Native inhabitants. For example, he suggested
destroying Acadian dykes as a means of controlling the population, and suggested that if
Native people could not be kept under control by tactics such as hostage-keeping, “‘tis
much better to continue the war till they are wholly extirpated.”207
Perhaps the most influential plan, however, was drawn up by the ubiquitous
Shirley, with assistance from future chief surveyor of Nova Scotia Charles Morris and
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evidently at Newcastle’s direction. Shirley’s handiwork, “General heads of a Plan of a
Civil Government propos’d for his Majesty’s Province of Nova Scotia,” was enclosed in
Shirley’s letter to the Duke of Bedford in March of 1749. 208 It proposed a more powerful
governor and council than in Massachusetts and would delay the creation of a General
Assembly until more Protestants had moved into the region or the Acadians had been
converted. It was put into action almost in its entirety later that year, when the Crown
organized a civil government under Edward Cornwallis. 209
Along with this plan for how the government of the province should be run,
Shirley included a cost estimate for settling 2,000 families and providing them with one
year’s worth of rations. He included three variations—Europeans, colonial families from
Pennsylvania and New England, and discharged soldiers—so that the King could “form a
judgement, which is the surest method of drawing a number of settlers together
speedily.” 210 Like Little, he recommended settlements be made in the Acadian heartland
districts of Annapolis, Minas, and Chignecto, a task he predicted would be difficult but
also “the most essential…for securing the possession” of the province (see figure 4). 211
He also repeated the claim made by Little that the French were in the habit of paying for
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their settlers’ transport and rations. Throughout the document, Shirley emphasized what
he saw as the critical importance of settling the province with Protestants as quickly as
possible. “A very speedy settlement of these lands is of so great importance,” he wrote,
that even a measure as symbolically loaded as lowering or even in some cases removing
the quitrent on granted lands should be seriously considered. 212

Figure 4. Acadian settlements c.1755. (From Robert A. LeBlanc, “The Acadian Migrations,”
Cahiers de Géographie de Québec 11, no.24 (1967): 526.)

Shirley, like Little, was also concerned with the most efficient way settlers could
be deployed to attain control over Nova Scotia. Much like Little, he argued that the best
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and most effective use of Protestant settlement would be to place families within existing
Acadian villages, as well as an additional township in Canso meant to defend the fishery
there. 213 He placed the greatest emphasis on the plantations to be made within the
Acadian heartland around the Minas Basin. These new settlers, he argued, would act as a
means of de-Frenchifying the inhabitants. For example, in his letter to Bedford he
recommended that a survey should be immediately undertaken to determine exactly what
lands the Acadian inhabitants laid claim to, as much of it would likely be needed for “the
English settlement proposed to be planted among ‘em,” and encouraged removing
Acadians from good land if necessary. 214 He also proposed various means of encouraging
them to intermarry with Protestants and, ultimately, convert.
Shirley’s concern about the Acadians and his proposed solution was explicitly
military in nature. Indeed, manipulating the demographics of the frontier was the
companion strategy to his better-known proposal to erect a string of forts and
blockhouses through the interior. In another letter to Bedford written at the same time, for
example, he proposed combatting French encroachments on British lands in the Ohio
River Valley and Nova Scotia with a combination of strategic forts and settler
deployment. “I think it impracticable,” he wrote,
to make these French inhabitants good subjects to the Crown of Great Britain,
without mingling English settlements among them, as contiguous to theirs as may
be, whereby the English language, laws & customs may through a constant
intercourse of trade & dealing, be gradually introduced, and their bigotry to their
priests & the French government be in time won out, together with their affinity
213
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moved into since the 1710 conquest.
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to the French of Canada & Cape Breton, by Intermarriages with their English
neighbours; who would in the mean while have a constant inspection into their
behavior 215

Much as forts would make it possible for British soldiers to militarily overwhelm the
French, moving British families into French settlements would allow them to culturally
and religiously absorb them. It is also telling that in his many written objections to
French encroachment in the Ohio valley and elsewhere, he tended to imagine—often
incorrectly—that these encroachments came not so much as forts, as civilian
settlements. 216
The most explicit rendition of this effort at weaponized settlement came from
future Nova Scotian chief surveyor Charles Morris. Morris had been a member of the
Massachusetts militia and participated in military action against Acadian and Mi’kmaw
forces in Grand Pré in 1747. Shirley had commissioned him to survey the area and
suggest appropriate places for future settlements.217 Morris’ report, which Shirley
enclosed in his packet to Bedford, outlined specifically how many Protestants families
could be planted in Annapolis, Minas, and Chignecto, identifying a total of nineteen
potential small settlements made up of 30-100 Protestant families, for a total of 1,420
families. 218 Morris enclosed a map that shows both the existing Acadian populations, and
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suggestions for where Protestant families could be settled. 219 Acadian settlements were
rendered as small houses with peaked roofs, and projected Protestant settlements as neat
grids, creating a powerful visual of the belief held by Shirley and others that the best way
to reduce French power was to overwhelm Acadian populations with Protestant families
(see figures 5 and 6).

themselves against a party of Indians, and support themselves,” enclosed in Shirley to
Bedford, 18 Feb 1748/9, fols.74-75, CO 5/886, TNA.
219
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Figure 5: Charles Morris' map of proposed Protestant settlements, showing current Acadian populations.
(Charles Morris, “A Plan of Settlements Propos’d to be Made at Annapolis, Menis[sic], and
Schiegnecto[sic],” CO 700/NOVASCOTIA13, TNA.)
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Figure 6. Detail of above showing proposed settlements in the Chignecto region. Existing
Acadian settlements are shown as houses with peaked roofs, and proposed Protestant settlements
are shown as grids.

Shirley, Morris, and Little’s proposals to deal with the Acadian problem by
weaponized settlement, however, was only one approach considered by the British.
Following on the successful expulsion of the French from Louisbourg, British officials
increasingly began to toy with the notion of removing Nova Scotia’s Acadian inhabitants
entirely as the companion policy to importing new Protestant settlers. Writing home after
the conquest of Louisbourg and reporting a delay in plans to remove the Acadians of Isle
St. Jean as part of the terms of capitulation, Warren hoped that
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they will be sent away next spring, as we see the ill consequences in Nova Scotia,
that attend keeping any of them in our territorys, and indeed it would be a good
thing if those now at Annapolis could be removed, and this I have mentioned to
the Admiralty, and I believe now W. Shirley does to your Grace. 220
The Nova Scotian council put an even finer point on this issue. Its report to the Secretary
of State concerning the state of the province in 1745 concluded that “upon the whole it is
most humbly submitted whether the said French inhabitants may not be transported out of
the Province of Nova Scotia and be replaced by good Protestant Subjects.”221 Although
he doubted the practicality of removal, Mascarene wrote to Shirley that if
these Inhabitants can be removed and good Protestant Subjects transplanted in
their room; notthing can be of greater advantage to the Brittish interest in general,
and to that of the Northern Colonies in particular and espcecially to that of this
Province.222

While a weaponized understanding of settlement had been a feature of thinking about the
Dawnland at least since the 1710 conquest, after the treaty of Aix-le-Chappelle it became
the single most influential line of thought and argument among those who concerned
themselves with the project of settling the far northeast.
Unlike the earlier schemes, this flurry of plans translated into action. Halifax
became the First Lord of the Board of Trade and Plantations in the fall of 1748. He was
an ambitious man, and he took to his new position with a zeal not before seen at the
Board. His goal was no less than to enforce order and uniformity on the notably dis-
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ordered and politically heterogeneous British colonies, and he seized upon Nova Scotia
as the perfect place to experiment with new forms of direct imperial rule. Drawing on the
ideas of Warren, Shirley, Little, and others, the aggressive settlement of loyal Protestants
was to be the cornerstone of this approach. Halifax and the Board moved quickly, and by
April 1749—around the same time that Shirley’s proposals and Morris’ map were
received—a plan for the settlement of the province, drawing on the many in circulation
through the following year, had been drawn up. In a major departure from the initial
plans, however, the first course of action would be to establish a new capital for the
province on the Atlantic-facing coast. 223
Plans moved forward at break-neck speed. By May, transport ships full of
prospective settlers were docked at Portsmouth harbor. Perhaps in part because Halifax
was attempting to move far faster than the sluggish British bureaucracy was accustomed
to, the ships waited at port nearly a month longer than originally anticipated, introducing
a series of new problems. The steward of the Merry Jack, for example, “forcibly [took]
away” and had sex with one of the women on board, “said to belong to one of the
settlers,” and refused to release her back to her family. This frightening case of sexual
assault would have been magnified by the close confines of the ship, and it led to violent
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brawl between the settlers and the ships’ crew. The only official response was to remove
the passengers to another transport; the fate of the woman was left unmentioned. 224
Finally in late June, the ships, laden with nearly 2,000 settlers and Nova Scotia’s
newly anointed governor Edward Cornwallis, arrived in the large harbor on the Atlantic
shore known to the Mi’kmaq as K’jipuktuk, sometimes anglicized as Chebucto. 225 The
new settlement was, appropriately, named Halifax, and work was soon underway to lay
out a town along lines already determined in London. Cornwallis, a man with no civilian
experience and fresh from the suppression of the highland Scots following the 1745
uprising, ran the new settlement like a military camp. Settlers were forbidden from
leaving. One group of eight men, for example, “went off in canoes”—possibly with some
Native people, or in an attempt to trade—and were promptly hauled back within the
palisades, removed from the ration book, and kicked out of the province. Surveying the
settlers who came with him like he would a camp of soldiers, Cornwallis dismissed the
majority as “poor vagabonds that embraced the opportunity to get provisions for one year
without labour.” Many had arrived without shoes, stockings, or shirts; others were
“sailors that only wanted passage to New England.” He accused the majority of the latter
of having incurable venereal diseases. 226 Clearly disgusted by his encounter with the
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lower sorts, Cornwallis employed some of the settlers of higher rank—who were not
expected to perform manual labor—to manage the lower sorts as overseers. They were to
direct these people to labor on public buildings in return for being provided with
rudimentary clothing.227
Instead of what he saw as the dregs of English society, Cornwallis looked to a
familiar source, increasingly thought of as the solution to all population woes: the
German states. In the same letter in which he derided the English settlers, he praised the
“few Swiss” who had arrived with them, finding them “easily governed” and good
workers. He strongly suggested implementing a proposal he had been given while still in
England, to extend the rights of subjects to German Protestants and offer a cash bounty to
each German family who arrived in the colony.228
Indeed, “foreign Protestants” of various descriptions, rather than Britons or
colonists, quickly emerged as the preferred option for settlers in the region. Several
proposals for Nova Scotia involved French Huguenots, including several hundred
refugees who arrived at the isle of Jersey in early 1750. 229 When the Board received
Cornwallis’s proposals, they agreed heartily, writing in response that the Nova Scotia
project would be greatly forwarded by the “industrious and exemplary dispositions” of
Germans. They promised to look into the issue and find a way to bring as many as
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possible beginning in the next year.230 The Halifax plan, after all, called not just for the
development of a new capital at Halifax, but for extensive Protestant settlement
throughout the province, and this would ultimately require more people than the seed
population that had arrived with Cornwallis.
Within six months of Cornwallis’s arrival, George II had officially approved a
plan to contract with a Rotterdam merchant, John Dick, to acquire new settlers for Nova
Scotia. The Board of Trade received broad latitude to contract with him or any other
merchant, and to “offer…reasonable encouragement to foreign Protestants in order to
induce them to settle.”231 These “encouragements” were very generous. In addition to
subsidized passage from Germany, prospective settlers were promised, gratis, fifty acres
of land with an additional allowance of ten acres per family member plus a year’s
provisions and any tools needed for husbandry, agriculture, and the fishery.232 The Board
authored a declaration meant to be circulated throughout the German states, which
painted a rosy picture of a growing province “as rich and fertile as any other of the
British Colonies,” overseen by a “wise and judicious governor,” and welcoming new
settlers every day.233
The declaration sent to Dick masked an unfolding catastrophe on the ground.
Cornwallis had walked into an already precarious environment, where Native and
Acadian hostility to the British regime had lain just below the surface since the
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“conquest” of 1710 and had frequently erupted into open fighting. The combination of
the sweeping new settlement plan—which made no provision for negotiating land
cessions and violated the treaties signed by Mi’kmaq and Wolastoqiyik in 1726—
combined with Cornwallis’s bellicose and arrogant nature was disastrous.
Initially, relations between the new Nova Scotian establishment and the Mi’kmaw
and Wolastoqiyik nations had been cautiously friendly. A number of Native people and
some sachems visited the town site in the first month and were friendly enough to give
Cornwallis the impression that they would readily renew the 1725/6 treaty. 234 In August,
Cornwallis’s party sent to remove the French from the mouth of the St. John returned
with representatives from the Wolastoqiyik and Chignecto Mi’kmaq, probably from the
Fundy shore area of the Siknikt district. These communities were at the front lines of the
border dispute between the British and French, and well connected with their
Passamaquoddy and Penobscot cousins who were increasingly oriented toward
diplomacy with the British. Following normal protocol, the representatives met with the
Provincial council several times—probably over the course of several days—and agreed
to renew the treaty of 1725/6. 235 Mascarene, who had been present at the original
negotiations and several other meetings between Wabanakis and the Massachusetts
Governor, was by now an old hand at Native diplomacy; he was still in Halifax at the
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time of this meeting and it seems likely that he nudged Cornwallis—who had no
grounding in this form of treaty making—into the proper forms. Things looked good.
The Wolastoqiyik and Siknikt deputies, however, did not seem to have
community power to renew the treaty, and this initial meeting was likely simply a display
of their openness to begin negotiations for renewed friendship. The deputies returned to
the north shore of the Fundy with Howe and a shipload of ceremonial gifts in order to
“ratify” the treaty renewal closer to home. This two-step treaty process was followed in
New England, with the full community meeting, feasting, and exchange of gifts with
high-ranking men signifying the actual moment of renewal. Cornwallis, had mistaken the
beginning of the treaty process with its conclusion.236
Compounding his lack of knowledge of Native diplomacy, Cornwallis appears to
have vastly underestimated the Mi’kmaq and Wabanaki in just about every way. In
dismissing Acadian claims that they could not take up arms out of fear of Native
retaliation, Cornwallis wrote derisively that “at present above ten thousand people are
awed by two hundred Savages.” 237 In fact, the Mi’kmaq population alone was something
more like 3,000, including 600 or more fighting men. Cornwallis’s arrogance is nowhere
more evident than in his claim to the Board of Trade that “with an addition of force by
sea and land” he could “root [the Indians] out entirely.” 238 At this point, the only actions
taken by the Native nations of Nova Scotia were the capture of twenty Englishmen at
Canso, who were immediately returned, and vague rumors of a general council at
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Cobequid bay. Indeed, Cornwallis’s immediate move from cultivating friendship to
proposing the elimination of the entire Mi’kmaq and Wolastoqiyik population before any
major violence was committed is very telling of his personality and general approach to
governing.239
Cornwallis’s opinions on the Native population of the northeast were shared by
his fellow Englishmen who had come to Halifax. Hugh Davidson, for example, wrote to
his friend Richard Nevil Aldsworth that the Mi’kmaq were nothing but “poor wretches”
who would be entirely removed from the province within a few years.240 He also
discounted their organization and military ability, claiming that Halifax’s rickety and
hastily built wooden palisade meant that “ten thousand Indians could not destroy the
settlement.” 241
This combination of arrogance and utter disregard for the Mi’kmaq and
Wolastoqiyik as independent actors came to a head in the fall of 1749. After the incident
at Canso, Mi’kmaq attempted—but evidently failed—to take another English ship at
Chignecto. The key incident, however, took place on September 30, when some Mi’kmaq
attacked a party cutting wood on the east side of the harbor, killing four men and taking
one prisoner.242 Cornwallis and his council immediately switched to offensive mode. The
resolutions passed on October 1st were almost shockingly harsh, implementing a scalp
bounty and stating that
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to declare war against them [the Mi’kmaq] would be in a manner to own them a
free and independent people; whereas they ought to be treated as so many bandit
ruffians or rebels to His Majesty's Government…. [I]n order to secure the
province from further attempts from the Indians some effectual method should be
taken to pursue them to their hunts and show them that after such actions they
shall not be secure within the province. 243
From then on, friendship was impossible.
Although certainly a reflection of Cornwallis’s personality, his and his council’s
hardline approach to the Mi’kmaq and Wolastoqiyik was informed by British
understandings of sovereignty in the far northeast. Early in Cornwallis’s tenure, Halifax
and the rest of the Board of Trade wrote to him, informing him that the French governor
at Canada, Roland-Michel Barrin de La Galissonière, had demanded that the
Wolastoqiyik be included in the general peace and treated as allies of the French. The
Lords saw this as a French attempt to undermine British sovereignty in what is now New
Brunswick, and indeed, this was Galissonière’s intention. However, the practical effect
was to tie Wabanaki submission to the British to the problem of resolving the brewing
border dispute in Great Britain’s favor. These concerns led the Board to inform
Cornwallis that there was “an absolute necessity of compelling these Indians to renew
their Submission to His Majesty,” and urged him “to take such measures for that purpose
as shall appear to you most likely to prevail.” 244 For a man like Cornwallis, those
measures would inevitably involve a naked show of force.
The Board of Trade was perfectly aware of this turn of events; indeed, it had
received Cornwallis’s letters containing a full account of the situation and the Council’s
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declaration of war a few days before contracting with Dick and penning the official
invitation to German families. 245 While the Board disapproved of Cornwallis’s genocidal
desire to “root [the Indians] out entirely,” it generally approved of his conduct and must
have understood the violent situation that the settlers they recruited would arrive to. 246
Yet, while the advertisement to potential German settlers touched on the Acadian
population, it did not mention Native inhabitants at all, although it did note that settlers
would be provided with guns.247 It seems likely that the Board was relying on the
ignorance of peasant families from the German States, who had more than enough of
their own troubles.
The Board of Trade was not the only group considering the possibilities of
German settlement in the far northeast in the years after 1748. Between the high death
toll among the Louisbourg campaign troops—most of whom were from east of the
Piscataqua—and several devastating Native raids, the war had been a demographic
catastrophe for northern New England. Little estimated that over 7,000 men from the
northern colonies—by which he mostly meant Massachusetts—had been lost. 248 It was
also a massive setback for the Maine speculative companies who had risen to the fore in
the wake of Queen Anne’s War and hoped to make their fortunes in Kennebec Country.
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The unscrupulous Waldo, who had been Pepperell’s second in command on the mission,
was particularly hard hit. His settlements at St. George and Broad Bay were wiped off the
map. 249 In a memorial to the Duke of Bedford, Waldo claimed that his efforts to recruit
soldiers from his estates in eastern Massachusetts had “so thinned that frontier” that it had
been left vulnerable to the Wabanaki attacks that destroyed them. As usual, his concern
was not his people but his pocket book: he complained that lands that had once brought
him £1,000 sterling a year were now “almost entirely laid waste.” 250
Following the war, Waldo did make efforts to make his purchase of the TempleNelson land rights in Nova Scotia mean something. He teamed up with British merchant
and diplomat Wyndam Beawes and circulated a plan to settle several thousand European
families in Nova Scotia.251 Nothing, however, seems to have come from this scheme, and
Waldo instead focused his efforts on re-populating his St. George lands.
Despite Waldo’s only patchy success earlier in the decade recruiting Germans to
fulfill his speculative concerns, after the war the idea of using Germans to make up for
the massive population losses sustained in the war gained steam almost immediately.252
Just a month before the Lords of Trade made a contract with John Dick to bring Germans
into Nova Scotia, Lieutenant Governor Spencer Phipps made a call to recruit “foreign
Protestants” to replace wartime settler losses in a speech before the General Court. This
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proposal immediately caught the attention of men throughout the colonies who made a
living by the German trade, which, by then, was a booming industry in Pennsylvania and,
to a lesser extent, South Carolina. Joseph Crellins, for example, who had been active in
efforts to bring Germans to South Carolina, wrote to Phips from Philadelphia within a
month of Phips’ speech to offer his services. 253
Massachusetts took unprecedented steps to encourage foreign Protestants to settle
in the less densely settled parts of the province. A committee appointed to look into this
possibility first selected the area of Fort Massachusetts, in the west of the province near
modern North Adams, as the site for these government-recruited settlers. Fort
Massachusetts, like the militarized settlements to the Eastward, had been decimated
during the war; sixty settlers had been killed and another thirty had been taken captive
and taken to Canada during an attack the same year as the one on Broad Bay.254 The
committee proposed laying out two townships for Germans, and suggested that the
government should grant them 100 acres per family, with an additional allowance of 25
acres for sons nearing the age of majority and 50 acres for adult single men. 255 The
committee was also ordered to put together an act that would supersede all past acts that
could in any way impede the importation of foreign Protestants. 256
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By the time the committee’s recommendations were voted on, the two western
townships had been joined by another two townships in the Eastward, to be laid out
inland from Falmouth (modern Portland).257 The townships were the New England
standard at six miles square, and to be peopled with 120 settlers each, either “distinct
families” or single men over 21 whose grants were conditional on their staying in the
township for at least seven years. 258 The government planned to hire Crellins to recruit
these foreign Protestants, with a promise of 200 acres of reserve land in each township if
he fulfilled his obligations.259
As with the broader war effort, any difference between official Massachusetts
policy and the interests of Maine’s great landholders was nearly impossible to discern.
The General Court was far from the only body interested in recruiting Germans in the
post-war era. Waldo also made a contract with Crellins for an additional 200 families to
try and repopulate Broad Bay, making Crellins both the official provincial agent and
directly responsible to Waldo.260 Another large proprietary group, the Kennebec
Company, also became involved in the rush, setting aside in late 1751 a township
opposite the Kennebec from Fort Richmond for German Protestants, somewhat
uncreatively called Frankfort. 261 The company hired Rotterdam merchant John Steadman
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and Henry Ehrenfild Luther, a civil official from Frankfort who had taken it upon himself
to act as an advisor to the province, to recruit for them in Germany. 262
That both the British powers of the Eastward were trying to recruit Germans in
1750-1751 was bound to cause issues. Massachusetts and Nova Scotian officials first of
all had to deal with the familiar problem of Pennsylvania Newlanders and agents for
South Carolina, both more established emigration pathways for German families. Even
getting settlers aboard a ship was no guarantee they would end up where the recruiters
wanted them. Crellins, for example, complained that a minister who had originally agreed
to go to Maine jumped ship once he arrived in Amsterdam, changing his destination to
South Carolina.263 Moreover, official government agents were not the only people trying
to bring Germans to the far northeast in the early 1750s. Competition between official
recruiters and the people who had been contracted by Waldo and the Kennebec Company
caused significant tension. 264 At one point, Crellins pointedly asked the secretary of
Massachusetts to remind Luther that only one of them had the authority from the
government to settle the four townships that had been set aside for foreign Protestants. 265
Indeed, Luther had become a particularly enthusiastic booster for the
Massachusetts cause. Luther was a jurist, councilor to the Duke of Württemberg, and
owner of a successful type foundry that provided fonts for Philadelphia’s first Germanlanguage publications. Concerned by what he saw as deeply unethical practices by those
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who were recruiting settlers for Pennsylvania, Luther jumped on the New England
project as a possible means of reforming the emigration system. 266 He repeatedly warned
Crellins, Waldo, and other representatives of Massachusetts to avoid the merchants of
Rotterdam (including Steadman) who he accused of employing shady men called
“enlisters,”
men of ill fame and…desperate reputation who spread over all Germany… and
woe to them who trust any thing with them, and who suffer themselves to be
seduced by their promises.267
The use of such men, Luther argued, would not only tarnish the reputation of the New
England and Nova Scotia projects, but potentially lead to a ban on emigration. 268 Luther
wrote to the Massachusetts provincial secretary Josiah Willard with proposals on how to
fix what he understood to be a badly broken system. The agents of Massachusetts and
Nova Scotia should work together, he suggested, which would end up as a benefit to both
parties. By receiving more official support from the Board of Trade and installing
impartial on-the-ground agents, the two northern colonies would “entirely defeat the
unlawful trade of the Newlanders of Pensilvania” and establish themselves as the most
official of the many squalling British attempts at luring German families across the
Atlantic. 269

266

Luther also had a dim view of what he saw as excessive religious factionalism in
Pennsylvania: Henry E Luther to [William Shirley?], 5 Sept 1751, vol 15a, pp.85-88,
MAC.
267
[Henry E Luther] to Samuel Waldo, 5 Sept 1751, vol 15a, pp.83-84, MAC; see also
Henry E Luther to [William Shirley], 5 Sept 1751, vol 15a, pp.85-55, MAC.
268
[Henry E Luther] to Samuel Waldo, 5 Sept 1751, vol 15a, p.84, MAC.
269
Joseph Crellins to Josiah Willard, n.d., vol 15a, p.64, MAC.

107
Luther’s efforts to secure the confidence of Massachusetts officials tended toward
the extreme. In 1751, for example, he wrote to Shirley that
I can't well express the joy which I feel when I represent to myself your province's
being one day sufficiently peopled; it will be able not only to defend the other
provinces on your continent belonging to the Crown, but also powerfully to
advance the just designs of the English Nation and make their flagg respected as
far as the coasts of Africa and the East Indies. This honour which awaits you, and
which I look upon as certain, gives me a most sensible pleasure, which nothing
equals, but that of being so happy, as to contribute all in my power thereunto. 270
Luther then proceeded to promise his unborn child to the service of the province,
planning to name the child George if male and Anne if female. When little Anne was
born that November, she was duly baptized with Luther’s friend standing in for the
child’s official godparents, the Governor, Council, and Representatives of the Province of
Massachusetts. 271
In a world where acceptable Protestant bodies were a limited commodity, the
Massachusetts schemes—approved by the Province but not the Board of Trade—
threatened to obstruct the Parliamentary-funded efforts to settle Nova Scotia with the
same families. Massachusetts officials gave Crellins specific instructions not to obstruct
the work of the Nova Scotia agent, but his mere presence was seen by the Board of Trade
as a potential affront and, perhaps, yet another example of Massachusetts exceeding its
proper place in the Empire. Crellins arrived in Germany as the work of recruiting
Germans for Nova Scotia was already under way. In February 1751, shortly after
Crellins’s arrival, Luther arranged a meeting between Crellins and Dick’s deputy Kholler.
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This meeting initially produced good results and both sides promised to work together in
harmony, but the agreement collapsed in less than a month. According to Crellins and
Luther, Dick and his deputy Kholler went on the offensive, publishing disparaging
advertisements in German newspapers claiming that the Nova Scotian agents had a more
legitimate commission and attempting to discredit the New England efforts with the
Board of Trade. Crellins claimed that Kholler and Dick’s efforts cost him well over 250
potential settler families, scared off by the rumors of impropriety. This behavior
continued the next season, as Kholler took out advertisements in newspapers throughout
the German States claiming that the New England project was intentionally trying to
sabotage Nova Scotian efforts and that Crellins was not a man who could be trusted.272
Although Crellins swore that he had in fact gone out of his way to promote the
Nova Scotian efforts, he also accused Dick and Kholler of recruiting Catholics, making
promises that they were not authorized to make, and using shady practices—such as
stealing transports bound for New England—that would harm the reputation of the
British generally. Crellins, Waldo, and others in the Massachusetts interest insinuated the
Nova Scotian slandering was putting the very frontier at risk, alleging that Nova Scotia
would only benefit from a more densely settled Massachusetts and that the French King
might use the confusion to begin recruiting Germans for his own efforts in Canada and
Ile Royale.273
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The New England recruiters, however, were far from a united front. Crellins
complained that his efforts were being undermined by two men he had brought to assist
him, Steadman and Peter Wild, who had since been hired by William Bowdoin and the
Kennebec Company. Crellins alleged that while he lay sick in his cabin, Steadman and
Wild took the poorest of the contacted settlers out to a tavern where they plied them with
wine and wrote letters home on their behalf that slandered Crellins and promoted the
efforts of Steadman and Wild—and, by extension, promoted the interests of the
Kennebec Company above those of the Province and Waldo. 274 Indeed, the Kennebec
Company appears to have attempted to poach some of the settlers intended for the
Provincial townships.275 For example, a boatload of settlers for the Provincial townships
was turned over to Steadman by Crellins at Rotterdam. Once the transport arrived in
Massachusetts, however, the Kennebec Company voted to try to persuade as many of the
Germans aboard as possible to settle on their township by paying their passage and
providing additional provisions.276
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the result was that Massachusetts received far fewer
Germans than had been hoped for in the period immediately following the war. Nova
Scotia, on the other hand, made a stronger showing, but only relatively: Dick was able to
recruit enough Germans for one or two large townships. However, the state of continued
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war with the Mi’kmaq made following the original plan of creating new settlements
within Acadian lands—50 miles through dense woods or a treacherous two day sail from
the British stronghold of Halifax—untenable. Even if the province had been at peace,
many commenters considered the German-speaking settlers inappropriately foreign, and
did not trust them too far beyond the reach of the government.277 Instead, most of the new
settlers were sent a day’s sail up the coast from the capital to create the new settlement of
Lunenburg. Retaining something of the flavor of the original settlement plans, the site
was located nearly on top of the old métis village of Mirilegueche, one of the only areas
of significant Francophone presence on the Atlantic shore at the time.278
Lunenburg would prove to be the only township other than the capital settled as
part of Halifax’s grand scheme. Like that settlement, it was frequently described in
military terms, and the imperial officials overseeing its creation left little question that
they understood it to be on heavily contested ground. Governor Peregrine Hopson, for
example, wrote to the Board of Trade requesting 500 muskets “and accoutrements for the
use of the foreign Protestants.” 279 These guns were eventually acquired from
Massachusetts, from the store on Castle William originally meant for an aborted invasion
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of Canada. Instead, they would be used to support a different kind of conquest. 280
Lunenburg’s military nature extended to the ways in which settlers were cared for. They
were provisioned by the military, which kept track of rations, expenditures, and names of
settlers alongside provisioned soldiers and in the same manner. 281
Rather than intermingling German families within French settlements, the new
German settlers were ultimately deployed as a kind of living buffer between Englishspeaking colonists and their enemies. The German settlers both at the Massachusetts
Eastward and Nova Scotia still farther eastward lived with the consequences of being
used as human shields, a goal made clear by both the Board of Trade and the Maine
proprietors, who made frequently referred to them as a “barrier against both the French
and Indians.” 282 At the Kennebec German community of Frankfort in 1754, Wabanakis
began killing livestock, a common precursor to attacks on human inhabitants. When
Abraham Wyman went to confront some of the young men involved, “one of them
discharged a gun at him and would have killed him, but one of them struck the gun aside
and bid him qyick walk, or else he would be killed.” 283 Two weeks later the Germans
were told by Wabanakis that a party of French and mission Indians would attack the
settlement within two weeks “and that all the old people were to be killed and the young
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carried to Canada.”284 Terrified, the German settlers fled to the nearest garrison house
and wrote to the governor for protection.285
Violence against settlers and their property, however, was not the only Native
response to British attempts at expansion. In 1754, representatives of the Mi'kmaw
districts and some Wolastoqiyik from the St. John River Valley approached the
provincial council and proposed peace and recognition of British rights to the southwest
of the peninsula and parts of the mainland in exchange for the recognition of the
northeast half of the peninsula as their exclusive territory. While the Mi’kmaq had always
pushed for protection for their lands during peace negotiations, this plan was remarkable
for its specificity, laying out precise boundaries for the land in question. The document
presented to the Government at Halifax made it clear, moreover, that while the amount of
land specified may have seemed large to British eyes, the Mi’kmaq saw it as a significant
concession, “very limited in view of the immensity of the land they did possess, and of
the amount at present in their possession.” 286 Within this space, no British or French
forts—let alone settlements—would be tolerated, and while they promised to allow the
British passage through the region on the highways, they made it clear that any British
detachments found “going into the woods” would be considered enemies. In return, the
English would be free to develop the Bay of Fundy, the south shore, Halifax, and perhaps
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even the St. John River Valley as European settler spaces, regions that were, not
incidentally, the best agricultural land the province had to offer.287
The lands that would have made up this reduced but potentially more secure
Mi’kma’ki are interesting in a number of ways. Although the plan was delivered to the
Nova Scotian government by Father Le Loutre, a priest known for his pro-French
activism, the Mi’kmaw proclamation, by banning all forts and proposing withdrawal
from the Acadian heartland and moving further east rather than joining the French on the
Acadian mainland, in fact suggested a break from French as well as British plans for the
region. In this sense the plan represents a pragmatic evolution of a pan-Indian approach
to land and diplomacy that had been increasingly evident in the region since 1749, when
several Mi’kmaq leaders made arguments that the Nova Scotian peninsula should belong
exclusively to “les sauvages” and made statements linking their struggle over land with
other indigenous people throughout North America. 288 Furthermore, while this reduced
Mi’kma’ki would have entailed the abandonment of communities on the southwest shore
and Bay of Fundy region, the emphasis on the importance of Canso in particular as a
Native space represented a continuation of a long-standing policy while also attempting
to secure claims to the parts of the region that had been least influenced by either the
British or the French.
The Mi’kmaw proclamation, however, was not taken well by the Nova Scotian
government, which seems to have considered it laughable at best and a nefarious French
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plot at worst. 289 Nova Scotia in the 1750s was run by people who were invested in a
vision of land ownership that reduced the importance of so-called “Indian title” in favor
of grants directly from the Crown, which either ignored the presence of Natives or
considered them conquered people who occupied the land only at the Crown’s
sufferance. Cornwallis’s successor Charles Lawrence dismissed the proposals as
“insolent and absurd” and wrote to his superiors that the Council did not even see fit to
answer them, “or to take the least notice of them.” 290 Reflecting a paternalistic idea of
Wabanakis as subjects without rights to the land, when the plan was proposed again the
following year by Mi’kmaw delegates, Lawrence claimed that while the Council was
“perfectly disposed” to grant the Mi’kmaq an “allowance” of land, he made it clear that
such “allowances” would be much smaller than what had been proposed, and that any
such grants would be made on British, not Native, terms. 291
The British establishment at Nova Scotia had reason to fear a French settlement
scheme. The return of Ile Royale in 1748 presented an opportunity for French officials to
reimagine what their holdings on the Gulf of St. Lawrence looked like, and what they
were supposed to achieve. The most notable accomplishment of the post-return era was a
set of ambitious plans for the refurbishment of the largely destroyed fortress. Protecting
the fishing outports also became a much more prominent consideration post-1745,
although that is only relative to the neglect they received before. Louis Franquet, hired to
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evaluate the defenses of the fort and recommend improvements, originally included
eleven redoubts located at villages throughout the colony. 292
French officials, on the whole, appear to have shared many assumptions with
British planners about the power of population to tip geopolitical contests. At least some
French officials in France were pushing for a more direct role in settlement during these
years. Compared to their British competitors, however, and contrary to Shirley’s paranoid
beliefs, the French made barely any attempts to either attract new colonists or rework the
demography of their holdings. Instead of drawing new settlers from France or Germany,
the primary hope was to convince Acadians to move from British territory to lands still
held or claimed by the French. At the same time as officials in Massachusetts and Nova
Scotia were importing German families, officials at Versailles earmarked 100,000 livres
for the transportation and provisioning of Acadian families. 293
The violent high point of efforts to move Acadians into French claims took place
around the Isthmus of Chignecto in 1750. Following the return of Louisbourg, the French
had increasingly attempted to enforce their claim to mainland Nova Scotia—modern New
Brunswick—with a border at the Missaguash River. Nestled in the tidelands on the south
side of the river, the residents of Beaubassin Village, a major Acadian settlement, were
subject to pressure from both British and French demographic schemes. Morris’ map had
called for five clusters of Protestant settlement in the immediate area, including one in the
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middle of the village itself.294 The French, meanwhile, had increased efforts to bring the
population north into their claimed territory. Finally, after a Cornwallis sent a military
detachment to secure the Isthmus, the French burned the village to the ground to force the
inhabitants across the river, displacing up to 1,000 people. 295
Beyond this violent and forced population movement, the efforts to move Acadians
saw few results. Support from within Acadia from both Acadians themselves and
government officials was tepid. Jacques Prévost, the financial comptroller for the colony,
was pessimistic about the transplanted Acadian settlements that had been made, and after
the outlay in 1750-1751 there appears to have been little support from the establishment
in France for settlement experiments.
Although official support dried up, further experiments in demography came in
the next two years under the brief but memorable tenure of Governor Jean-Louis de
Raymond, comte de Raymond. Raymond made pushing into the land beyond Louisbourg
a priority during his two-year tenure as governor. While his plans were mocked by
contemporaries and even some historians as being overly grand or even delusional, they
differ very little from what the British establishments in Halifax and Boston were
discussing and implementing at the same time. 296 In one of his most lampooned acts, in
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late 1752 he allowed between fifteen and twenty-two soldiers to marry in one day and
then settled them in a village on the Mira River named after their superior, Minister of the
Marine Antoine-Louis Rouillé, comte de Jouy. While married soldiers were relatively
uncommon and certainly frowned upon in the French military, it is easy to imagine
Cornwallis or Lawrence approving of something similar. Raymond founded several more
inland agricultural villages in an attempt to move Louisbourg beyond the fortress and
make it self-supporting, a major acknowledged weakness and one not unknown to the
founders of Halifax further down the Atlantic coastline. Late in his tenure, Raymond
even appears to have been planning a German settlement of his own, near the soldier
village of Rouillé on the Mira River. 297
Raymond, however, found little support for these plans among other officials in
Louisbourg. Prévost, who had quickly positioned himself as Raymond’s rival, strongly
objected. He wrote to Rouillé that the village that bore his name was doomed to fail, and
the wives and children of the soldiers would quickly become a liability.298 Indeed, despite
Raymond’s efforts and the halting attempts to lure Acadians to the area around Port
Toulouse, the overall number of French settlers in Ile Royale living beyond the walls of
Louisbourg decreased dramatically in the colony’s post-1748 re-founding. Although the
overall number of civilians in the colony greatly increased, in 1752 there were only 1,671
settlers living outside of Louisbourg, compared to 2,518 in 1737.299 The biggest factor in
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this shift was no doubt the material and psychological effect of the English attacks in
1745, which had not only taken over the city but also destroyed most of the major outport
communities. Better success was found on Ile Saint-Jean, the modern Canadian province
of Prince Edward Island. By the time of Louisbourg’s second fall in 1759, British
officials sent to round up and deport the Acadian inhabitants living on the island found
nearly 5,000 residents. Nevertheless, the bulk of the Acadian population remained in
British Nova Scotia on the rich agricultural lands of the Bay of Fundy and Minas Basin.
Some Acadian emigres to French lands even returned. In the attempted villages around
modern Sydney, Cape Breton, for example, residents were given permission to return to
British Nova Scotia in the fall of 1754.300
The official declaration of war between the British and French crowns in 1756
disrupted both British settlement efforts and Wabanaki attempts to create a peaceful and
sustainable new order. Most dramatically, the deportation of the Acadian population
beginning that same year permanently and dramatically altered the demographics of the
Dawnland. Within five years, the French had been permanently removed from North
America. Settlement efforts generally in conformation with the Halifax plan continued
after the peace; but both the meaning and the target of weaponized settlement had been
altered in ways that would have dramatic repercussions for all of the Dawnland’s people.
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Chapter Three: The Invasion of the Dawnland

On an unseasonably cold day in May 1759, Massachusetts Governor Thomas
Pownall sailed toward Penobscot Bay. Accompanying him in a small entourage of sloops
were many of the men who had defined the Bay Colony’s relationship with the Eastward
since the early decades of the century, including landowner Samuel Waldo. Sharing the
tight quarters of the Governor’s vessel were four young Wabanakis, Laurent, JosephMarie, Joseph, and Zacharie. None had been empowered to act as diplomats or speak for
their communities. Instead, six days earlier, they had been swept up in a dragnet after
Pownall’s arrival at Fort St. George. Surrounded by thirteen Anglo-American military
men and government officials, the young Wabanaki men had been subjected to a hostile
“examination” by the governor before being bundled into the boat. 301
As the ship approached the site of a proposed English fort at the mouth of the
Penobscot River, Pownall finally consented to allow the men to return home to their
communities. In an ominous speech, he told them to “tell your people that I am come to
build a fort…and will make the land English, I am able to do it, and will do it. If they say
I shall not; let them come and defend their land now in time of war.” The only way they
could expect peace, he said further, was for them to “become English, they and their
wives and families,” by accepting British law and dominion, renouncing all their land
rights and claims, and moving their communities to within sight of the fort. He then had
the Wabanaki men followed in order to determine the location of the river’s primary
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carrying place, which he planned to fortify in order to, as he later put it, close “the last
and only door which the enemy had left to the Atlantic.” 302
Pownall capped off his trip to the Eastward by marching up the river as far as the
falls—roughly the site of modern-day Bangor, Maine—and dramatizing his possession of
the Penobscot Country on behalf of the empire by burying a lead plate engraved with the
date, an affirmation of Britain’s and Massachusetts’s possession of the region, and, of
course, his name. In perhaps a fitting symbol of the end of an era, during the march
Waldo dropped dead of a stroke, dramatically closing a period of speculation and
settlement schemes in the Eastward that he had dominated. Pownall ended his sojourn—
which both he and the General Court announced was a complete success—by visiting the
ruins of the French and Penobscot settlement of Pentagoet. Near sunset, he hoisted the
King’s Colors over the barren skeleton of the fort. Standing within it, he and his men
drank heartily to the British King’s health.303
Less than a year before Pownall’s expedition, France had surrendered the fortress
town of Louisbourg on the island colony of Ile Royale for the second time. Unlike in the
previous war, however, it would never be returned. A few months after Pownall’s return
to Boston, Québec—the political center of France’s vast North American claims—also
fell after the dramatic battle on the Plains of Abraham. The rest collapsed quickly. By the
time Montréal surrendered in 1760, French power had been broken. Suddenly, the
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imperial struggles that had defined North American politics east of the Mississippi for
close to a hundred years had changed forever. 304
The fall of Louisbourg did not end the war, or even fighting in the Northeast,
which would drag on for six more years. But it brought about a sea change in the region.
Civil and military leaders in Nova Scotia and Massachusetts switched from a defensive
posture to one that was much more aggressive and confident, and old dreams of settling
the region with loyal Protestants revived with startling speed. 305 In both provinces, the
government acted to clear the way for settlement in areas that had been far outside
European control before the war broke out. These projects went beyond simply providing
land for ambitious British colonists. In Nova Scotia, the government, with prodding from
the Board of Trade, hoped to deploy settlers to confirm possession of the province in the
face of continuing French and, especially, Native resistance. In Massachusetts, the
governor and General Court also saw settlement as a way to end Indigenous power in the
region, but the schemes that emerged immediately after Louisbourg were also designed to
secure Massachusetts’ claim to the Sagadahock Country, the conflicted region between
the Kennebec and St. Croix Rivers claimed by both Massachusetts and Nova Scotia.
Wabanaki people, exhausted by the long war and destabilized by the rapid
departure of the French, scrambled to respond. The newly emboldened provinces of
Massachusetts and Nova Scotia pressed strongly worded treaties and frequently acted as
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though the question of Native title had been solved by French defeat in the war. Rather
than simply reclaiming or expanding lands that had previously been occupied by
Europeans—which had been one of the main preoccupations of the previous decades—
the settlement projects of the late 1750s and early 1760s pushed increasingly into lands
that Wabanakis had made strong and specific ownership claims to for many years.
Eighteenth-century British observers believed that the fate of the far northeast
represented one of the most important issues of the post-war world. 306 Indeed, the British
case for aggressive Protestant settlement in the Dawnland was perhaps even clearer
following the war than before it. In Nova Scotia, the pre-war deportation of the French
Acadian settlers, who had been living in the region for nearly a hundred years, had left
almost all the province’s productive agricultural land empty. As fruit rotted in orchards
and the elaborate dyke systems that had been carefully built and maintained over the
previous hundred years decayed and overflowed, the extent to which the British province
had relied on Acadian labor became painfully clear. 307 While rounding up and deporting
as many Acadians as possible had perhaps made the province less French, it had done
little to make it more British, and the reward for inflicting such mass human suffering
appeared to be little more than a crippled economy.
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Acting on explicit instructions from the Board of Trade, the Nova Scotia
government had tried to recruit settlers to fill Acadian lands even before Louisbourg had
surrendered. 308 Without an immediate promise of British victory in the war, however,
settlers were understandably reluctant to move to what they considered an exposed
frontier. One group of potentially interested settlers, for instance, told Nova Scotia
governor Charles Lawrence that they “had…too much reason to fear the enemy would
have it in their power very much to molest if not totally extirpate them.” 309 Optimistically
predicting success later that year at Cape Breton, in February of 1758 the Board of
Trade—still led by the Earl of Halifax—instructed Lawrence to publish a proclamation
intended to continue “that inclination which the New England people seem at present to
have for obtaining settlements in Nova Scotia” as well as to “excite the like inclination in
other parts of America.”310
Lawrence took this injunction seriously, and moved quickly after the French
defeat at Louisbourg in July 1758.311 With the assistance of the Provincial Council, he
published two proclamations, the first in October 1758 and a more detailed missive in
early January 1759.312 Sticking mostly to his official instructions, Lawrence offered up to

308

Charles Lawrence to the Board of Trade, 9 Nov 1757, CO 217, LAC.
Ibid.
310
Board of Trade to Charles Lawrence, 7 Feb 1758, CO 217, LAC; For the Earl of
Halifax and Nova Scotia, see Beaumont, Colonial America and the Earl of Halifax, 51–
52.
311
For the direct connection between the fall of Louisbourg and Lawrence’s settlement
promotion efforts, see Charles Lawrence to the Board of Trade, 26 Sept 1758, CO 217,
LAC.
312
“A Proclamation,” 12 Oct 1758, enclosed in Lawrence to the Board of Trade, 26 Dec
1758, CO 217, LAC; “A Proclamation,” 11 Jan 1759, enclosed in Lawrence to the Board
of Trade, 5 Feb 1759, CO 217, LAC
309

124
500 acres of land per family free of office fees, with a one shilling per 50 acre quit rent
that did not come due for ten years—an offer that was especially appealing to poorer
New Englanders in the increasingly cramped colonies of Connecticut and Rhode Island.
To sweeten the pot even further, Lawrence offered free transportation and a year’s worth
of provisions for the first settlers of the first three granted townships. These townships—
Horton, Granville, and Falmouth—comprised the old Acadian districts of Grand Pré and
Piziquid, which had been the densest region of Acadian settlement prior to the
Deportation. These were also the lands that had been targeted for British infiltration in
the 1740s and 1750s and were still defined by Acadian-cleared land and established
orchards. 313 Now, instead of seeding British settlers within Acadian villages, the British
Parliament would subsidize New Englanders to take their place entirely.
Just how much Parliament should be paying for, however, was a contentious
topic. Lawrence had not in fact been authorized by the Board of Trade to provide
transportation or provisions and had acted on his own, a situation that echoed his
insistence on continuing to provision the Lunenburg settlers long after the Board no
longer considered it a good idea. 314 Preemptively defending his decision, Lawrence wrote
to the Board that he had been pressured into it by the Connecticut and Rhode Island
delegates. As Lawrence told it, they had responded to Lawrence and the council’s initial
unwillingness to grant transportation and provisions by asking
who were the people (as they expressed themselves) that broke the ice. I have
good reason to apprehend as they were the first that they would have been the last
313
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and the only ones we should have seen on that errand, they would have returned
disgusted and have given such discriptions of the Country as must have
discouraged others from even thinking of it.315
Indeed, Lawrence was convinced that powerful forces in the older colonies were lining
up to oppose Nova Scotia’s new settlements. 316 This initial outlay, he argued, was
necessary to get the ball rolling. With just a little more help, he believed, the province
would “repay with interest the heavy expence of nursing it whist in its infancy.”317
Although initially skeptical, the Board echoed this argument in their official report to the
King in December 1759. It cautioned that “two[sic] strict an attention to oeconomy”
would potentially risk the success of a plan “productive of the most essential advantage
not only to the colony of Nova Scotia, but to Your Majesty's other colonies on the
continent of North America, and finally to this Kingdom.” 318
Indeed, the plan seemed to work. By September 1759, Lawrence had contracted
for thirteen townships, lining the coast from the Isthmus of Chignecto to the German
settlement of Lunenburg—the entire southwest coastline closest to the Gulf of Maine and
the New England colonies (see figure 7). Writing excitedly to the Board of Trade,
Lawrence stated that he had “not the least doubt but that every acre of cleared land in the
province as well as the whole coast from hence to Cape Sable will be well peopled sooner
than heretofore has been conceived to be possible.” 319 These grants went far beyond repeopling land left empty by the exile of the Acadians. The Board of Trade noted with
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approval that Lawrence’s plan would “not merely to people the cultivated lands
heretofore possessed by the French Inhabitants,” but also “grant out with them a very
large proportion of wild and uncultivated country.”320

Figure 7. “Planter” Nova Scotia showing the extent of townships in Nova Scotia by 1767. The 13
townships granted by 1759 were, beginning at the Isthmus of Chignecto and moving west,
Sackville, Cumberland, Amherst, Onslow, Falmouth, Horton, Cornwallis, Granville, Annapolis,
Yarmouth, Barrington, Liverpool, and Tinmouth; Tinmouth was a failure but eventually
resurrected in 1762 as New Dublin. Annapolis and Granville were only lightly settled. The
townships on the Petitcodiac and St. Johns other that Maugerville and, to a lesser extent,
Hopewell, never manifested until after the American Revolution, although they were granted as
part of the Philadelphia land boom. (From Margaret Conrad, ed., They Planted Well: New
England Planters in Maritime Canada (Fredericton, NB: Acadiensis Press, 1988), 8.)
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Granting land that had never been occupied by Europeans and was still very much
home to Mi’kmaw and Wolastoqiyik people violated the Wabanaki understanding that
the treaties of 1725/6 banned new British settlements without their explicit consent. Both
Lawrence and the Board of Trade, however, never so much as considered consulting
Native leaders, even as Indigenous warriors took action. As he granted out hundreds of
thousands of acres of land and new settlers began to trickle into the province, Mi’kmaw
and Wolastoqiyik, warriors—sometimes alongside Acadians who had escaped the British
dragnets—hounded the inhabitants of what they understood to be illegal settlements and
attacked the still significant British military presence. A few months after issuing his first
proclamation and little more than two weeks before issuing his second, Lawrence
complained to the Board that “the Indians, notwithstanding the success of his Majesty's
arms in the reduction of Louisbourg, still infest and harrass the promising settlement of
Lunenbourg.” 321 In April of 1759, shortly before issuing the first township grants, he
wrote that “the Indians have again opened the spring with fresh murders amongst the
settlers,” that five soldiers had been killed at Fort Cumberland, and that a provision vessel
had been seized by Native pirates.322 In the same letter in which he wrote about the
thirteen townships in September, Lawrence wrote that “sixteen or seventeen” vessels had
been taken, and that Native people and remaining Acadians “have infested us more than
ever, and indeed in a manner too which they never attempted before.”323 Yet both
Lawrence and the members of the Board of Trade discussed the grants on the
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southwestern shore and future plans for lands in the interior of what is now New
Brunswick and the eastern parts of the peninsula as though Native title—and, indeed,
actual possession—did not matter.
As Lawrence issued proclamations and granted townships, Governor Pownall in
Massachusetts tackled the issue of Native title directly with his “conquest” of Penobscot.
A few months after returning, Pownall claimed in a speech to the General Court that “a
great many families stand ready to go down to Penobscot” and urged the court to do what
they could to clear the way for large land grants. 324 Lt. Governor Thomas Hutchinson
reported to the Board of Trade in June of 1760 that the General Court was preparing to
divide York County—which had previously covered all of Massachusetts’ claimed
territory from the Piscataqua to the St. Croix—into three. Hutchinson complained that the
sheer size of York County had been “a great discouragement to the settlement of the
eastern part of it.”325 The division had also been strongly encouraged by the Kennebec
Company, a newly ascendant speculation company whose membership included several
members of the General Court.326 As thanks for Pownall’s attempt to “open up” the
Eastward, in May 1760 the Company granted him 501 acres in Frankfort—which they
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subtly renamed “Pownallborough”—and presented him with an elaborate signed map of
the town. 327
Major settlement efforts in the Penobscot country, however, proceeded much
more slowly than in Mi’kma’ki. This was perhaps in part because of Pownall’s departure
to take up the governorship of South Carolina a few months after his “conquest.” It may
have also, however, been in part a result of Nova Scotia’s new policies, which siphoned
off land-poor families who may have otherwise migrated to Penobscot. Indeed,
Lawrence’s proclamation had been, it seemed to him at least, a wild success. Settlers
began to arrive before the end of 1759, chiefly to the subsidized townships of Horton,
Cornwallis, and Falmouth. Although Lawrence had arranged for an agent in New York
and news that Nova Scotian lands were open for white settlement reached as far as the
British Isles, the vast majority of early settlers were New Englanders, particularly from
Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts fishing communities in Essex County and
Cape Cod. 328
The arrival of these New Englanders overlapped with continued deportations of
Acadians. While Lawrence was issuing proclamations, hosting agents, and sending
surveyors to lay out townships, squads of rangers were combing through the westernmost
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part of the peninsula and the St. John River Valley rounding up Acadians who had as yet
managed to avoid deportation by fleeing into the interior and sheltering with Mi’kmaw
families. 329 In November 1759, just as New England settlers began arriving en masse,
Governor Lawrence deported 151 Acadians from the Cape Sable area to Great Britain—
56 men, 46 women, and 59 children. 330 Some observers connected the expulsions directly
with the ongoing settlement efforts. An article in the Boston Evening-Post recorded the
departure of two sloops and a schooner filled with settlement agents and bound for Cape
Sable “to view the lands…with an intention of settling there,” and concluded that “the
[Acadian] Inhabitants were removed from thence in good time.” 331
The Planter grants were designed to discourage speculation and were meant to be
given only to people who would actually settle the province. 332 In this sense, New
Englanders were ideally suited to take them up. Beginning with what Virginia DeJohn
Anderson terms “the Great Reshuffling” that began shortly after their arrival in North
America, New Englanders had refined a communitarian method of township expansion
that created ideal grantees for Lawrence’s scheme. 333 Once access to new lands in a given
town became limited, a group of householders would form a corporate body and petition
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for new township grant. These early settlers became the town proprietors, with control
over town governance and land granting. Common lands were divided and passed on to
approved newcomers and younger generations, eventually creating a new group of land
poor settlers who repeated the process. The small groups of would-be proprietors who
responded to Lawrence’s proclamation acted in just this manner and represented
relatively close-knit groups of householders generally coming from one New England
town or small region.334
New Englanders, however, were not the only people the Nova Scotian
government or Parliament had in mind. Indeed, the Board of Trade was in fact somewhat
concerned that Lawrence had already granted all the fertile lands, and commanded him to
lay aside some Acadian lands for British officers and soldiers who had served in the
Seven Years’ War.335 This reservation was not meant simply to reward discharged
military men and their families for their service and keep them from falling idle and
problematic. The Board saw their military experience as a powerful asset, arguing that
they were thereby the “properest settlers for a frontier colony.”336
Lawrence, for his part, did not fully agree with the Board’s assessment of the
usefulness of veterans. A military man himself, Lawrence suggested that officers and
soldiers were in fact “the least qualified from their occupation as soldiers of any men
living to establish new countrys,” asserting that what was needed was farmers and
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fishermen like the New Englanders he had recruited. Reflecting a view that Nova Scotia
was a particularly difficult and isolated type of frontier, he argued if ex-military families
were to be granted lands at all that they should be sent to the “valuable lands to the
westward, in the neighbourhood of the old established colonys” where they could move
to more settled regions if life became too difficult. 337 Lawrence nevertheless proposed
settling the soldiers along the north side of the Bay of Fundy in modern New Brunswick
from Passamaquoddy Bay to the Petitcodiac River, and on the Gulf of St. Lawrence at
Miramichi and Tatamagouche—all regions that not only had scant histories of Acadian or
other European settlement, but were also among the chief power centers of Wabanaki
people. 338 They were also regions that had been previously singled out as potential spaces
for British expansion. 339 In this, Lawrence was attempting to fill the shapes of an imperial
map that had for many years been pure fantasy.
As with Massachusetts, all this settlement activity went hand-in-hand with Native
diplomacy of various sorts. In January 1760 the Nova Scotian government sent an
expeditionary force to the St. John’s River Valley to root out fugitive Acadian families.
The men returned with 300 prisoners but also seven Wolastoqiyik and Passamaquoddy
delegates interested in negotiating a formal peace. 340 They were no doubt inspired by the
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fall of Québec. Indeed, they had opened their peace negotiations with British officers at
Fort Frederick in mid-November, almost exactly two months after the battle at the Plains
of Abraham.341 They may also have had in mind Pownall’s harsh “examination” at
Penobscot the previous spring, which had included a young Passamaquoddy man, and
were seeking better terms from their other colonial neighbor.342
Mi’kmaq also began to make formal overtures. Michel Augustine of Richibucto,
Paul Laurant of La Hève, and Claude Renée of Shubanacadie, arrived at Halifax in late
February to make peace terms. The agreement they signed was essentially a slight rewording of the 1725/6 treaties.343 Historian William Wicken speculates that Augustine
represented the western Mi’kma’ki and the other two men the eastern. 344 However, it is
also possible that they acted as delegates for the three westernmost Mi’kmaw districts of
Siknikt, Kespukwitk and Sipenkn’katik, which would suggest these initial overtures
spoke primarily to the interests of western Mi’kma’ki rather than the eastern communities
that were more closely associated with the French establishment at Île-Royale. 345
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The limited geographic scope of this initial round of treaty making helps explain
why it was not until 1761—after most settlers had already arrived—that a major public
treaty signing between Mi’kmaq generally and the Province of Nova Scotia occurred at
Halifax. On June 25 1761, a group of Mi’kmaq including at least four sachems met with
representatives of the Nova Scotian government and the “principal inhabitants” of the
town to participate in a ritualistic burying of a hatchet on the Governor’s farm. 346 The
leaders who signed the treaty on that day—the same re-worded agreement signed by the
western representatives over a year before—represented communities and districts in
eastern Mi’kma’ki. They chose as their speaker Jeannot Peguidalouet from Cape Breton,
perhaps reflecting the tradition that Unama’kik/Cape Breton was the head district of
Mi’kma’ki. Treaties continued to be signed with individual villages after the hatchet
burying, but the ceremony appears to have been the major public celebration of the
renewal of peace and friendship that represented a broad national Mi’kmaw consensus. 347
Formal treaty making was clearly on the agenda throughout the region. A little
less than a year after the Penobscot expedition and about a month after the initial peace
agreements signed by Wolastoqiyik/Passamaquoddy and western Mi’kmaw delegates at
Halifax, four Penobscot delegates arrived at Boston. They stayed there for roughly three
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weeks, meeting with the Governor and Council and eventually coming to peace terms.348
According to the documents produced by Pownall, Massachusetts promised to protect
“all such Indians of the Penobscot Tribe or their allies” and accord them “all the rights
benefits priviledges and advantages which British subjects do or ought to enjoy.”349 In
exchange, the Penobscot signatories agreed that they were subjects of the British King,
had forfeited all their lands, would denounce the French, and would arbitrate any
problems between Penobscot and British settlers in the courts of Massachusetts, not their
own justice system. 350 Significantly for the future of the fort and the proposed Penobscot
settlements, the Native men agreed that they would hunt and fish only in areas delegated
to them by the Bay Colony, “but not to the exclusion of any other His Majesty's
Subjects,” and would live and farm on lands that would be assigned to them within sight
of Fort Pownall.351 As in his description of his actions at Penobscot the previous year,
Pownall made it clear both in the text of this document and to the Board of Trade that he,
at least, saw his interactions with the Native people of the Eastward as constituting a
conquest, not a negotiation. Enclosing the minutes of the meeting to the Board of Trade,
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he wrote that he “would not suffer it to be called a peace” and instead referred to the
outcome of the conference as “terms of accommodation.” 352
It is difficult to say how Penobscots interpreted this agreement. Certainly, the
terms were much harsher than those Wabanaki districts agreed to in Nova Scotia. Wicken
has convincingly argued that the 1760/1 Nova Scotian treaties were essentially a
reconfirmation of the 1725/6 agreements, which Wabanaki people interpreted as a
protection of Native land rights.353 In contrast, Pownall’s “terms of accommodation”
explicitly demanded that Native nations cede their lands. It is unclear what the
relationship between the signatories—Kehouret, Joseph Marie, Zachetien, and
Zachebesen—was to the larger Penobscot nation. Kehouret may have been the author of a
letter to Governor Shirley in 1754 giving him intelligence on the French and assuring him
of their desire for peace, and a known conciliatory leader within the district.354 Joseph
Marie may have been the same Joseph Marie that Pownall had interrogated at the
building of the Fort, and perhaps the Joseph (or Jo) Mary who later accompanied the
Massachusetts survey of the Penobscot River.355 But, in general, the signatories are
obscure, and major sachems and negotiators of the era such as Tomah, Odohando, John
Neptune, French Michel, and Espegueunt are conspicuously absent—perhaps because the

352

Pownall to the Board of Trade, 23 May 1760.
Wicken, Treaties on Trial.
354
James Phinney Baxter, ed., Documentary History of the State of Maine, vol. 24
(Portland, ME: Maine Historical Society, 1916), 21; Saxine, “Properties of Empire,” 378.
355
The journal is reproduced in Fannie Hardy Eckstorm, “History of the Chadwick
Survey from Fort Pownall in the District of Maine to the Province of Québec in Canada
in 1764,” Sprague’s Journal of Maine History 14, no. 2 (June 1926): 76.
353

137
nation was undergoing a leadership crisis at the time. 356 The previous winter had been
unusually mild, which would have likely meant a poor hunt and a possible food crisis
among a people who had just narrowly survived many years of warfare. 357 Penobscots in
1760 were under greater pressure than their more populous Mi’kmaq neighbors, and even
then, the men who came to Boston may have represented a non-majority faction.
The presence of someone who may or may not have been a Passamaquoddy,
rather than a Penobscot, also raises the issue of who exactly Pownall believed he was
dispossessing, and, indeed, if he even cared. The population estimates Pownall or one of
his clerks appended to the conference minutes—“5 Sachems and 73 Warriors,” which
would translate to a population of around or slightly less than 400 people—suggests that
they represented factions from the Passamaquoddy district as well as the Machias district
of the Penobscots. Other population estimates from the same years indicate a population
of 400 or more only when Passamaquoddies were lumped in with Penobscots. For
example, the anonymous author of a journal of the Penobscot Expedition published in
newspapers in 1759 claimed that there were only 54 Penobscot and Machias warriors,
and an additional 20 or 30 at Passamaquoddy, a combined figure—74 or 84—very close
to that in the terms of agreement. The journal’s author furthermore argued that the
Machias and Passamaquoddy “are all united under the Penobscots, and may really be
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considered as one tribe.”358 This, along with Zacharie and Joseph’s presence at Fort
Pownall, suggests that Pownall, at least, believed that his terms covered all Native people
living between the Penobscot and St. Croix Rivers. Perhaps he was simply uninterested in
engaging with Native politics beyond finding someone to sign his documents. Most likely
it was a combination of both, leading to an imperfect treaty signed by imperfect delegates
agreeing to harsh and unusual terms.359
Either way, the effect of the agreement appears to have only lasted for a few
months at best. Newspaper reports claimed that when the delegates arrived in Boston in
April, 28 Penobscots had taken up residence in and around Fort Pownall. 360 This would
have coincided with the traditional Wabanaki seasonal round, in which spring and
summer were spent closer to the coasts. Yet by mid-June, newspapers reported that “the
Penobscot Indians have withdrawn and gone off with their squaws and children.”361 This
may have been in part the result of an altercation between the Penobscot and some
English hunters. Newspapers reported that in May, two Anglo-Americans had been killed
by Native men in the vicinity of Fort Pownall, and the Penobscot near the fort had
seemingly blamed it on some passing “Canada Indians” causing an alarm. After
investigation, however, British officials at the fort decided that rather than an act of war,
the incident had been “owning wholly to disputes arising between the Indians and our
hunters,” and that “it is also reported that some of the latter plundered some of the
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former.”362 These vague reports suggest that tensions at the Fort were rising between
Penobscots and European migrants, which, combined with their reported departure less
than a month later, is highly suggestive.
The roaming hunters whom Penobscots clashed with were not the only Europeans
entering their lands. Massachusetts’ efforts to settle the Penobscot country finally began
to bear fruit in 1762. On two days in March of that year, the General Court granted
twelve townships on the east side of the Penobscot River.363 When completed, the
townships promised to settle over 3,000 people in the Penobscot country, which would
add significant weight to Pownall’s abstract claims of dominion and tip the demographic
balance dramatically out the hands of Native people. Appreciating the importance of
settler density, the Court instructed surveyor Samuel Livermore to lay all twelve
townships out contiguously, “which method…is most likely to be beneficial as well to the
province as to the petitioners.”364 As in Nova Scotia, these grants were applied for by
groups of families who intended to actually settle in the new townships, bringing the selfreproducing logic of New England towns deep into new territory. If successful, the New
England settlement projects in Mi’kma’ki and Penobscot Country would squeeze
Wabanakiak on both ends while monopolizing valuable coastal space. They would also
have the effect of expanding not just British America, but the specific cultural and
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political traditions of New England, turning the Dawnland into a new outpost of
Yankeedom.
Just as the future of the Eastward as a new appendage of New England seemed
sure, the arrival of a formal peace upended dynamics in the region. The Treaty of Paris,
signed in February 1763, confirmed France’s loss of power in North America.
Unbeknownst to most historical actors, it was also the end of the flurry of state-sponsored
settlement in the northeast. The spendthrift days of the pre-war and post-Louisbourg era
were replaced by an increasing awareness of the massive national debt, and the empire
that emerged after the war was above all else one jealous of its prerogatives and
protective of its pocketbook. Soon, conflicts over sovereignty between the Crown and
Massachusetts would complicate settlement programs east of the Penobscot just as
Parliamentary money dried up in Nova Scotia.365 At the time, however, the signing of the
peace seemed to promise continued efforts in the region as the collapse of the French
North American Empire was confirmed and the pre-peace efforts to settle territory
protected.
This ultimate financial withdrawal, however, was preceded by massive
expenditure. One of the first effects of the peace was a flurry of surveying activity across
North America designed to reinforce the British Empire’s power over its new and newly
uncontested territories.366 In the Dawnland, these surveys were done with the specific
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goal of facilitating new Anglo-American settlements in areas that had not previously been
settled by Europeans. Even more than the efforts of the previous four years, these new
incursions into the Dawnland caused uneasiness throughout Wabanakiak. Indigenous
communities from the Kennebec to the Gulf of St. Lawrence scrambled to find ways to
protect their land in the face of unprecedented intrusions and the crushing news that the
French, their main ally, had left for good.
The most dramatic attempt to draw new borders following the peace was the
Royal Proclamation of 1763, an effort at both rationalizing the Empire and coming to
terms with its newly multi-national character. The Proclamation was issued with the
stated aim of ensuring that British subjects could “avail themselves with all convenient
Speed, of the great Benefits and Advantages” of the “extensive and valuable
acquisitions” made during the war. By prohibiting grants of land west of the Appalachian
mountain range, the authors of the Proclamation not only sought to quell Native-settler
conflicts in the continental interior but also to direct settlement into the northern and
southern coastal peripheries. 367 Many officials were explicit about the implications of the
act for guiding Anglo-Americans into Nova Scotia, Maine, and the far southern colonies.
A memo written before the Proclamation was finalized—likely by Henry Ellis, sometime
governor of both Georgia and Nova Scotia—argued that a line would force Anglo-British
subjects to
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emigrate to Nova Scotia, or to the provinces on the southern frontier, where they
would be usefull, to their mother country, instead of planting themselves in the
heart of America, out of the reach of government. 368
Similarly, a memo written by the Board of Trade to the King in 1768 suggested that the
reservation of western lands in 1763 was almost entirely meant to encourage and
continue “the policy of this kingdom to confine her settlements, as much as possible, to
the sea coast,” arguing that preventing emigration to the interior was necessary to ensure
that settlers would move into Nova Scotia.369 Without such a ban, the authors suggested
that, “tempted by a moderate climate,” settlers would leave Nova Scotia and Florida for
the interior, thereby “abandon[ing] latitudes peculiarly adapted to the production of those
things, which are by nature denyed to us.”370
Surveys and new borders, however, also proliferated at the local level. In
Massachusetts, Governor Francis Bernard commissioned a series of surveys of the
Eastward following the peace that were linked to his own settlement schemes as well as
the townships granted by the General Court in 1762. Bernard was well aware that the
success of these surveys relied on Native knowledge and cooperation, and that they
would be viewed with suspicion and even violence by those same Native communities. 371
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Because of this, Bernard went to some lengths to convince the Wabanakis whom his
surveyors relied on that their intentions were wholly innocent and concerned only with
opening new roads and clarifying borders. Wabanaki people, however, were not fooled.
The Penobscot portion of the survey, for example, was theoretically meant to investigate
the feasibility of running a road from Fort Pownall to Québec. However, it was also tied
to Bernard’s land interests at Mount Desert Island, and lead surveyor Joseph Chadwick’s
journal made frequent references to locations that could be developed into townships. 372
Wabanakis understood the survey as a threat to their sovereignty. Just weeks
before the survey was set to begin, Penobscots and some Wolastoqiyik/Passamaquoddies
debated renewing war against the English in their midst. 373 Although rejected, this was
not a fringe proposal. It had been put forward by no less a figure than Tomah, described
as the Penobscot “governor” in the immediate post-war years. 374 Tomah had acted as the
speaker in the meeting with Bernard the previous fall. 375 Oso, a Penobscot woman who
lived near Fort Pownall and who became a chief informant of commander Thomas
Goldthwaite, described the argument that took place at the council as one over the nature
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of Penobscot sovereignty. Tomah, she reported, had declared the lands belonged to the
Penobscot and that the English had no right to treat them as “slaves.” 376 Others, however,
argued—as had Pownall—that the English now held their land by right of conquest. Oso
may have simply been flattering Goldthwaite by framing the issue in these terms.
However, the proposal clearly divided Penobscot leaders. Tomah was supported by
Espegueunt, an important diplomatic chief, but other crucial leaders like John Neptune
and French Michel argued that improving the British alliance was the best strategy. 377
Despite the specter of war raised by Tomah’s proposal, the survey went on.
Several high-ranking Penobscots who had been involved the earlier debate accompanied
the survey, including John Neptune, Espegueunt, and French Michel. Bernard
optimistically assured his superiors that the Penobscots were in “good humor” and would
willingly assist the survey.378 He also repeatedly dismissed any threat, insisting that
Tomah was now in exile and that the vast majority of Penobscots had rejected his ideas in
favor of friendship with Massachusetts. 379
Things went well until the party reached the Penobscot village at Panawahpskek,
the site of the modern Penobscot Reservation in Old Town. Chadwick had been
instructed to lay out a line at the nearby falls, beyond which Governor Bernard had
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promised English people would not settle. Perhaps this sensitive issue brought the still
simmering tensions in the group back to the fore. Three Wabanaki members of the
party—perhaps including Espegueunt—refused to continue to assist Chadwick and his
surveyors. A heated debate broke out. As Chadwick described it, “the desput between our
party and the other Indeins was so graet as to com to a fray,” and for two days the future
of the survey was uncertain. Finally, the two sides reached a compromise. Chadwick and
his men could continue and would receive assistance from Wabanaki guides. However, in
response to Penobscot concerns that the surveyors would leave “their countrey exposed,”
none of the British would be allowed to make any sketches or drawings of the land. In an
opening memorandum to his journal, Chadwick noted bitterly that this restriction “made
it impractable for ous to preform the work with acquric [accuracy].” 380
Chadwick’s reference to an altercation between the Penobscot men who had
agreed to guide the survey suggests that disagreements over whether to cultivate the
Anglo alliance remained very bitter; the presence of Neptune, Michel, and Espeguent
suggests that this division fell on the same lines as the recent debate over the war
proposal. Not just Penobscot land, but Penobscot sovereignty was under threat,
something that both sides were keen to protect. Delivering their ultimatum, the
Penobscots pointedly reminded Chadwick that “when thay waer amongst English men
thay obayed their commands”; now that he was in their country, it was time for him to
“obay Indeins orders.”381 The Wabanakis made sure to drive this point home. On their
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arrival at Passadumkeag, Chadwick and his party were quickly ushered into a darkened
room. Rumors that Tomah had been exiled and discredited were evidently greatly
exaggerated. The surveyors now came face to face with him, along with Odohando and
Joseph Orono, all of whom were “richly dressed,” and sat on “three packs of bevier,” a
clear reference to the material wealth of the nation.382 Additional packs of beaver skins
were brought out for the English surveyors to sit on. If the Massachusetts men were in
any doubt that Tomah still held authority among the Penobscots, this display must have
removed it.
Bernard’s other survey also met with trouble, although of a somewhat different
kind. The issue of the Nova Scotian border had been hotly contested since the British
“conquest” of 1710, and would remain fuzzy and unclear until well after the American
Revolution. 383 After suffering much epistolary abuse from his superiors and the Nova
Scotia governor, in 1764 Bernard had finally managed to get all the British officials
involved to agree that the border between the two colonies would be the St. Croix River.
This river bounded the original grant to the Earl of Stirling in the 1630s and was the site
of France’s first overwinter encampment.384 All that was left to do, it was thought, was to
survey the river itself.
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But the men sent to document the course and location of the River St. Croix
quickly discovered a crucial issue: by the late eighteenth century, there was no river
commonly called the St. Croix. The location of Samuel de Champlain’s 1604 camp and
the river that surrounded it was by this time unknown to Anglo-Americans (although
perhaps not to Wabanakis), and all three major rivers that emptied into the bay had from
time to time been called the St. Croix. 385 These rivers were known to both Europeans and
Native people by their Wabanaki names: they were, from west to east, the Cobscook, the
Schoodic, and the Magaguadavic. With only a scant handful of New England migratory
fishermen representing the entire European population of the Bay, the surveyors turned to
the people who knew the area best: Passamaquoddies. 386
Centered on the St. Croix River drainage system, Peskotomuhkatik, the
Passamaquoddy homeland, stretches from roughly the edge of Penobscot Bay in the west
to the Lepreau River in modern New Brunswick on the east, and inland as far as the head
of that river. The main Passamaquoddy settlements in the eighteenth century were
clustered around both sides of the Schoodic River where it flows into Passamaquoddy
Bay. These included an important seasonal village at Sipayik/Pleasant Point on the west
side of the mouth of the river and a summer agricultural village several miles up the
Schoodic at the head of the tide near modern Calais and St. Stephan, where porpoises
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were also brought after the hunt.387 The Passamaquoddies also had a burial ground and
gathering place at Qonasqamkuk, modern St. Andrews, on the east side of the Schoodic,
where one or more large wooden crosses marked places of worship and important
burials. 388 The prominence of the Schoodic is reflected in the meaning of its name, which
refers to the process of burning fields to make way for human habitation and
agriculture.389
The majority of English-speaking Europeans who spent time in Passamaquoddy
Bay before 1783 were not permanent settlers, but migratory New England fishermen. The
relationship between Indigenous nations and roving fishermen sometimes led to violence
elsewhere in the region. 390 The scant evidence for Passamaquoddy Bay, however,
suggests that Passamaquoddies successfully managed the fishery, playing an important
role in directing where and when these New Englanders took fish in their territory. In the
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1790s, Alexander Hodges, a former Indian trader, recalled a story he had heard about
what he believed to be the first New England fishing expedition into the Schoodic River
in 1760. On arriving in the Bay, the fishermen were greeted by Louis Neptune, the son of
then-sachem Bahgulwet. 391 When asked where the best fish could be found, Neptune was
at first reluctant to help. Only after a two-day negotiation during which Neptune was
offered alcohol and hospitality did he finally agreed to take them to the Schoodic. 392
This episode, though remembered many years later and at second hand, might be
interpreted as a negotiation over fishing rights in the Passamaquoddy’s main river.393
Alexander Nichols, who had been on the fishing trip in question, stated that their usual
fishing grounds at that time were at the falls of the Schoodic—in other words, near the
Passamaquoddy summer village. Nichols also built a camp on the shores of the river and
opened some small roads, going so far as to contemplate moving his family there, while
also recalling that he and his colleagues had “confided much” in John Baptiste Neptune,
Bahgulwet’s elder son who inherited the sachemship on his death. 394 It seems highly
unlikely that any of this would have been possible without formal or informal consent
from Passamaquoddies. Certainly, Passamaquoddies believed they had the right to
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dictate land use. They stated as much during a 1783 meeting with American
representatives. 395 In 1770, they complained to Nova Scotia Governor William Campbell
that some English people were encroaching on their land rights by hunting without
permission and taking up land at Qonasqamkuk.396
Rather than Massachusetts or Nova Scotia, then, the leading political authority in
Passamaquoddy Bay as late as the early 1770s was the Passamaquoddies, and they were
entirely uninterested in ceding their land or sovereignty to the British Empire. Much as
with the Penobscot survey, Bernard attempted to reassure Passamaquoddies that the
surveying teams had nothing to do with settlement.397 Bernard explained to his friend and
business partner Richard Jackson that Passamaquoddies would “take umbrage at any
appearances of preparing to settle in that bay and river.” 398 Therefore, despite the fact that
he was at that very moment involved in a land scheme with Jackson and others that
would have imported several hundred settlers to the bay, Bernard presented the survey to
Wabanaki people as being concerned only with settling the border dispute between his
colony and Nova Scotia. 399 Despite this awkward attempt at subterfuge, however,
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Passamaquoddies fully understood the implications of the surveys and found ways to
continue to assert their sovereignty despite the emboldened colonies that threatened to
crush Passamaquoddy country between them.
There are no sources that cast direct light on the internal politics of
Passamaquoddy country at this time, but Passamaquoddy behavior during the surveys
may offer a clue. An examination of the Massachusetts and Nova Scotia surveys reveals
that Passamaquoddies gave wildly conflicting answers to these surveyors when asked
which of the three rivers entering the bay was the “ancient” St. Croix. In 1764, John
Mitchel, hired by Massachusetts, arrived in Passamaquoddy. Following his instructions,
he met with “forty of the principal Indians,” including the Bahgulwet. According to
several accounts, these men were unanimous in their opinion that the true St. Croix was
the Magaguadavic on the eastern side of the bay, swearing a formal oath that it “was the
ancient and only river known amongst them” as the St. Croix.400 To further back up their
claims, Louis Neptune and two others then took Mitchel to the Maguagadavic itself to
dramatize their claims. There, Louis Neptune stood “on a point of land on the north
side…in concurrence with two other Indians,” and “declare[d] the Magaquadavie, to be
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the same river known among the Indians by the name of St Croix.” 401 Yet the next year,
Native informants from the same community told Charles Morris, Surveyor General of
Nova Scotia, that the St. Croix was in fact the Cobscook, sixteen miles to the west, on the
opposite side of Passamaquoddy Bay. 402 Morris’ Native informants even told him that the
name St. Croix had come from how Cobscook Bay “run[s] a cross the mouth of” the
river.403
The Passamaquoddy responses to these surveys may be an example of Wabanaki
attempts to adapt the old imperial “play off” system to a changed reality of multiple
British jurisdictions. They might also be evidence of a growing split within the
community over how to respond to the changed reality of life in the Northeast, as was the
case in nearby Penobscot district. Certainly, later Passamaquoddy accounts of the
location of the St. Croix were inflected with political considerations as a dispute over
leadership succession became tied to the looming question of whether Passamaquoddy
country should ally with the British Empire or the emergent American state.404 Whatever
the cause, Passamaquoddy people had arranged it so that their heartland, centered on the
Schoodic River and Passamaquoddy Bay, remained both undivided by an imperial
boundary and within two different colonial jurisdictions (see figure 8). The two colonies
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were aware of these conflicting claims, but for reasons that remain unclear, no further
action was taken to resolve issue until after the American Revolution.

Figure 8. A map of the traditional Passamaquoddy homeland showing the importance of the St
Croix/Schoodic watershed, prepared by the modern Passamaquoddy nation. Red lines
representing the Magaguadavic and Cobscook “rivers” have been added by the author to show
how the jurisdictional overlap created by Passamaquoddy testimony preserved the Schoodic
watershed area and access to the carrying places connecting Passamaquoddy country to the
Penobscot and St. John Rivers. (Original map can be found on the website of the Passamaquoddy
Pleasant Point Tribal Government:
http://www.wabanaki.com/wabanaki_new/Data_Homeland.html.)

Efforts to document the land for settlement also threatened Native sovereignty in
Nova Scotia. In addition to many smaller surveys commissioned by land speculators, the
province was a key subject of Samuel Holland’s monumental survey of the northern part
of British America, a project funded and organized by the Board of Trade and Parliament
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as a necessary post-war action. In his official instructions to Holland, Board of Trade
secretary John Pownall (the brother of Governor Thomas Pownall) wrote that the first
order of duty was to survey the Gulf of St. Lawrence and islands, including Cape Breton
and St. John’s Island. This region was, he wrote, “of the most pressing excpediency, in
order to accelerate the different establishments which have been proposed to be made.”
After he had completed his work there, Holland was to survey the northern and eastern
coasts of the peninsula, “where it is proposed to make establishments for carrying on the
fishery, the coaleries, and other purposes of immediate settlement.” 405
This new attention to the northeast of the Nova Scotian peninsula was an
important shift. Lying closest to the now-former French colony of Ile Royale and at the
entrance to the St. Lawrence River, most of this region had been under actual or
perceived control of the French until the defeat of Louisbourg and had been outside of the
government at Halifax’s control. The Gulf shore and islands were also a Mi’kmaw
stronghold. Outside Louisbourg and the southeastern corner of Cape Breton, there was
practically no European settlement either imaginary or real, nor had there ever been.
Unsurprisingly, it was also where most Mi’kmaw people lived at this time. In 1764
Governor Montague Wilmot—a nephew of the Earl of Halifax—estimated that 400 of
500 total Mi’kmaw “fighting men” lived in the region east of Halifax, on Cape Breton
Island, and along the Gulf of St. Lawrence. 406 Cape Breton was also considered to be the
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head district of the Mi’kmaw nation, and therefore of deep symbolic import.407 Many of
these new post-treaty settlement efforts therefore effected Mi’kma’ki in ways far more
profound than the New England resettlement of Acadia had been earlier in the decade.
Perhaps as part of the general post-war move toward treaty-making, Mi’kmaw
people had in fact rekindled their pre-war attempts to have the northeast officially
recognized as Indian country only a few months before the Treaty of Paris. 408 In 1762,
acting Nova Scotia governor Jonathan Belcher issued a proclamation setting aside the
coastal areas of this same region “as the claims and possessions of the said Indians” and
forbid “all molestations of the said Indians in their said claims.” 409 Belcher believed he
was following official orders to identify Native land claims in the wake of increasing
tensions in the interior. He made it clear in a letter sent to the Board of Trade justifying
his actions that he interpreted this proclamation to grant only use rights, not full Native
ownership. 410 Nevertheless, had his plan been carried through, Mi'kmaw communities
would have retained nearly half of the modern province of Nova Scotia.
While this proclamation was doubtless met with deep satisfaction in Indian
country, it was bitterly opposed by both the European settlers of Nova Scotia and the
Board of Trade. Speaking on behalf of his constituents, assemblyman Joshua Maugher
wrote to the Board of Trade to express his disgust, particularly at the fact that Native
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people had been given exclusive access to the coasts. 411 The Board of Trade agreed with
his judgment, and Belcher lost his job in no small part because of the proclamation.412
Despite their own Royal Proclamation delimiting Native and Anglo-American lands in
the continental interior, the Lords of Trade took great exception to the “very
extraordinary claim…so inconsistent with His Majesty's rights, and so injurous to the
commercial interests of his subjects” that Belcher had “unaccountably admitted” in the
Dawnland 413 Belcher quickly rescinded his proclamation. Yet fearing that angering
Native people would lead to a replay of the war then raging in the Ohio country, he chose
not to tell Mi’kmaw leaders that their claims had been thrown out once again. 414 News of
imperial and provincial intentions to settle the region in the mid-1760s must therefore
have been met with surprise and perhaps a sense of betrayal from Mi’kma’ki.
When they came, the grants came quickly. The Nova Scotia government made
several large grants in the “newly opened” areas of Nova Scotia just as Holland was
receiving his instructions. In April 1764, the government approved two proposals, one
made by a group of disbanded officers in Montreal and another by a group of Albany
merchants. The council voted to “give each memorialist 1,000 acres …at [Shediac] &
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Tatmagush, east side of Pictou, & on the sea coast between Canso and Halifax.” 415
Grants were also made on the eastern coast of New Brunswick, previously untouched by
any Europeans aside from a handful of French missionaries and, more recently, a squalid
Acadian refugee camp. 416 A group of Scottish merchants who had received a grant in
Miramichi clearly recognized that their new claim was far outside the British pale.
Through the intervention of Francis Bernard, they successfully petitioned the Nova Scotia
government for provincial protection to prevent “interruption” of their new fishery from
Mi’kmaw inhabitants. 417
The most significant threat to Mi’kmaw power in the region, however, was a
series of township grants made to Alexander McNutt and several companies formed
under his influence. Organized primarily by mid-Atlantic merchants, these grants
reflected a nearly forgotten land craze that swept Philadelphia in 1764 and 1765.418 The
Crown and provincial government granted between 1.5 and 2 million acres of land to
Philadelphians. 419 In the mind of the Nova Scotian government, the Philadelphia
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townships were directly linked to the project of Native dispossession. In fall of 1765, for
example, then-governor Wilmot wrote to the Board of Trade that the settlers to be
brought by the Philadelphia jobbers were "a step necessary for keeping the Indians in
awe." 420 The number of new settlers the plan would have brought in would have reduced
the relative Native population of the province from roughly third to less than a fifth.421
More important, nearly all of the land granted to Philadelphians lay within the
Wolastoqiyik and Mi’kmaw heartlands along the St. Johns River and northeastern coast
of Nova Scotia. Many of the towns were to be laid out on top of major Wabanaki
population centers. Two of the reserved townships, for example, were on the sites of
Mi'kmaw summer villages. 422 In Wolastoqiyik country, where most of the grants were
made, the situation promised to be even worse. Most Wolastoqiyik in the 1760s were
living on and around Aukpaque Island near modern day Fredericton. After 1765, the
island was completely surrounded by township grants (see figure 9). 423 Had the
Philadelphia scheme been successful, the results would have been devastating for
Mi'kmaw and Wolastoqiyik autonomy and forced them to alter long-standing patterns of
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hunting, fishing, and village location. Heavy settlement on the St. Johns would also have
a major effect on Wabanaki cross-tribal diplomacy, as the valley had become an
important location for conferences between Abenaki, Penobscot,
Wolastoqiyik/Passamaquoddy and Mi’kmaw leaders over the past decades.

Figure 9. Detail from Benjamin Jacob’s 1765 map of proposed land grants along the St. John
River. Aukpaque Island, a principal Wolastoqiyik village, is one of the small islands crudely
depicted in the river at the bottom of the sketch. ("A Map of the River St. Johns in the Province of
Nova Scotia,” May 1765, JYB.)
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Like their western Wabanaki cousins, Mi’kmaw people debated what to do in the
aftermath of the treaty and the new incursions into their land it has caused. In summer of
1765, just as the speculators were descending on Halifax, Native people from throughout
Nova Scotia gathered on Isle Madame off the coast of Cape Breton in the Potlotek region
of Unama’kik. Like an earlier meeting held at Potlotek in 1749 to discuss the founding of
Halifax, the 1765 meeting was a cross-district meeting gathering leaders from many
communities in Mi’kma’ki; it was perhaps even a formal Grand Council.424 In a letter to
the Board of Trade, acting governor Michael Francklin claimed that Indians had
terrorized the settlements they passed through on the way to the meeting, and "declared
they were to meet French Forces, and threatened to destroy the out settlements when they
should return."425 It is not too far of a stretch to suggest that the meeting was at least in
part a direct response to the imperially-sponsored land fever then engulfing the province,

424

Potlotek, derived from the French “Port Toulouse,” was used by Mi’kmaw people to
describe the entire southeastern corner of Cape Breton centered on modern St. Peters. For
the role of the Potlotek region as a site of Grand Council meetings and other pan-district
meetings in the eighteenth century, see McMillan, “Mi’kmawey Mawio’mi,” 77; A. J. B.
Johnston, Storied Shores: St. Peter’s, Isle Madame, and Chapel Island in the 17th and
18th Centuries (Sydney, NS: University College of Cape Breton Press, 2004), 73, 113114. Potlotek, and Chapel Island specifically, continues to hold this significance as a
gathering place and spiritual heartland for modern Mi’kmaw people. Chapel Island is the
capital of modern Mi’kma’ki and the site of Grand Council meetings and the annual
festival of St. Ann.
425
Francklin to the Board of Trade, 3 Sept 1766; this may have been one of the incidents
recalled by Henry Alline. Henry Alline, The Life and Journal of the Rev. Mr. Henry
Alline (Boston, 1806), 7.

161
and that a military response was hotly debated. 426 Native groups met on Isle Madame
again in summer of 1766, "in the same disposition." This time, they tied their concerns
directly to the settlement projects of the Philadelphia jobbers.427 Francklin reported to the
Lords of Trade that some of them had informed the government that "they will not allow
any Settlement to be made at Pictou, and that part of the Coast of this Continent that lay
nearest to St. Peters [St. Pierre]"—in other words, the same region that had been subject
to the 1754 and 1762 proposals and that had just been granted to Philadelphians. 428
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Similar large conferences that reached across district boundaries were held
throughout Wabanakiak in the middle 1760s. Just months after the 1766 Isle Madame
meeting described by Francklin, a major conference took place at St. Johns—probably at
Aukpaque—that was attended by almost the entire Penobscot Nation. 429 The largest and
most geographically expansive conference took place in 1767. Delegates and families
from across Wabanakiak, including Mi’kma’ki and the Québec mission villages, met at
Panawahpskek at the falls of the Penobscot where Chadwick’s guides had nearly deserted
him three years before. The major topic of the meeting was English encroachment on
their lands, lands that they were “determined to maintain their right” to.430 As in 1764,
violent action against the English was openly discussed, although ultimately rejected. 431
Events of the following years made working with, rather than against, the British
system more attractive to Wabanaki leaders. McNutt’s schemes fell apart within five
years, and European immigration to Nova Scotia and modern New Brunswick after the
planter migrations amounted to a trickle rather than a torrent.432 While the impact on
Mi’kmaw and Wolastoqiyik communities was very real, European population numbers in
Nova Scotia did not regain their pre-Acadian deportation levels before the American
Revolution, hovering around 12,000 people for most of the period. The locations of these
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settlers also remained constant from before the war, as most efforts to extend deeper into
Mi’kma’ki amounted to nothing.433 European settlers were confined largely to the old
Acadian heartland in the Annapolis Valley as Isthmus of Chignecto, complemented by a
smattering of fishing villages clinging to the southwest Atlantic Coast. As historian John
Reid has convincingly argued, Native people in Nova Scotia were able to retain a
significant amount of leverage throughout the 1760s and early 1770s, even as the
government remained committed to “overawing” them. 434
Likely because of the mediocre results of the settlement schemes, the sense of
urgency from Wabanakiak appears to have lessened in the latter have of the 1760s and
into the 1770s. There are no more records of major Wabanaki conferences after 1767.
Between that period and the outbreak of the American Revolution, Penobscot,
Passamaquoddy, Wolastoqiyik and Mi’kmaw diplomacy centered on attempts to work
within the British colonial apparatus to obtain provisions, formal land grants, and,
especially, Catholic priests. Considering the crucial role played by Jesuits and other
priests in Wabanaki diplomacy over the previous 150 years, the intention of these
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requests was likely as much political as it was religious. 435 The quest for new priests also
reveals Wabanaki efforts to play different British jurisdictions off one another, an
approach similar to the “modern Indian politics” of the era of the imperial wars where
Native nations would use promises of exclusive loyalty to gain concessions from multiple
empires. 436 For example, during his meeting with Tomah and the other Penobscot
sachems, Chadwick agreed to carry a message on their behalf to Governor James Murray
of Québec requesting a priest that Massachusetts had denied them. 437 Wolastoqiyiks filed
a similar petition.438 British resistance to providing them with their traditional middlemen
placed them at a disadvantage and led to experimentation with new strategies. Penobscots
and Wolastoqiyik/Passamaquoddies who were close to the Fort Pownall establishment,
for example, went so far as to make a show of throwing away their old Catholic religious
books and inviting the Protestant Chaplain of the fort into their villages to perform
services. 439
Just as Wabanaki people were beginning to find their footing in the new British
Empire, problems unrelated to settlement took center stage in the minds of British
imperial officials and colonial administrators. Colonial resistance to efforts at imperial
reform rocked the mainland port towns of the North American British Empire. Suspicious
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of attempts by Parliament to directly tax the colonies, civic leaders in towns such as
Boston led r violent protests in opposition to what they understood as imperial overreach.
As colonial subjects began to look around them with fresh eyes, the weighty
subsidization of settlement and heavy-handed royal meddling in the Eastward began to
take on a sinister cast. What kind of a future was promised by a government that would
spend millions of pounds erecting a city in the middle of nowhere, and then ask the
established colonies to pay for it? What right did people across the sea have to tell hardworking laborers where they could and could not cut wood? The future of the far
Northeast in the face of a contested empire would look very different than the one that
had been imagined just a few years before, when Thomas Pownall confidently drank to
the King’s health in the ruins of French North America.
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Chapter Four: Contesting the Imperial Future in the Great Nova Scotian Land
Boom
In late May 1765, a very young Anthony Wayne sat hunched over pen and paper
on the deck of a ship. For three weeks, he had been surveying the southwest coast of
Nova Scotia. What he found exceeded all his expectations. He wrote to his employers in
Philadelphia—a group of well-connected men that included Benjamin Franklin—the land
in Nova Scotia was "equal to any [in] Pennsylvania," even "equal to any [he had] ever
seen." 440 Anticipating that what was at that moment undeveloped coastal and riverine
meadowland would “be a place of great importance in a very short time,” he instructed
his employers to apply for lots in the city he was about to help survey. Modestly, it was to
be called Jerusalem. 441 “I do assure you the land exceeds any idea I ever could have
formed of it before I saw it,” Wayne wrote. 442
Wayne was not alone in Nova Scotia that summer. The warm months of 1765
unleashed a mob of so-called "land jobbers" onto the province's shores, culminating in a
frenzy timed to avoid the implementation of the Stamp Act, which would have imposed
new taxes on the required paperwork. 443 In a little over two weeks, the Nova Scotian
government acting on instructions from the Board of Trade granted more than 2.5 million
acres of land to companies and individuals from both sides of the Atlantic. Wayne and
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others like him were key players in the attempt by British imperial officials to transform
Nova Scotia from a place of Native and French dominance—which in many ways shared
much in common with the trans-Appalachian west—into a profitable Protestant settler
colony like its neighbors to the south. Philadelphia's plantations, if successful, would
have led to the arrival of an unprecedented number of new Protestant settlers and
drastically undermined the land base and power of the Mi'kmaq and Wolastoqiyik who
still dominated the province. The enthusiastic response to the project of developing Nova
Scotia was a rare moment during the 1760s when colonial elites and British imperial
planners could agree on a common goal widely seen as beneficial—both socially and
financially—to both sides: the dispossession of Native people in the name of commercial
and imperial development in the coastal periphery.
Yet just three years later, another Philadelphian took direct aim at the attempts to
develop Nova Scotia in Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania. 444 John Dickinson
dismissed Nova Scotia and the new gains of the post-1763 empire as, at best, drains on
the public pocketbook and, at worst, actively detrimental to the development of the older
settler colonies by threatening to siphon off populations that would be put to better use in
the near colonial west. "The icy rocks of Canada and Nova-Scotia," Dickinson finally
declared, "never will return to us one farthing that we send to them."445 Dickinson’s harsh
words reflected the fact that the Nova Scotian land boom was, for the vast majority of
speculators, a complete failure. It ultimately resulted in barely a handful of new settlers
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and only one successful new town, Pictou, originally named Philadelphia Plantation.
Indeed, the boom’s primary legacy was to create a temporary legal roadblock to Loyalist
resettlement: in the 1780s, the majority of the land granted in the middle 1760s was
escheated and re-granted to refugees. 446
Because it did not result in a significant settler migration, this period in Nova
Scotia’s history has often been glossed over in larger histories of the region. It is
generally characterized as a time of wanton land speculation in which government
corruption led to the transfer of thousands of acres of land to insiders with little interest in
development or settlement.447 Marcus Hansen memorably referred to the period as “a
veritable carnival of land-grabbing.448 Fred Anderson describes it as “a decade of feverish
speculation” characterized by “wild schemes, conflicting claims, and unfulfillable
promises that actually hindered the colony's recovery from the devastations of war and
depopulation.” 449 Bernard Bailyn has given the period its most thorough modern account,
writing of the era as a “wild land boom” during which “speculation in Nova Scotia lands
swept like an epidemic throughout the British world.” 450 Although dismissive, these
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assessments nevertheless point to the unprecedented amount of attention directed at Nova
Scotia during these years, as monied gentlemen from across the empire jockeyed for the
chance to stake a claim in an expanded imperial world.
Fascination with Nova Scotian land was hardly new. What had changed as a result
of the Treaty of Paris was a movement from a policy in which the government sought
direct control over the project of settlement to one in which the work of settlement was
contracted out to companies and individuals. The end goals of Halifax’s great plan — a
settled, loyal, Nova Scotia and a more centralized imperial government —remained
popular, but turnover in the London administration and strict instructions to cut costs in
the wake of an expensive war made the experiments in direct government funding
politically and financially untenable. Nova Scotia still received a stipend from Parliament
in order to keep the province running, but Whitehall would no longer pay for experiments
in directly sponsored settlement. Instead, between 1761 and the end of large private land
grants in the early 1770s, the Nova Scotian government turned to private individuals to
settle the province for them. 451 Individuals and companies were given tracts of land up to
100,000 acres and given a brief timeline to fill them with a given number of Protestant
families obligated to pay a royal quitrent, but other than that the new proprietors were
free to manage their lands however they saw fit. The result was an explosion of
settlement schemes that reflected a multitude of different perspectives on land tenure,
economics, and political organization, all circulating within the same period and the same
130,000 square kilometers.
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Nova Scotia attracted so much attention in these years in part due to its particular
geographic position as an Atlantic colony that was also perceived to be an open
“frontier.” On the one hand, developing Nova Scotia buttressed a notion of empire
centered on the ocean, the navy, and trans-Atlantic trade. This model of empire, which
David Armitage memorably summed up as “Protestant, commercial, maritime, and free,”
carried with it a political and economic logic that favored developing European
settlements on coastlines and securing important sea-lanes. 452 On the other hand, a mass
migration of white Protestant settlers into Nova Scotia land also fit nicely with visions of
a land-based, settler-run empire. The post-war years saw a general boom in colonial
expansion into previously Native and French territory. While the most famous and beststudied of these migrations was that into the so-called Ohio country, British settlers also
moved east and north into French Canada, Maine, and Nova Scotia.
While settler-led migrations away from old colonial power bases and the creation
of new Atlantic control points could both be entertained within the speculative world of
Nova Scotia, elsewhere these two positions were coming into increasing conflict. Many
in the planning class found settlement in the American interior by white British subjects
deeply disturbing. Henry Ellis, sometime absentee governor of Georgia and Nova Scotia,
expressed a common concern when he argued that by “planting themselves in the Heart
of America” Anglo-Americans would lose their ties to the mother country and be more
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prone to such sins as domestic manufactures, smuggling, and not engaging in trade with
Britain.453
As the Board of Trade grew increasingly hostile toward the creation of interior
colonies, Nova Scotia—as well as Georgia and the Floridas to the south—were proposed
as the alternative, new colonies waiting to be developed which still fit seamlessly into a
bluewater notion of empire. In particular, adding new Protestant bodies to Nova Scotia
would mean better access to the fisheries and a host of spin off benefits that would
promote and sustain the British naval apparatus. The fishery, for example, was often
understood through the ancient trope of the “nursery for seamen,” where valuable sailors
could be trained up and drawn upon in times of war. 454 This understanding of the nature
of the English-speaking part of the British Empire translated into policy. The Royal
Proclamation of 1763, for example, was passed as much to keep Anglo-American settlers
from disappearing into the interior and out of imperial control as it was to prevent war
with the powerful Native coalitions of the Ohio country.455
Philadelphian speculators do not appear to have shared this vision. However, at
least for a time, they were just as interested in the economic and political opportunities
Nova Scotia could provide. Benjamin Franklin, for example, who was heavily involved
in the Nova Scotian boom, certainly disagreed that the Anglo-American population
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should be kept within access to the sea. Rejecting the notion of checks on AngloAmerican settlement to the west, Franklin argued in the 1750s and early 1760s that
through the process of territorial expansion across the North American continent, wealth
based on colonial consumption would become practically limitless. Settler expansion into
the west should therefore be encouraged as much as possible. 456 The many ties that he
and his fellow Philadelphian speculators had to other land projects in the west and
beyond the Appalachian Mountains suggests that a great many of them also shared
Franklin’s opinions. To these men, an increase in the colonial consumption of British
manufactures, rather than the production of naval stores, was the primary economic
justification for settling Nova Scotia. Specifically, they argued that access to Nova
Scotia's plentiful raw materials would facilitate Philadelphia's ever-increasing
consumption of British-made goods. 457 As the battles of the Imperial Crisis would show,
these men also tended to favour much less direct imperial intervention in questions of
land and economy than the Board of Trade and many in the British government hoped
for.
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At the heart of debates over where “British” settlers should be living was a more
general disagreement over who should run the post-war empire and who should benefit
from it. Would it be an empire by and for white Britons generally, with rights tied to
ethnicity and untethered from geographic space? Or would it be based on a stricter model
of centers and peripheries, with colonial subjects—both colonial Britons and ethnic or
racial others—unequal in various ways to those who remained at “home”?
These debates, which intensified following the loss of a unifying French enemy,
bled into Nova Scotian settlement schemes in the years between the Seven Years’ War
and the outbreak of the American Revolution. Many colonial-based speculators
understood Nova Scotian land as simply an expansion of an older colonial order based on
small-holding farm families and a relatively horizontal political structure, and created
townships and other settlements that reflected these assumptions. Other interested
parties—including speculators as well as government officials—saw it as an opportunity
to make actual a vision of empire based on hierarchy, deference, and centralized control.
Unlike, for example, the Philadelphian speculators, many in Nova Scotia’s government as
well as connected British insiders planned manors instead of townships, and assumed
their settlers would rent, not own, their lands. 458
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It was well-connected merchants in the mid-Atlantic, not New England, who
drove this new phase of colonial interest in Nova Scotian land. In addition to Franklin,
Wayne's company included Franklin's friend John Hughes, an anti-proprietary politician
and speaker of the House in the Pennsylvania assembly.459 John Foxcroft, Franklin's coDeputy Postmaster for North America, was involved in the early days of planning. 460
Franklin's political enemies were also well-represented among the speculators. William
Smith, president of the College of Philadelphia—today's University of Pennsylvania—
headed up another well-capitalized company centered on the College and including
several other Church of England ministers.461
Other Philadelphians also took active interest. Matthew Clarkson, a future mayor
of Philadelphia at that point heavily involved in trade in western Pennsylvania, led
another company along with his physician brother Gerardus. 462 Two future signers of the
Declaration of Independence—Richard Stockton and John Witherspoon—were involved
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at various points in a third group that would later attempt to develop land at Pictou.463
This company was centered on the College of New Jersey in Princeton but also included
Philadelphian merchants like the Rhea and Wykoff brothers.464 At least seven other land
companies from the Philadelphia area were active in Nova Scotia the mid-1760s. Some of
them were modest. Silversmith William Ball, for example, headed up a group of artisans
and farmers from the Northern Liberties that were shut out of the first phase of the
boom. 465
This sudden interest in Nova Scotia in a region that had previously had little to no
involvement in Eastward appears to be at least partially—if not entirely—the result of
efforts by Alexander McNutt. McNutt was born in Ulster, grew up in rural Virginia, and
gained notoriety in the 1760s as a promoter and land agent working in and around Nova
Scotia. In memorials and meetings, McNutt claimed to have contacts throughout North
America and Northern Europe and contracts with thousands of prospective settlers, and
he had a particular interest in bringing in Philadelphians. He was, at least for a short
period, spectacularly successful. At the height of his influence, on one day in 1765 his
name was included on grants making up over one million acres of land.466
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McNutt, when historians have paid attention to him at all, has not come across
particularly well. Bailyn refers to him as “frenetic and unscrupulous.” 467 Others have
called him “utterly unreliable,” and “distinctly untrustworthy,” while one early
biographer stated that as many of McNutt’s statements were “so grossly at variance with
facts” that the author “hesitate[d] to believe that a person who could so boldly make them
can properly be regarded as sane.” 468 He was a man who had no compunctions about
overstating his achievements or credentials: for example, he claimed at one point to have
brought more people to Nova Scotia than currently lived in the province, and, in the
1780s, he insisted to the Continental Congress that he had an official contract to settle the
entirety of the Ohio River Valley, the Susquehanna, and most of what is now upstate
New York.469 During the American Revolution he took it upon himself to declare Nova
Scotia an independent republic, which he called New Ireland, and wrote two pamphlets
laying out a detailed plan of government.470
It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that McNutt had a rather fluid relationship
with the truth. But in his consistent articulation of a land policy and imperial vision based
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on the absolute rights of Protestant settler families, McNutt represents the effort to
incorporate the Canadian Maritimes into a colonial order more reminiscent of the
Pennsylvania and Virginia Backcountry than anything the Board of Trade had in mind. It
was an ideology that placed working settler families at its heart, demanding a wide
latitude of independence and freedom for some while simultaneously rejecting dealings
with non-Protestants and non-whites.
McNutt was a Scots-Irish immigrant who likely arrived in the colonies with his
family as a child or very young man. His family would have been among the many that
arrived in Philadelphia in the 1720s and 1730s and quickly fanned out into the
Pennsylvania and Virginia “backcountry.” The McNutts eventually settled in the southern
end of the Shenandoah Valley on land known as the Burton Tract, probably sometime in
the early 1740s.471 This region had been purposefully settled starting in the 1720s and
1730s by Virginia Governor Sir William Gooch, pursuing a weaponized settlement
strategy very similar to that envisioned for Nova Scotia in the 1740s, 1750s, and 1760s.
Nervously viewing the mountainous region beyond Virginia plantation country, Gooch
believed that the only way to protect the colony from Native attack, French
encroachment, and slave insurrection fomented by mountain maroon communities was to

471

On the “McNutt Grant,” see George Norbury MacKenzie, ed., Colonial Families of
the United States of America, vol. 5 (Baltimore: The Seaforth Press, 1912), 379. If the
genealogies are correct, the family first went to Hagerstown, MD, just a few miles north
of the Shenandoah Valley. For McNutt’s earlier years, see also Eaton, “Alexander
McNutt, The Colonizer,” 1066.

178
create a barrier settlement of imported Protestants, much like the kind McNutt helped
build thirty years later.472
As in Nova Scotia, Gooch’s weaponized settlement rhetoric paid little practical
attention to the real human cost of policies that understood families as little more than
chess pieces to be deployed against a faceless “savage” enemy. Historians have shown
how the rapid expansion of white settlement in Appalachia and the Ohio Country
transformed the region into a powder keg, as diplomacy with Native nations gave way to
land grabs and casual violence. Indeed, Peter Silver argues that a shared rhetoric of fear
and suffering that demanded authorities choose between white settlers and Native people
was what bound the region’s settlers together, creating a rhetoric he calls the “Anti-Indian
Sublime.”473
McNutt’s home valley was typical of the region as a whole. In 1742, a party of
28 Oneidas and Onondagas led by Onondaga leader Jonnhaty passed through the
Shenandoah. What happened next depended on who you asked: colonists claimed that the
Native men had “appeared in a hostile manner among us killing & carrying off horses
&ca,” while Jonnhaty and his men claimed that they had been followed and harassed by
colonists who eventually forbid them to continue in the region.474 Either way, their
journey ended near the forks of the James and Maury rivers, where a firefight resulted in
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with eight Virginians and four Haudenosaunee men dead. The following upset was not
resolved until the Treaty of Lancaster two years later. 475
McNutt served as a captain in the Virginia militia in the early years of the Seven
Years’ War. 476 By 1758, however, he had exchanged one Scots-Irish enclave for another,
moving to the inland New Hampshire town of Londonderry. He continued to serve as a
captain in colonial militias: in 1760 his company was sent to Nova Scotia to garrison Fort
Cumberland. It seems to have immediately struck him as a special place, as the colony
became the center of his world for the next fifty years. McNutt later claimed to have
acted as an agent for Governor Charles Lawrence during the early Planter years; indeed,
in his typical grandiose style, he occasionally took credit for the entire migration.477 In
late 1760, McNutt obtained Lawrence’s permission to act as an agent to bring in settlers
from Northern Ireland, and had a number of townships reserved in his name for this
purpose. 478 McNutt’s plan was immediately popular on both sides of the Atlantic, in no
small part because he promised to bring in settlers at no public cost.479
McNutt spent the next few years travelling between Halifax, London,
Londonderry, and Philadelphia in pursuit of his plans. Just how many people he brought
to Nova Scotia during this time is a matter of contention, particularly as McNutt routinely
exaggerated his own successes. However, by 1763 he seems to have settled roughly 500
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people from Northern Ireland and New England in the townships of Onslow, New
Dublin, and Maugerville—the latter two, it should be noted, without permission from the
Nova Scotia government.480 By 1764, he had, through his connections with Hughes and
Franklin, managed to nearly single-handedly create the Philadelphian land boom. 481
The lands that McNutt and the Philadelphians were party to were in the form of
township grants. Indeed, the vast majority of the 2.5 million acres given away at the end
of October by the British Crown were parceled out in 100,000 acre townships, a system
explicitly meant to reduce Native political power by promoting speedy, orderly
settlement. 482 Townships, as distinct from large individual grants or small individual
plots, were intended for swift and relatively centralized settlement by families who would
be recruited by the township proprietors. They were also significantly larger than New
England town grants, which were standardized at six square miles, or about 23,000 acres.
The Board of Trade and others intended these grants to ensure that the process of
settlement could be focused on particular areas to create zones of relatively dense
settlement. They had originally been formulated as a military strategy intended as
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"security...against the insults and incursions of neighbouring Indians or other enemies,"
and had been a cornerstone of the Board of Trade's instructions to Nova Scotia governors
on how they should be distributing land since 1749. 483 Because responsibility for
attracting setters could be delegated to a limited number of proprietors and the land
revoked quickly if terms were not met, granting land in townships also met the Board of
Trade's requirements for cost effectiveness.
Delegating the responsibility of settlement to a small number of hand-picked
people, rather than opening a land market directly to individual families, also helped
ensure that the Board of Trade could maintain some control. It also reflected the deeply
status-conscious nature of the period: township grants, and really any grants at all, were
reserved for men from the upper echelons of society or who had performed some kind of
service. Considering the first wave of post-war land applications, the Board of Trade
wrote that while they did not have intimate knowledge of the petitioners, those they
approved
are either Officers of Character and Consideration, who appear to have acted in
His Majesty’s Service with Merit either in a Military or Civil Capacity, or are
Persons of known Substance and Ability.484

Status was equally important for those who petitioned the Nova Scotia governor rather
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than the crown. 485 Francis Bernard, attempting to reserve land for himself in
Passamaquoddy Bay, pointedly asked Michael Francklin to remind the Governor that “all
the Gentlemen concerned in the partnership, except myself, are members of
Parliament.”486
Indeed, although all the individuals and companies involved in the land boom
hoped to profit in some way, the desire for land was expressed in terms of service to the
empire. A land grant was either the reward for service, as in the case of applicants who
had served in the Seven Years’ War, or else it was given in exchange for a promise of
future service—the proper development of the grant. Writing in May 1764, for example,
Franklin expressed that assisting in the settlement of Nova Scotia could be a means for
him to continue to be of service to the British empire. The previous year, Franklin had
come out against the actions of the Paxton Boys, a settler vigilante group that had
murdered 20 Susquehannocks. Now perceived as opposing the interests of white rural
Pennsylvanians, Franklin believed that there was “no Likelihood” of him “being engag’d
in any Project of a new Government.” However, he wrote, “the Popular Character I have
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in America may at least be of Use in procuring Settlers for some Part under an old
one.” 487
In part because of the involvement of men like Franklin, both the Board of Trade
and government at Halifax felt that the Philadelphia associations had both the “ability and
intention” to settle the townships. 488 The companies, in turn, were willing to spend a
great deal of money to prove their good intentions. The Board of Trade reported to the
King in May of 1766 that, even before receiving the grants, the companies had spent
upwards of £1,500 sterling on surveying and “taking other measure preparatory to the
execution of the plan.”489 In 1768, the Board of Trade spoke glowingly to the King of the
activities of “the principal Persons of Pennsylvania” in Nova Scotia, pointing to them as
prime examples of their efforts in the peripheries. It is clear that the attempt to harness
colonial money and people to settle Nova Scotia was not, as has been suggested by some
historians, a “fly-by-night” scheme consumed with the promise of profit at the expense of
the Province, but a serious effort to transform it. 490
It is therefore unsurprising that the Philadelphian representatives sent to Nova
Scotia in the early spring of 1765 received an enthusiastic welcome from the Governor
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and Council. 491 The council approved reservation of all the lands McNutt requested—16
townships, with a promise of at least 8,000 Protestant settlers—with full grants only
pending approval from the Board of Trade and proper surveys. They concluded that the
scheme “required all possible encouragement, on consideration of the many advantages
to be gained by such an increase of people,” and even approved McNutt's petition for a
charter for the projected Atlantic coast city of Jerusalem—a bold move during a period
when the city of Halifax still lacked a charter. 492
The Philadelphia men were quickly integrated into Halifax society. Writing home
to Hughes only a week and a half after arriving in town, Wayne recorded multiple dinners
with the Governor and various Halifax gentlemen. 493 Ingratiating themselves with elite
Haligonians was essential, and, indeed, part of the instructions given to the agents as a
means of managing the intense competition for the best land.494 Surveyor Benjamin
Jacobs, for example, was told to discover the religious affiliations of Halifax’s power
players and reminded of the fact that there were “Church men, Quakers, & presbyterians”
among the membership of his company. 495
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Out-and-out bribery and espionage were also important tactics. “I plainly see that
there will be old tuging and pulling for land this summer,” Jacobs wrote to his brother.496
He then asked for £20 for “what is called secret services” to ensure that the company
would gain title to the best lands.497 Jacobs was not the only one so instructed. In July,
Wayne complained to Hughes that a “Mr. Lesket” had ingratiated himself with council
enough that he was able to convince “many of the Gentleman of the Councill here, that
he will be the only man that is Capable of Complying with the terms of Settlement.” 498
As a result he was able to secure five townships—many more, and much sooner, than
other Philadelphia companies. 499 Wayne's own account for the year included £7 worth of
wine given as a gift to Attorney General William Nesbitt—a man known for padding his
meager salary any way he could—“for Obtaining a Grant…of Land.”500 Ultimately,
Hughes, Wayne, and Franklin's company joined with Jacobs and Smith's and Clarkson's
in a strange alliance of political enemies to get the grants for two townships, Monckton
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on the Petitcodiac River and Frankfort along the St. John.501 The company centered on
Princeton gained title to a grant they called Philadelphia Plantation on the northeast shore
of the province. In total, at least seventeen townships were granted to McNutt and his
affiliates.
The large number of grants made in McNutt’s name, the fact that few of them
were ultimately settled, and his habitual self-aggrandizement have led many historians to
portray McNutt as a ruthless land speculator. But examining his many memorials, in
which he went out of his way to aggravate individuals who were key to any financial
success he may have had suggests that, far from financial gain, McNutt was motivated by
a near fanatical adherence to an ideology of empire that placed the smallholding
agricultural settler family at the forefront. He saw himself as the champion and facilitator
of hard-working Protestants everywhere who simply “a little encouragement to transport
themselves.” 502 As he put it in a memorial to the Continental Congress in the late years of
the American Revolution,
his undertaking [was] wholly calculated for the relief of the distressed of the
human species on both sides of the Atlantic, not confined to seats or parties, party
views or party plans, but wholly for the public good, and for the benefit of all
those of fair moral character who may embrace the opportunity503
The Crown and government were needed to encourage promoters like McNutt, who saw
himself, rightly or wrongly, as directly deputized by the royal authority to settle Nova
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Scotian lands. That authority was needed to protect settlers from forms of land granting
that McNutt saw as predatory, and to ensure their civil and religious liberties so that they
might “take their own way to happiness.” 504 In short, in the eyes of McNutt, the heart of
the empire was a network of independent small householders, and the correct role of
imperial authority was to facilitate an orderly transfer of lands to white settler families
who would work them. Although few were as explicit as McNutt, and were more
obviously interested in financial gain, the colonial speculators he attracted nevertheless
broadly shared his vision of an empire of smallholding Protestant families. They
uniformly framed their role as that of middlemen facilitating—and profiting from—sale
to white families, with some limited proprietary rights centered mostly on the control of
mills. 505
Franklin, certainly, published a number of tracts articulating his opposition to the
spatial politics of difference epitomized by the Proclamation Line, an opposition bound
up in his understanding of trade and the economy. Taking up what Steve Pincus has
identified as a “radical Whig” or “Patriot” ideology of empire—which was especially
popular and resonant among colonists—Franklin argued in the 1750s and early 1760s for
an empire based on profits from colonial consumption of manufactures. 506 Settler
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expansion into the west should therefore be encouraged as much as possible. 507 The
many ties that the Philadelphian speculators had to other land projects in the west and
beyond the Appalachian mountains suggests that a great many of them also shared
Franklin’s opinions. Certainly they agreed about the crucial role of manufactures in the
imperial economy, arguing that access to Nova Scotia's plentiful raw materials—most
notably fish, but also timber and minerals—would facilitate Philadelphia's everincreasing consumption of British-made goods. 508
Although they differed about the political role of white settlers and where they
should be allowed to live, the Philadelphian speculators—at least those associated with
Franklin—shared assumptions about the geopolitical power of settlement. In July 1764
Franklin, Hughes, and Foxcroft wrote a memorial to McNutt, expressing the belief that
allowing settlers to take up individual plots, as they claimed was the case in the near
colonial west, meant that "the frontier is so thinly settled that the people are an easy
pray[sic] to the Indians." Dense settlement—and, implicitly, the displacement of Native
people—was the solution, which could only be obtained by putting control over large
amounts of land in small amounts of hands.509 In other writings, Franklin made clear the
effect he thought such dense settlement had on ethnic others. Discussing Québec, but
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echoing earlier arguments about the demographic effects of settling Nova Scotia, he
wrote in 1760 that "from the crouds of English settling round and among them,” French
habitants would soon “be blended and incorporated with our people both in language and
manners.” 510
The Philadelphians also expressed their goals within a framework influenced by
the arrival of huge numbers of Germans to Pennsylvania beginning in the 1720s, the
same Germans that the planners of the 1740s had hoped to channel to the Eastward in the
earliest direct settlement schemes. Echoing fears of “backcountry” settlement emanating
from the Board of Trade, the companies argued that these Germans had flooded their
home region to such an extent that all of the good land had been used up, forcing some of
them further into the interior, and rendering the rest "useless persons." 511 Earlier, Franklin
had written about these German migrants using much the same logic as he used when
considering the power of Anglo-American settlers to crowd out the French, suggesting
that German settlers in the Philadelphia area would “shortly be so numerous as to
Germanize us instead of our Anglifying them.” 512 As Franklin, Hughes, and Foxcroft put
it in their memorial, by removing these potentially dangerous Germans to Nova Scotia,
they would become "not only be useful to themselves, but advantageous to Brittain." 513
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Whether or not they were fully aware of it, they were also playing into the dream of a
German-based settlement plan that only recently had been the bedrock of northeastern
colonization.
Yet as Philadelphians scrambled across the province and in and out of Haligonian
parlors, their compatriots at home were becoming entangled in a different imperial
drama. In June, Hughes had shared with Wayne the exciting news of his appointment as
stamp-master; by September, only armed patrols recruited by his political allies kept an
angry mob from destroying his house. According to Fred Anderson, “the strain of staying
up all night under arms after weeks of enduring anonymous threats sent Hughes into
physical collapse.” By the beginning of October, when the stamped paper arrived, he was
“teetering on the edge of the grave.”514 Hughes left Philadelphia, settling in New
Hampshire after 1769, his political career in ruins.
The Stamp Act Crisis shaped the timing of the grants and the terms that the
Governor was willing to offer and the companies were willing to accept. Nova Scotia was
among a handful of colonies in which stamped paper was actually used. The Nova Scotia
Gazette, for example, printed several issues on stamped paper. In response, mobs
throughout the colonies burned copies of the paper in taverns. An especially scandalized
writer for the New-York Gazette referred to the appearance of a stamped Halifax paper as
“the most noble ignoble tragedy that ever could be tragedized since the creation of
man.” 515 Beyond concerns over rights to tax, what the implementation of the Stamp Act
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on 1 November 1765 meant in practical terms was that the cost of getting a land grant in
Nova Scotia was about to skyrocket. The price for a 100,000 acre township would have
increased by at least £39, on top of the £70 in "office fees" estimated by Wayne in
October 1765.516 This combination of ideological opposition and practical monetary
concerns meant that Philadelphia men were determined to have the grants completed
before the Stamp Act came into effect. The Nova Scotian government, however, was
locked in an ongoing transatlantic correspondence with the Board of Trade, whose
officials had made it abundantly clear that they were not permitted to act until they
received official approval of the terms of the grants. 517
The good will of spring and early summer evaporated as a lack of flexibility and
attempt to centralize land granting in Whitehall combined with uproar over the Stamp
Act. By the beginning of October, the companies and the Nova Scotia government had
come to an uncomfortable impasse. Acting governor Francklin explained to the Board of
Trade that the representatives of the companies had effectively imported the Stamp Act
protests that had otherwise spared the province. They flatly refused to pay stamp duties
on their grants and threatened to simply go home. The result was that in order to save the
deal the government was obliged to give terms that were not approved of by the Crown,
terms that were still thought to be too harsh by the companies, who accepted them only
reluctantly.518
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The terms were indeed harsh by the standards of both previous and later grants.
They also laid bare the very different goals of the Philadelphia men and the Board of
Trade, despite their shared assumptions about the benefits of the economic development
of Nova Scotia through Native dispossession and elite-controlled white settlement. Using
private individuals and companies to develop the townships was considered by the Board
of Trade to be both efficient and economical, but it wanted to minimize the amount of
time the land was held by such companies due to fears over the dangers of land
speculation. 519 The timeline each company was given to settle Protestant families was
therefore very tight: 100 families of five on each township within four years of the date of
the grant, or else risk escheatment. 520 This provision proved contentious. Company
members expressed concerns that this condition was impossible to fulfil, particularly as
the grants had not been completed until late in the season, which meant that nothing
could be done until the following spring.521
As this drama was playing out, another, parallel story of the Nova Scotian land
boom was developing. While the bulk of the acreage was distributed as townships, the
Board of Trade and the Nova Scotian government also made smaller personal grants with
more relaxed stipulations. Unlike townships, which were 100,000 acres and typically
granted to companies, these allotments were made to individuals and tended to be
somewhat smaller—although at 20,000 acres, they were far from modest, and indeed
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almost as large as a New England town. These smaller parcels were often granted
alongside townships; Franklin, for example, received at least one, as did many other of
the proprietors. It was this type of grant that was most popular with those who saw in the
land boom the opportunity to reinforce or establish their identities as aristocrats.
Manorial schemes, in contrast to the freehold townships imagined by McNutt and
the Philadelphians, were especially attractive to Nova Scotian government insiders and
members of the British aristocracy. For example, Michael Francklin, one of the most
important—or perhaps simply ubiquitous—political figures in 1760s Nova Scotia,
obtained a grant on the southern side of Chignecto Bay. Clearly signaling his intentions,
he named this tract Francklin Manor and was seeking tenants for his property in Germany
as early as 1765.522 A number of proposals written by Francklin between 1765 and 1768
show that he was experimenting with terms and his role as landlord. In 1765 he drafted
sample agreement with German tenants, which laid out eye-watering rents of £10 per
year and disallowed tenants from selling their lands or moving without his permission.
Later, he also experimented with rents paid by turning in one third of merchantable
produce and half of the “increase of their stock” on a yearly basis.523
In his revisions, however, Francklin made his proposed terms lighter. In 1767, one
of his proposals shows a tenant scheme that looked much more like a modified version of
the low-rent leases determined on lives by which many peasants held their land in
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England in the early eighteenth century.524 Tenants would be granted 160 acres, leased to
his tenants for three lives, with rent that slowly increased over five years to the extremely
modest sum of 1 shilling. In addition to this largely ceremonial rent, Francklin’s tenants
would pay the King’s quitrents for their lands and all rates and taxes, which came to
about 4 shillings.525 The same clause also appeared in freehold grants. This form of
tenancy was relatively light, and left the leaseholders almost total control over their lands
in a way not dissimilar to farmers who had purchased their land but were still required to
pay quitrents to the Crown. Indeed, one seventeenth-century observer referred to
arrangements of this kind as “estates ‘more in show than in substance.’”526
The next year, working on pseudo-Philadelphian Hillsborough Township on the
Petitcodiac, Francklin drew up terms that asked for nothing but a “free rent” of 1d per
acre, which would have come to 5 shillings for the 60 acre plots proposed. Francklin’s
landlordly experimentations, however, were not a simple progression from harsh to easy.
A 1768 document in the same collection, however, lays out very different terms for a
settlement “on the River Pilquediac.” These do not mention rents, but stipulates that the
tenant must give the landlord one third of their mercantable produce and half of the
“increase of their stock” on a yearly basis. 527
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Francklin was far from alone. Other Nova Scotian officials, such as future
governor J.F.W. DesBarres, also enthusiastically adopted a manorial model, and similar
grants were made to others close to the government. In 1767, for example, William
Owen, a close friend and sometime employee of Governor William Campbell, received a
large grant in Passamaquoddy Bay, then considered part of Nova Scotia. Owen’s claim
included the largest island in the bay, which he renamed Campobello in honour of his
patron. 528 Owen arrived in Passamaquoddy Bay in June 1770 with 38 indentured servants
to found a settlement he called New Warrington, after the town in England where the
voyage had been fitted out.529 Owen’s plan was to develop Campobello as an English
estate. He planned to grant 99-year leases to his tenants in return for a tax on livestock
and half of any profits or produce, including grain and slaughtered animals. 530 As the
region’s sole JP, he would also be responsible for meting out justice for his tenants—
many of whom were his unfree servants. 531 While his commission as JP had been
separate from his land grant, the effect was to recreate a feudal manor where both land
and justice were monopolized by one person: Owen.
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James Boyd, the younger brother of a Kilmarnock merchant and a relation of the
Earl of Erroll, also received a reservation from Governor William Campbell in 1767 for
50,000 acres of land at Passamaquoddy in exchange for a promise of settling 50
families. 532 By 1773, he had reportedly brought 26 families amounting to 125 people, but
perhaps only one of these households remained after the Revolution. 533 It is unclear what
terms Boyd planned to offer his settlers, but he seems to have been viewed as a would-be
aristocrat by the migrant fishermen who summered at Passamaquoddy. Alexander
Hodges, for instance, recalled that Boyd had made it impossible to carry on a profitable
fishery, presumably because of his claims to control when and how the area was
fished. 534 Alexander Nichols, another fisherman, remembered that Boyd had arrived in
the bay “pretending right from the Governor at Halifax,” but that he had been ignored. 535
Owen recorded several incidents of clashes between Boyd and New Englanders in his
journal. For instance, Owen revoked a license he had given Boyd to clear ships leaving
the province after “the skippers and fishermen of all the New England schooners…to a
man, vowed they would have nothing to do with Squire Boyd.” 536
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This miniature feudal revival also prompted the heirs of long-defunct claims to
attempt to resuscitate them. 537 William Alexander of New York, for instance, claimed the
dormant title of the Earl of Stirling beginning in 1759. Based on his ancestor Sir
William’s original patent, Alexander then claimed title to a large swath of
Transpenobscotan land. In 1768, he went so far as to put out an ad offering to sell 1,000
acre tracts around Penobscot Bay and town lots in his eponymous proposed city of
Alexandria. 538 As an open conflict with the still precarious Penobscot Townships, this
claim was roundly rejected by the General Court of Massachusetts (and later the Board of
Trade), who questioned both the continued validity of the Stirling patent and Alexander’s
own pretentions to the earldom. 539 To make their opposition especially clear, Bernard
even published a proclamation denouncing Alexander’s claims. 540
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Other would-be landlords were already members of the British aristocracy. The
most notorious of these was John Perceval, Second Earl of Egmont. In late 1763, he
petitioned for a grant of all of St. John’s Island, the modern province of Prince Edward
Island. 541 Owen, who of course had his own manorial schemes for Nova Scotia, wrote of
the Earl’s plans that
He proposed dividing it into certain Lordships, lots, or divisions, to be held under
him by Feudatories, upon a system somewhat similar to the old feudal tenures in
England; and that it should be governed by a new Code of laws calculated upon
that principle. Thus would his Lordship, like the duke of Athol in the Isle of Man,
have been King in St. John's; acknowledging the sovereignty of the King of
England, but not subject to any acts or ordinances of the Legislature. His patent
was absolutely made out; but before it passed the Seals, the eyes of the Ministry
were opened and it was cancelled. 542
His initial plans thwarted, Egmont scaled down the acreage of his request, but not his
vision. In 1768, Egmont received a 22,000 acre grant stretching from Jeddore Harbour on
Nova Scotia’s eastern shore to the Shubenacadie River. 543 By the following year he had
drawn up detailed plans, which called for a “Mansion House, Park, Castle, &c” held in
demesne located in what is now Head of Jeddore, Nova Scotia.544 He was also interested
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in perhaps getting a second grant for Isle Madame and additional lots along the
Shubenacadie River. 545
A beautifully detailed map created for Egmont of his new holdings in 1769 shows
his plan for laying out his American estate (see figures 10 and 11). Originally annotated
by the surveyor with details of the survey, it was then heavily annotated in a different
hand, most likely Egmont himself. These annotations single out such details as a
blockhouse to be built next to the mansion house where settlers could flee in time of war,
an arrangement combining a medieval castle with modern frontier defense tactics. In a
long marginal note composed in October of 1769, Egmont explains that the plans for a
future “large town” would be done along the same lines as had been done for the Island
of St. Johns. He also sketched out six perfectly square three mile by three mile
settlements, divided into individual square miles in an even checkerboard pattern. In his
marginal note, Egmont wrote that within each of the squares he intended settle the central
squares himself; the four “angular” squares in each were to be “granted away in Fee to
any 4 Gentlemen who will plant each 4 Families of 5 to a Family on his Respective
Square Miles” or to a set of 16 families.546 Egmont explained the importance of the mile
divisions by reference to William the Conqueror, who, according to Egmont, granted
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square mile fiefs to the men who had assisted him in the conquest.547 Unsurprisingly,
Egmont’s map completely erases any evidence or mention of Mi’kmaw people.

Figure 10. Detail from map of the Earl of Egmont’s Nova Scotian lands showing the siting for the
mansion house and block house. (Map of Egmont Holdings with Annotations, Egmont Papers.)
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original subjective measurings which referred to how efficiently a specific plot of land
could be worked by oxen.
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Figure 11. Detail from Egmont map showing a proposed town.

Egmont’s scheme was warmly supported by both Governor Campbell and
significant members of government like Francklin and Joseph Gerrish. Indeed, Gerrish,
who acted as one of Egmont’s agents, proclaimed that Egmont Harbour would be “a great
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& valuable Setlement, so necessary for the well Being of this Colony.”548 Surveyor
Charles Morris Jr — the son of the province’s original surveyor — wrote to Egmont that
“we may compare this Province to a rough Diamon[d] of immense value [which] castes
but little lustre at present,” and needed only the help of men like Egmont to be
transformed into a “well polished Jewell [that] woud yield as bright a Lustre as any Gem
in the British Crown.”549 Francklin, for his part, offered to cut Egmont in on his existing
scheme to recruit German tenants. He sent Egmont an estimate for the costs of
“importing” forty German families, which would be divided up between Francklin and
Egmont’s lands.550 In addition to the Germans, Egmont seems to have early on contracted
with a group of settlers from Jersey. 551
It is unclear how much of Egmont’s tract was ever settled. Egmont’s agent,
Joseph Woodmass, wrote in December of 1769 claiming to have recruited 38 recently
arrived Irish immigrants. 552 He proposed to settle them on the Stewaicke River, close to
the Scots Irish settlements in Colchester and Onslow. That same month, Woodmass
placed an ad in The Nova-Scotia Chronicle looking for new settlers, and implying far
more Shubanacadie land than there in fact was. 553 Egmont died the following year. While
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his heirs continued to interested in his other scheme to create a plantation colony in East
Florida, they quickly abandoned his Nova Scotian projects. 554
Most of Nova Scotia’s landlords erred more on the side of Francklin’s approach
than Egmont’s. However, for many observers, even the mere suggestion of being a tenant
was an insult enough. While holding land as a tenant was the norm in the British Isles and
Europe throughout the eighteenth century, the British American colonies are often
understood as special domain of the independent yeoman freeholder. In truth, land
ownership was hardly universal even among free whites. However, the relatively free
availability of land for white settlement, pried from the hands of a kaleidoscope of Native
nations, remains perhaps the central fact of North American colonial history. 555 For those
opposed to tenancy in general, even the lightest of copyholds was seen as ideologically
anathema. 556
McNutt had a particular animosity towards any land scheme in which settlers
were tenants, and insisted the settlers he brought should be the full and clear owners of
their land.557 For example, in 1763 he accused the grantees of several large Nova Scotian
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patents of using their influence to deny grants of land to his settlers, thereby forcing them
to become tenants on their land.558 A few years later he repeated his accusations,
claiming that the tenants on these properties “cannot properly be called by any other
name than slaves.” 559 He even drew up a special map, showing the Board of Trade
exactly which grants he felt were damaging attempts to settle the province by interrupting
township layouts, offering poor terms to tenants, and reducing settler access to the best
provincial lands (see figures 12 and 13). Among the landowners specifically singled out
were Francklin and DesBarres.

Figure 12. Map made by Alexander McNutt showing lands claimed by him (red) and lands he
claimed had abusive land policies, usually based on tenancy rather than freehold (yellow). (CO
700/NOVASCOTIA 43, TNA.)
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Figure 13. Detail of above map showing Francklin Manor and DesBarres’ lands, colored yellow.

While McNutt’s erratic behavior was key to his downfall, his vocal opposition to
the land plans of the men who in fact ran the province he hoped to shape likely played a
larger role that has been previously appreciated. As early as August 1765, Wayne
remarked to John Hughes that McNutt had “powerfull enemies” in Halifax “which he
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little suspects.” 560 In 1766, the Nova Scotia Council and acting governor Francklin wrote
a scathing report to the Board of Trade on McNutt’s claims that seems to have decisively
turned the imperial government against him.561 Yet McNutt’s populist tendencies
became only more pronounced after his fall from grace. In 1767, for instance, he was
censured by the Nova Scotia Council for parceling out land to settlers in New Dublin
township that had not been granted to him, claiming that he had a right from the crown to
redistribute all Nova Scotian lands to settlers. Some of this land was likely owned by
Attorney General William Nesbitt, who brought the complaint against him, and whose
land he had singled out in a memorial to the Board of Trade.562 Despite conventional
narratives that argue McNutt was delusional and unliked, he seems to have continued to
find common cause with Nova Scotia’s everyday settlers. In 1771, for instance, the
leaders of Cornwallis Township recorded that they planned to apply to him “on the
Matter of applying to His Majesty for a Charter of Privileges Both Sivil & Relidgeous,” a
prospect that no doubt would have delighted McNutt. 563
These debates, as well as the generally difficult atmosphere created by the Stamp
Act boycotts, soured the initial goodwill between the township proprietors and the Nova
Scotian government. Nevertheless, after receiving the grants, surviving evidence suggests
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that serious attempts were made to settle at least three of the townships—Monckton,
Philadelphia Township, and the Philadelphia Plantation, aka Pictou—at great cost. 564
Soon after the grants were confirmed, advertisements from competing companies
appeared in Pennsylvania newspapers. 565 Company representatives also trolled
Philadelphia and the Pennsylvania and New Jersey countryside for recent immigrants—
largely Germans, but some Scots-Irish—to recruit. 566 The township of Monckton
experienced particular early success. The 1766 census, taken in the fall of that year,
recorded 201 "Petitcodiac new settlers that came last year and this summer.” 567 By
January 1767, Monckton was substantial enough to warrant its own column in yet another
census. The census-taker recorded 60 individuals, 49 of them "Germans and other
foreigners." 568 This number, however, was still somewhat short of the 125 persons who
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were supposed to have been living on the grant within the first year. 569 Other companies
also had muted success. Although the proprietors of Philadelphia Township were of more
modest means and had not received their grant until a year after the rest of the
Philadelphia companies—and, indeed, only even gained title to 20,000 of the 100,000
acres they requested—they were as successful, if not more so, at peopling their plot. 570
By fall 1768, there were at least a dozen and perhaps twice as many families in what was
occasionally known as "New Philadelphia." 571
These settlers, however, were not the docile placeholders imagined by the
proprietors and imperial officials, and they objected to the land they were planted on.
Despite the enthusiasm of Wayne and the other surveyors, the land obtained by the
various Philadelphia companies, like most Nova Scotian land, was of very poor quality
for agriculture. One friend of a settler recalled years later that the land at Philadelphia
Township was "roccy and barren." 572 The proprietors of Pictou complained that a certain
"Mr. Anthill" was spreading similar—and not unsubstantiated—rumors that their grant
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was "rocky, barren, and unfit for improvement."573 There was, after all, an ecological
reason that most European settlement in the province had been confined to the Acadian
heartland—it was the only region of the province suitable for large-scale farming, the
backbone of Anglo-American land use. 574 Proprietary and imperial obsessions with
import-export centered visions of empire had neglected the fact that the majority of the
kinds of settlers they hoped to attract were focused on subsistence farming and the
attainment of a “competency,” a model for which Nova Scotia was ill-suited. 575
Settlers soon began agitating for more acreage and threatened to vote with their
feet. Nathan Sheppard, the agent for Philadelphia Township, wrote home in 1768 that the
settlers there were demanding 500 acres of land rather than the previously agreed upon
200 and were going to leave if they did not get it.576 Franklin’s son William and others
also mentioned in their letters that settlers in Monckton were planning to leave if action
was not taken by the companies to assist them. 577 One tradition reported in the nineteenth
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century by proprietor Benjamin Jacobs' son holds that while the proprietors were able to
find many prospective settlers, as soon as they reached Nova Scotia the settlers "scattered
about wherever they chose...the result was an entire failure."578 Company agents were
frustrated. Sheppard wrote in 1768 that "the disagreeable task of dealing with so many
ordinary people as I have this summer has quite discouraged me from having any thing to
do with agency again in settling our lands."579 Faced with the fact that their settlers were
little inclined to do as they were told, that no more seemed to be coming, and that the
townships they had been given did not meet the needs of the settlers they brought,
proprietary resolve—already strained by the Stamp Act and Native opposition—began to
crumble further still.
Many of the individual proprietors continued to be engaged in their Nova Scotian
lands into the next decade. 580 Pictou, for example, found new life after the company
turned to Witherspoon, who was able to recruit a boatload of Highland Scots in 1773.
The arrival of the ship Hector ensured Pictou's survival as a town, if not necessarily as a
proprietorship.581 As early as 1769, however, it was painfully clear that the
transformation of Nova Scotia, if it was going to be done, was not going to be done by
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the Philadelphians. 582 The escheating of American lands in Nova Scotia began the next
year, when two of Alexander McNutt’s township grants were revoked. 583 Although there
is no direct evidence, the previous effects of the Stamp Act and the timing of proprietary
withdrawal suggest that renewed tensions between Great Britain and the colonies after
the passage of the Townshend Acts was another major blow to the Philadelphia
schemes. 584
By the time Dickinson took direct aim at the attempts to develop Nova Scotia in
Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania, the key document in generating a colonial
resistance movement to the acts, Philadelphian interest in Nova Scotia lands had
evaporated almost entirely.585 Some of the Philadelphia proprietors—many of whom
frequented David Hall's stationary shop, where Dickinson purchased writing equipment
while composing the Letters—may have suddenly found themselves agreeing with
Dickinson’s harsh judgement of the colony as a frozen money pit. 586 Nova Scotia, once a
geographic space that promised imperial cooperation and a shared vision of empire, was
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now a symbol of everything colonists were growing to hate about their attachment to
empire.
Critiques of both Nova Scotia’s peculiar settlement history made their way into
political discourse. Pro-colonial merchant Dennys deBerdt, for instance, wrote
suspiciously of Parliamentary support of Nova Scotia, Georgia, and the Floridas. He drew
a clear line between these colonies and the older ones they bracketed. “All the Colonies
but Georgia & Nova-Scotia, were originally settled by persons drove from their native
Country,” he wrote. “If you consider the thousands that have been expended in settling
Georgia & Nova-Scotia, you will better judge of the merit of the other Colonies which
settled themselves without any expence to their mother Country.”587 Franklin made a
similar observation on several occasions. Barely two years after he became involved in
the Nova Scotia land rush, he scribbled in the margin of a pamphlet that
Except the late attempted Colonies of Nova Scotia and Georgia, No Colony ever
received Maintenance in any Shape from Britain: And the Grants to those
Colonies were mere Jobbs for the Benefit of ministerial Favourites: English or
Scotchmen. 588
Franklin continued this judgement on the spoils of Nova Scotian settlement in the
margins of another pamphlet sometime after 1770. First remarking that all colonies
except Georgia and Nova Scotia had been founded by settlers at no expense to the crown,
he concluded that those Atlantic peripheries “were sent wrong People who dy’d or went
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away.” 589 It is hard to say if he acknowledged himself as a contributor to what he now
saw as an utterly failed and wasteful cause. Although it is impossible to claim direct
causation between Franklin and DeBerdt’s views and the failure of the Philadelphian
companies, colonial perceptions of Nova Scotia’s currency as a worthwhile field of
action sharply declined after 1766. DeBerdt, for instance, dismissed an overture to invest
in (yet another) Philadelphia Nova Scotia project by writing scornfully that “Nova
Scotia…is in general a bleak, barren country.”590
Nova Scotia was also drawn into patriot discourse as a symbol of both colonial
contributions to empire and the empire’s ungratefulness. In pamphlet after pamphlet
coming out of Boston, Massachusetts’ Eastward services were invoked to argue for how
colonists had strengthened the British Empire. The many conquests of Acadia/Nova
Scotia and Louisbourg took center stage. For example, in the General Court’s official
statement on Massachusetts’ value to the empire written in 1774, they devoted nearly the
entire document to descriptions of Acadian conquests stretching back to 1690. The
Louisbourg campaign of 1745, and the heavy loss of life that came with it, was especially
highlighted.591 Nova Scotia was then both a symbol of imperial overreach, and the ways
in which the government in London had failed to acknowledge the contributions of
colonists.
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Friends of the King also took up the distinction between Nova Scotia and the
older colonies (and Massachusetts in particular), although they interpreted it differently.
An article in the Gentleman’s Magazine, for instance, proposed boycotting New England
products and vessels and barring them from the banks fishery in response to colonist’s
boycotts of English products during the Townshend Act crisis. “The effects of such a
measure,” the author wrote,
would be presently felt by these haughty colonists; and perhaps it would in the
end prove highly advantageous to Great Britain; for in the first place it would
oblige all the fishermen in that country to remove into the province of Nova
Scotia, and the other obedient provinces; the ship-builders would follow them,
and so would the Indian traders; Boston would soon dwindle into a poor,
smuggling village, and Hallifax and St. John’s would rise upon its ruins.592

For colonials and British officials, the shared belief that their social and economic
goals could be met by bringing white Protestants into the province at the expense of First
Nations and Acadian people created a rare moment of colonial-imperial cooperation
during a time of deepening crisis. However, like other encounters during the 1760s, what
had seemed like agreement proved chimerical, and the debates over an imaginary Nova
Scotia only served to show just how out of step colonial and British elites had become.
By the outbreak of hostilities between some of the mainland colonies and the
Crown, then, Nova Scotia had gone from an example of the promise of the British
Empire to a cautionary tale. While the landscape and geography of Nova Scotia itself had
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not changed, where once it had been possible for all to see “a place of great importance,”
more and more now saw simply “a bleak, barren country.”593
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Chapter Five: Crown v Colony: Struggle in the Sagadahock
One major player was missing from the Nova Scotia land boom: Massachusetts.
After the disastrous experiments with government sponsored recruitment of Germans in
the 1740s and 1750s, New Englanders rapidly cooled on the project of institutionally
supported Eastward expansion of all kinds, as well as meddling in affairs beyond the
formal borders of the colony. 594 In 1764 Governor Bernard wrote to the Board of Trade
that he had been blocked from holding a general council with the Penobscot by the court
due to a reluctance to spend money on anything to do with the Eastward, including
garrisoning eastern forts. 595 After the Planter boom of 1759-60, migration into Nova
Scotia from New England slowed to a trickle and was primarily family reunifications. A
not insignificant number of Planters even took the reverse voyage, abandoning their Nova
Scotian lands. 596
As Nova Scotia became a battleground over how the empire should be run, landminded members of the planning class turned their attention to the province’s own
Eastward claims. Massachusetts’ northern counties, particularly the land east of the
Penobscot that had been “conquered” by Thomas Pownall In 1759, shared in the general
post-war boom in land speculation. Indeed, referring to his personal interests in land at
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Penobscot and Passamaquoddy Bay, Francis Bernard wrote that “Land jobbing is
becoming a great bubble: If I do anything to good purpose, it must be by catching hold of
sudden occasion, which I shan't miss.”597
Increased interest in the Eastward, however, reawakened the dormant conflict
over authority in the Sagadahock Country. Claimed by both Nova Scotia and
Massachusetts, and subject to multiple attempts to transform it into its own colony along
the lines of Dunbar’s abortive Georgia project, the land between the Kennebec and St.
Croix Rivers soon became another flashpoint between the British Empire and its
colonies. As a result, unlike in Nova Scotia, where imperial power was directly
responsible for settlement efforts, in the Sagadahock tensions between colonial and
imperial visions served instead to stymie settler advance until after the American
Revolution.
In the Sagadahock country, Anglo-American settlement was strategically
deployed not just in an attempt to displace undesirable French and Native bodies, but also
in an attempt to resolve the dispute over whether it was the Crown or Massachusetts who
had the right to govern the land between the Penobscot and St. Croix rivers. These
simmering disputes between Crown and colony predated the outbreak of the American
Revolution, but it was the fault lines created by them that would ultimately determine the
location of the modern United States-Canada border.
Francis Bernard was given the governorship of Massachusetts in late 1759 and
arrived in the province the following summer. He was not an especially imposing figure.
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A former lawyer and old neighbor of Governor Pownall and his brother John—the
secretary of the Board of Trade—he was known primarily for his competent two year
tenure as governor of New Jersey, and his notably large family of eleven children. This
large family, as he opined to his patrons and friends, meant that his income did not go far,
although he still elected to renovate the governor’s two residences upon his arrival. What
was worse, he had been forced to buy not one but two commissions due to the death of
George II less than a month after his gubernatorial appointment. 598
When the Penobscot townships were granted in 1762, Bernard was granted the
entirety of Mount Desert Island in Penobscot Bay.599 The grant was proposed by
Bernard’s once and future enemy James Otis, perhaps to ingratiate Bernard with the
popular party in the General Court. 600 Bernard understood it as a good will gesture meant
to help him offset his costs. 601 The grant, however, also had the effect of making him
personally and financially involved in the question of the eastward’s future and the fate of
the proposed new townships. Writing to Massachusetts’ provincial agent in London,
Bernard noted that his Mount Desert grant came with “a tacit consideration, that I should
give my utmost assistance towards obtaining the Kings approbation of the grants of the
Townships.” 602 If placating Bernard was part of the plan, it was certainly successful. He
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wrote excitedly to his old friend John Pownall that the assembly’s grant “affords the
Strongest proof that the Annimosities[sic] that have prevailed here do not arise in any
way from me, my Conduct or estimation.”603 A few days later he wrote with similar
sentiments to his patron Lord Barrington, citing the grant as “an evident proof that a
personal opposition to me has no part in their dispentions.” 604
Bernard was eager to develop Mount Desert as quickly as possible, seeing in it the
answer to his perennial financial woes. There was, however, something that stood in the
way of both him and the other new proprietors of eastern lands. This something was the
special designation of the lands lying between the Kennebec and St. Croix Rivers. While
included in Massachusetts’ Charter, this region, by then known as the Sagadahock
Country or Province, was only partially under Massachusetts’ sovereignty. By the terms
of the Charter, Massachusetts could grant lands there, but those grants needed to be
confirmed by the Crown before they would take effect. It was this jurisdictional dispute
between the colony of Massachusetts and the crown of Great Britain that proved to be
perhaps the most significant roadblock to fulfilling Pownall’s dreams of making the land
“English.” This dispute meant that all the Anglo-American settlements in Maine east of
the Penobscot River prior to 1783 existed in, at best, a legal gray area.
The area called by the British the Sagadahock in fact had many names and
identities. Most fundamentally, it contained most of the homelands of the Kennebec,
Penobscot and Passamaquoddy people, and debates over who could control it frequently

603
604

Francis Bernard to [John Pownall], 13 Feb 1762, vol 2, p.31, FBP.
Francis Bernard to Lord Barrington, 20 Feb 1762, vol 2, p.29, FBP.

220
involved the St. Johns River-focused Wolastoqiyik community as well. Champlain
identified the region the home of the Etchemin people in the early seventeenth century,
suggesting that at that early point it had an ethnic and perhaps political identity separate
from the agricultural Almouchiquous to the south and the Souriquois to the northeast.
Although the extent of ethnogenesis and community disruption during the ensuing
centuries is unclear and disputed, what is clear is that the region became increasingly
important to Wabanaki people as they faced pressure from both Massachusetts and Nova
Scotia. In addition to Wabanaki people from what is now southern Maine, greater
Penobscot, Peskotomuhkatik, and Wolastoqiyik absorbed refugees from King Philip’s
War and other southern conflicts. What Anglo-Americans identified as the Sagadahock,
therefore, should be though of primarily as Indian country and the locus of Wabanaki
power outside of the Nova Scotian peninsula.
Wabanaki understanding of the lands connected by the great watersheds of
Penobscot, St. Croix, and St. Johns was intimate and deep. In contrast, Europeans had
knowledge that was sketchy, fluid, and decidedly impressionistic. Even the French, who
had an early Franco-Penobscot power base at Pentagueot had little practical knowledge of
the area and relied heavily on Penobscot goodwill and alliances to navigate the region.
On the British side, the first non-captive Briton or Anglo-American known to have
travelled the well-worn Native route to Québec from Penobscot was not until 1711. 605 As
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late as the 1764, this route remained poorly understood and un-surveyed, and the route
from the St. Croix watershed inland was unknown until well after the American
Revolution. 606 Even the sea coast remained something of a mystery. Official maps of
Passamaquoddy Bay were so poor that even basic issues like the shape of harbors and the
number of rivers was unknown. 607
The name ultimately given to the region by the British reflects this lack of on-theground knowledge, as well as the poor track record of English colonization projects in the
region. The term was ultimately derived from a Wabanaki word referring to a specific
part of the complex Kennebec River watershed—specifically, the main channel which
carries the outflow from the Androscoggin and Kennebec rivers into the sea. The original
term is unclear, but has been interpreted variously as “mouth of the river” or “going out
of waters into the sea.” 608 In the early seventeenth century, the name was given to a failed
English colony—also known as the Popham Colony—which was attempted at the mouth
of the Kennebec River from 1607-1608. 609 The name, however, was erroneously
interpreted by many English observers as a general name for the entire river watershed,
and it was still occasionally used into that sense into the eighteenth century. The
expansion of this very specific term to refer to the entire region between the Kennebec
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and the St. Croix is suggestive of the general lack of knowledge about anything east of
the mouth of the Kennebec.
Despite this lack of practical knowledge, based in part on the precedent of the
Popham Colony, the British crown had been making claims to the entire area since the
late seventeenth century. The high point of settlement efforts before the 1760s had come
in 1730, with David Dunbar’s short-lived colony of Georgia and the court case that
followed. That case confirmed the language of Massachusetts’ charter, acknowledging
the colony’s right to govern the region but reserving the right to grant lands to the Crown.
Despite the outcome of the court case, the Dunbar incident was not the end of the
struggle over Sagadahock. Indeed, as the region was overcome by successive imperial
wars, the issue simply went dormant. Both Massachusetts and Nova Scotia—which
remained a Board of Trade puppet colony—continued to claim the Sagadahock country.
Without making it obvious, however, the geography of the region changed slightly. After
the Seven Years’ War, the success of the proprietary townships in mid-Maine—which
were firmly tied to Massachusetts, both financially and politically—meant that claiming
the Kennebec region was a non-starter for the Nova Scotian party. Instead, the main
region of contention shifted north and east, in the region between the Penobscot and St.
John valleys. Nevertheless, commenters continued to use the term “Sagadahock” to cover
the region, despite no longer insisting that the Sagadahock itself was part of the tract.
The resurrection of active disputes over where Massachusetts ended and Nova
Scotia began coincided with the flurry of survey and settlement activity that marked the
period immediately following the Treaty of Paris. Among Governor Bernard’s planned
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surveys, as has already been discussed, was one of the St. Croix River meant to clarify
colonial boundaries. This survey was tied directly to the Penobscot Township grants.
Bernard wrote to Nova Scotia governor Jonathan Belcher in July of 1762 that because of
the township grants, "it appears to me necessary, that measures should be speedily taken
for settling the Line in order to prevent all Interfering between the two Provinces.” 610
Referencing the grants, Bernard suggested that it would be in both provinces’ interests to
finally figure out the precise location of the border between them. 611
The responses Bernard received to this request were the first indication that things
with the grants would not go smoothly. Belcher responded to Bernard’s request with a
lengthy list of historical proofs asserting Nova Scotia’s claim to the land east of the
Penobscot River. 612 With evident surprise, Bernard quickly sent a letter of self-defense to
Whitehall. 613 But in December Bernard received an angry letter that seemed to confirm
his worst fears. “You cannot be ignorant,” the Board declaimed, “that the River
Penobscot has always been deem'd and declared to be the Western boundary of Accadia
or Nova Scotia.” They further added that Bernard’s failure to inform the Board before
planning the survey was “such an aggravation of your misconduct as Our Duty to His
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Majesty will not permit Us to pass Over without animadversion.” 614 What was worse, the
Board presented what seemed like endless hoops to jump through before they would even
consider presenting the grants to the King and Council.
Bernard, of course, was not undertaking these surveys solely in the interest of
Massachusetts Bay. His claims at Mount Desert Island meant that his personal finances
were now tied to the question of who controlled the lands beyond the Penobscot River.
The resistance of the Nova Scotian governor and the Board or Trade to clarifying the
extent and nature of colonial power in the Sagadahock was not entirely unanticipated,
however. Both Bernard and the General Court were well aware of the charter proviso
requiring Crown approval for grants. They were also aware that the process had never
been attempted before. For this reason, Bernard advised Bollan to inform the Board of
Trade only of his own grant, and wait before announcing the twelve townships. He
reasoned that “it may be better that the first instance should be a single one” and the
“easiest & cheapest manner” would be preferred, taking “no notice of what is to come
after.”615 Despite this bit of self-serving sleight of hand, both Bernard and his
correspondents in London didn’t seem to initially anticipate that gaining approval for the
any of the grants would be difficult.
As a result, The Board of Trade learned of the townships only by chance, when, in
December of 1762, a flustered Jaspar Maudit, the newly minted agent for Massachusetts,
reported that, while he had not been informed directly, twelve townships and Bernard’s
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grant of Mount Desert Island had been made earlier in the year. 616 The Lords wrote their
disapproving letter to Bernard shortly thereafter, and the harsh tone was no doubt
influenced by Bernard’s lack of forthrightness. Nevertheless, the following year the
Board of Trade, in consultation with the King agreed that the St. Croix would, for the
time being, serve as the boundary—so long as the King’s rights in the Sagadahock lands
were reserved. 617 Once the two Governors, the King, and the Board of Trade all agreed
that the river bounding Stirling’s grant would also bound a reconstituted, modern Nova
Scotia, the survey could finally go forward. To that end, Massachusetts sent a team of
surveyors to Passamaquoddy Bay in 1764, and Nova Scotia conducted its own survey the
year after.618 The outcome of these surveys, as has been discussed, was in fact to extend
and reinforce the jurisdictional overlap under the influence of Passamaquoddy power
brokers, laying the groundwork for further confusion and conflict later in the century
In London, however, the Board of Trade continued to debate what to do with the
contested region. As the surveys were underway in Passamaquoddy, the Board—now led
by Wills Hill, the Earl of Hillsborough—agreed that settling the Sagadahock coastland
was important. However, they suggested that it would be best “if this district could be
sever'd from the Charter of the Province of Massachusetts Bay, and erected into a
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separate Province, under the immediate Government of the Crown.”619 Reflecting an
increasingly negative opinion of colonists and the forms of government of, in particular,
the New England colonies, the report took especial exception to extending
Massachusetts’ Assembly-dominated government—whose current state the report
characterized as one of “great Disorder and embarrassment in the Administration of
Government”— over yet more territory, and provisions they saw in the grants as
enshrining dissenting forms of Protestantism at the expense of the Church of England. 620
The King and Privy Council never explicitly denied Massachusetts’ grants. Their
refusal to take action, however, left grantees scrambling. The proprietors of the townships
granted by Bernard were forced to repeatedly petition for extensions to the conditions in
their grants that required they receive Royal approbation by a certain date, and they had
difficulty raising capital and people for a venture where they could not guarantee clear
land titles.621 Reflecting the fragility of settlement schemes, Bernard complained to his
friend Richard Jackson that “these kind of undertakings require the utmost
encouragement: a little damp presently knocks 'em up.”622 In a later letter, he bemoaned
that the government at London seemed to be passing up a great opportunity. “What a deal
of money has it cost the Government to make such a settlement in other parts?” he wrote.
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“Here nothing is askt of it but its permission.” 623 Here, he may well have been thinking of
Nova Scotia.
This imperial resistance to the Massachusetts grants was potentially a huge
problem for Bernard personally. In his enthusiasm, Bernard had already dived
pocketbook first into the project of “developing” Mount Desert. The July following the
grant, he personally participated in a round of eastern surveys, travelling with the
surveying party.624 He left them at Mount Desert with an ambitious itinerary. He planned
to erect a house, “lay out a Town for…a 100 families now waiting; contract for erecting 2
or 3 saw mills,” and “look for brick clay & Limestone &c.” 625 At Mount Desert he found
what seemed to him a lawless world, where the few European inhabitants who lived there
did so without any title and hunted, farmed, fished, and lumbered without any regard for
the claims of either the Penobscot or their (possible) governor and (potential) landlord,
Bernard. 626 Later he recalled that the island when he first visited was in danger of “being
wasted & improvidently possessed,” presumably by the “poor people” he found there,
who he desired to “make…useful to the publick.”627
In October 1762 Bernard returned and began the actual work of laying out the
township. The population was growing. Bernard was told that there were two families
living at the head of what is now Some’s Sound, and another four on the Cranberry
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Islands just off the coast, which Bernard considered to be part of his grant.628 At least one
of these families, that of Abraham Somes, had contracted with Bernard for the grant.
With the detached eye of an aristocratic landholder, Bernard described his visit to the
Somes’ family in much the same way he described the plant and animal life of Maine:
At the end of it we turned into a bay & there saw a settlement in a lesser bay. We
went on shore & into solme's log house; found it neat & convenient, tho not quite
finished; & in it a notable Woman with 4 pretty girls clean & orderly.629
Bernard also took the opportunity of this trip to recruit even more settlers for his still
unconfirmed lands, presumably from among those same “poor people” he encountered
there. 630
Bernard reacted to the news of the possible threat to the confirmation of the grants
in two ways. In public, and in several memorials to the Board of Trade, Bernard pushed
Massachusetts’s claim to the eastward. Citing Pownall’s expedition, the 1691 charter, and
the fact that Penobscot people had been treating with Massachusetts and not Nova Scotia
for decades, Bernard collaborated with the General Court to make a strong claim to the
lands between the Penobscot and the St. Croix.631 He also clearly believed that keeping
the Eastward as part of Massachusetts was the most efficient way to channel new bodies
into what he referred to as “the transpenobscotan country.”632 He attributed this at least
partly to New Englanders’ attachment to their own forms of government, as well as its
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booming population.633 Keeping the region within Massachusetts was the path of least
resistance. “What a pity will it be,” he lamented, “that this opportunity should be lost
upon account of a refined distinction.”634
Privately, however, Bernard was not so insistent. He went out of his way to
signal his neutrality and flexibility to his superiors. Throwing the twelve townships under
the proverbial bus, Bernard instead asked only for a grant to be made that confirmed his
ownership of Mount Desert while leaving the question of which colony it belonged to
undecided. Writing on his plan to Massachusetts agent William Bollan, Bernard noted
defensively that “I don't mean to desert the Province's cause; but I can see no particular
use in having my business hung up, for the whole time this question may be agitated.”635
Bernard’s suggestions for the fate of the eastward also went far beyond proposing
pragmatic grants. Recognizing the 1760s as a unique chance to reorganize the empire and
wanting to leave his mark on it, in response to his Penobscot difficulties Bernard came up
with an entirely new scheme for the northeast. Assuming that the crown’s reluctance to
confirm the grants was due to plans for a new colony, Bernard argued that the key to
more effectively governing the North American colonies was redrawing colonial borders
themselves. Anticipating the contours of modern Maine, Bernard suggested that a colony
that ran from the Piscataqua to St. Croix with its capital in modern Portland would “make
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one of the finest Provinces in America.”636 To compensate Massachusetts’ loss, he
suggested annexing Rhode Island—whose government he disapprovingly referred to as a
“Mobboccracy”—and New Hampshire. 637 In later years he refined his plan to include
dividing Connecticut between New York and Massachusetts on the grounds that charter
governments were a "Monster in Politicks." 638 He also proposed an additional new
colony to take in the lands between Penobscot and the St. John River with a capital at
Machias. 639 In increasingly pathetic tones, he repeatedly offered to travel to London to
discuss his ideas for the political reorganization he assumed was imminent. 640 It was, but
not in the way Bernard had thought.
Bernard imagined all kinds of ways his ownership of the island—and, by
extension, the Transpenobscotan country more generally—would serve the Crown. He
argued, for instance, that it would make an ideal “rendezvous for fleets & Transports in
case of an expedition to the West Indies,” while its remoteness would prevent “danger of
desertion or irregularity.” 641 Bernard also hoped to develop a number of industries on his
Mount Desert estate. He claimed to be planning to recruit hemp farmers from his old
home in Lincolnshire, as well as developing a potash manufactory. 642
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He also turned his mind to developing specialty fisheries. 643 In January of 1764,
for instance, he wrote Benjamin Franklin to both thank him for retrieving his wayward
university-drop-out son from Virginia, and to request he track down a gentleman in
Trenton who produced “The best pickled Sturgeon I ever eat.” With this recipe Bernard
hoped to set up a sturgeon fishery and pickling facilities at Mount Desert and had his eye
on a salmon fishery as well.644 In October of that year, he drafted a document proposing
that he would loan local fishermen two schooners and a whaleboat for their use, on the
condition that one fifth of their catch would go to Bernard. 645 Bernard later cast this
business arrangement as a humanitarian effort, describing how he had given fishing boats
to “poor tho’ honest and industrious” men out of “public concern, [rather] than private
interest.” 646
In addition to his financial interests in the region, Bernard took advantage of his
lands at Penobscot to satisfy his rather clumsy, if gentlemanly, interest in natural
philosophy. Convinced he had discovered a new variety of hemp—or maybe it was
flax?—he engaged in pseudo-scholarly correspondence with Thomas Pownall about its
potential scientific and agricultural merit.647 Nothing came of it, for which he blamed not
himself, but the Penobscot people who claimed they had lost the seeds in a canoe incident
and who were generally unenthusiastic about the project.648 Bernard also commissioned a
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full-sized canoe from a skilled female artisan—whom he declared was “esteemed the best
hand for a Canoo in America”—as a gift for his patron, Lord Barrington. 649 However,
miscommunication—or perhaps an intentional slight—resulted in the production of only
a pint-sized model canoe, which he nevertheless dutifully sent to Barrington. He later
successfully received a full-scale vessel, but it did not have the effect on Barrington
Bernard had hoped. In a letter explaining that he was returning the canoe to Bernard,
Lord Barrington wrote that “Nobody can navigate it or will venture to go into it. If it
receives damage nobody can mend it, & I have no place to put it in.” He suggested
instead giving it to the Duke of Cumberland.650
Whitehall, however, continued to drag its feet on the question of confirmation.
Discussing the question of the legality of the grants was first put off due to the loss of the
original grants, followed by rapid changeover within the British government. 651 While
the Board of Trade had recommended that Bernard’s grant be approved, they were less
enthusiastic about the townships to which the Mount Desert grant was so intimately
connected. They approved heartily of settling the region with British Protestants; but the
question of which colony would control the settlement was more vexing. Despite
Massachusetts’ strong claim to the region, they objected to the colony’s form of
government, arguing that adding new townships to the colony would further dilute the
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power of the appointed council and governor as more and more elected representatives
were sent to Boston, a dangerously republican threat. Leaving the townships under
Massachusetts authority would also allow for the expansion of the Congregationalist
church, shutting out the Church of England. Instead, the Board agreed with Bernard’s
perspective, suggesting confirming the townships only if the Sagadahock lands could be
established as a new colony. 652 Despite the report, nothing was done either way, and the
question of confirmation remained in an uncomfortable limbo.
Despite the discouragement, Bernard continued his work. In late summer of 1764,
Bernard made a contract with 80 German families for 2,000 acres of Mount Desert
land. 653 Laying his case before the Board of Trade, Bernard claimed that this “colony of
Germans” would lead inevitably to mass migration from the old country. 654 But as the
months and years dragged on without any confirmation, Bernard grew more and more
frustrated. Sometime later he wrote to the Board that “disorderly people” had destroyed
the houses he had built and were cutting down wood and making “great havock,” but
without the confirmation he was able to do nothing. He despaired at having to shoulder
the burden of the some £1,500 he had spent on improvements with no source of income
but his governor’s salary, an amount he dismissed as hardly enough to cover his “bare
subsistence.” 655 He opined to John Pownall that if the grant was not confirmed, “tho' it
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will not ruin my fortunes, it may break my spirit.”656 Worse still, the continued
uncertainty over the grant meant that he risked losing the contract with the Germans. 657
By 1766, after narrowly surviving the Stamp Act Crisis, Bernard bemoaned to his friend
Richard Jackson that “now I see all my schemes there running to ruin, & myself
further.”658 The grants were brought before the King again, and again, nothing
happened. 659
By this time, Bernard had all but given up on his island. The promised Germans
never came, and his lack of grant meant he had no real authority over the white settlers of
Mount Desert Island. 660 “I think of it as little as possible,” he wrote, “but the Sums of
Money I have expended there, the Disappointment I have met with & the Ruinous
Condition of my Works there will not suffer me to put it out of my Mind.” 661 He claimed
the confirmation problem had infected the whole region. Without the ability to appoint
Magistrates and other governmental officials in the region west of the Penobscot, Bernard
complained that “the people increase & live in great Anarchy & confusion” without the
steady hand of himself or other proprietors.662 His inability to get his confirmation was
used by his political enemies, particularly James Otis, as an example of his
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ineffectiveness and lack of credit at Whitehall. 663 At some point in 1767, Bernard—or
someone close to him—rather inexplicably translated his booster description of Mount
Desert into Latin.664 Perhaps his grand schemes to provide for his children had by then
become simply a copybook exercise.
During the later 1760s Bernard attempted to circumvent the issue of confirmation
by forming a company with several other British gentlemen, including Thomas Pownall,
with plans to take up townships in Passamaquoddy Bay under the seal of Nova Scotia.
Indeed, Benjamin Franklin appears to have been first made aware of the speculation
opportunities in Nova Scotia by Bernard’s good friend Richard Jackson, who attempted
to involve him.665 Although he continued to associate with the company for some time,
Franklin never followed through, leaving Bernard hanging for some time as he awaited
yet another grant that never came.666 Bernard was finally offered confirmation of Mount
Desert in 1771, as part of a package of rewards—including a baronetcy—that were given
to the beleaguered outgoing governor. 667 This act, however, was meant more as another
display of imperial rights in America than an approval of the transpenobscotan
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settlements. While Massachusetts granted more eastern townships after 1762, they all
remained unconfirmed and therefore technically illegal until after the Revolutionary War.
In addition to concerns over Massachusetts’ form of government, imperial
discomfort with granting land in the Sagadahock was intimately tied up with questions of
lumbering and access to the forests. White pine trees that could be used as masts by the
Royal Navy had been protected in Massachusetts since the 1691 charter, and made
general to the northern colonies in 1710 with the creation of the so-called “King’s
Woods.” 668 This reservation was restricted to white pine trees of greater than two feet
diameter and taller than a foot, but in practice they made all forms of logging the northern
woods suspicious from an imperial perspective. Although on the books throughout the
period of actual Anglo-American settlement in the far northeast, attempts to enforce these
claims grew more intense alongside settlement efforts.
Rumors of the “Tresspasses, waste and the destruction of the King's Timber” in
Maine swirled through Whitehall, directed primarily at grantless settlers east of
Penobscot. 669 The 1710 act had a provision for trees on private property; however,
colonial landholders in Maine (where most of the tension occurred) and the Board of
Trade had different understandings of just what private property entailed. New
Englanders, particularly large land holders, considered both their large tracts and
particular township plots to be private property whether or not they were developed. The
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Board, on the other hand, seems to have considered only worked land to be covered
under the private property exception, and considered New England communal land
granting practices to be a cheap excuse to try and circumvent the King’s power and
rights. 670 This created immediate tension between colonial landholders and the
increasingly onerous imperial apparatus.
The tensions over tree rights were in fact a long standing sore point in the
eastward. David Dunbar’s primary job, after all, was not to bring new Protestant families
to the eastward, but to preserve the king’s rights in the North American woods. As the
King’s Surveyor, Dunbar was to identify and set aside 200,000 acres of trees suitable for
masts and other naval uses in Nova Scotia, and another 100,000 between the Penobscot
and St. Croix. 671 In fact, rather than promoting settlement, Dunbar’s primary role was to
restrict it by removing settlers and prosecuting them for illegal lumbering. The job
description of the Surveyor of the King’s Woods put them in direct opposition to the
desires of the Anglo-American settlers who had settled in Southern Maine and were
venturing further and further east for timbering.
Unsurprisingly, it was reported that these settlers actively worked to make the job
of the Surveyor of the Woods as difficult as possible, for example by reclaiming seized
logs and throwing them in the rivers, either for later reclamation or just to get them out of
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the hands of the surveyors.672 While still in England, Dunbar learned from the deputy of
his predecessor that Armstrong had confiscated 200 logs that had been felled by settlers.
The settlers who had chopped them down insisted that the trees were within the bounds
of their township, and therefore they were well within their right. Armstrong insisted that
they were within the jurisdiction of the admiralty and the King’s Woods, and planned to
sell them, no doubt for a tidy profit.673 Several months later, Dunbar’s brother and
assistant Jeremiah seized another 200 logs suitable for masts from the outskirts of Exeter
township on the modern Maine-New Hampshire border. 674
Thomas Haley directly linked the lack of Royal control of the Sagadahock to the
local politics of trees. He framed the struggles over timber in the Eastward as a battle
between the King’s authority and unruly settlers, writing that “country people” could get
away with what he thought of as illegal logging and harassment as
where this valuable timber is cut, is at so great a distance from Piscataqua, Casco,
or any other place where a surveyor can be supposed to stay that without people
of resolution in our own pay, it is impossible to secure them.675
What was worse, he accused these same settlers of selling the mast timber to Spain,
directly helping Britain’s “enemies abroad” at the empire’s own expense. 676
Dismissively, he claimed that the great proprietorial townships that had been laid out
earlier in the decade had been created “merely to evade the Act of Reservation.” 677 In
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another letter, he wrote that “we have many enemys in the country, but they are generally
amongst that sett who hold our authority in contempt, as they would the sacred majesty
from whom it is derived.”678
These same tensions continued through the next decades, and quickly became a
particular issue for the Maine proprietors. The Kennebec Proprietors, for example, played
a large role in this question. Because their land had theoretically been granted before the
Charter—the same reason it had been confirmed to them in 1731—they believed that
their entire tract was exempt from cutting by the King’s surveyors. In 1757 news reached
them that deputies of the King’s surveyor were cutting mast wood on their tract.
Immediately, they wrote an angry letter to Benning Wentworth—who was Surveyor
General of the King’s Woods as well as Governor of New Hampshire—expressing their
outrage. Threatening to cease their settlement efforts, they wrote that they saw
Wentworth’s intrusions as “a very great Grievance and an Infringement on the Rights of
private property.” They threatened to bring the Governor up on charges of trespassing. 679
Interestingly enough, that same year the proprietors voted to include a reservation of mast
pines in their own grants to settlers, preserving to themselves the rights sought by the
King, although this vote was overturned six months later. 680
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After the war had ended, the Board once again reviewed the rules around the
reservation of trees. Finding that the current rules did little to preserve the timber, they
proposed a sweeping overhaul designed to get around the private property exemption.
They recommend first that land grants in the areas they identified as major white pine
growing regions cease immediately.681 After a careful survey of all the trees on ungranted
lands in those regions, they would reopen the question of settlement, reserving settlement
in areas identified as particularly rich in pines to small communities meant to provide the
needed for the labor of cutting and hauling the mast wood. Secondly, the Board proposed
giving landholders equivalent land elsewhere in exchange for surrendering pine rich
lands in their tracts.682
The Board’s suggestions were not implemented, and the clash between the King’s
surveyors and the Kennebec Proprietors soon reemerged. In 1769, the Proprietors sent a
letter to Governor John Wentworth of New Hampshire that was nearly identical to the
one they had sent his uncle twelve years earlier. In it, they informed him that while they
would do their best to preserve mast trees for the King, anyone who entered their lands
with Wentworth’s license to harvest masts would be considered a trespasser and
prosecuted as such. 683 The next year, a motion by the Massachusetts Council to publish a
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proclamation reaffirming the King’s right to white pine trees and promising to punish
magistrates who shirked their duties was blocked by the House of Representatives. 684
The question of the King’s right to mast trees also reached Nova Scotia. In
response to Alexander McNutt and the Philadelphia men’s extensive grants, the Board of
Trade recommended that the tree provision should be included in all grants, effectively
removing the private property exemption.685 It had an immediate effect on Philadelphian
settlement efforts, and several threatened to abandon their grants. McNutt, of course, was
deeply dismayed by this new provision, writing a memorial to the Board in early 1766
that characterized it as an attack on property rights. He also drew on a Patriot Whig
understanding of manufactures as the heart of the imperial economy and objected to the
implicit economic calculus of the provision. “The several Companys,” he wrote,
had principally in view the carrying on an extensive Fishery in order to
enoble[sic] them to make remittances to Britain for their manufactures…One
Hundred Thousand pounds sent to Britain for her manufactures wou’d its
presumed be of more value than any imaginary advantage arising from the
reservation of timber. 686
In miniature, these objections to the tree reservation provision replayed the clashes over
the nature of the empire that characterized the era of the Imperial Crisis. It pitted a vision
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of empire that placed a premium on colonial consumption and unfettered settler access to
and use of land against that of the Board of Trade, which desired more controls over both
land and trade.
The Kennebec Proprietors agreed with McNutt’s perspective. Writing about the
same issue several years later, the Proprietors threatened that if lumbering on private
lands was made illegal,
there would be a Stop to all further settlements in America; the trade to the West
India Islands would in a great measure cease; the plantations there, from loss of
trade, and want of Lumber (for which they depend on the Northern Colonies)
would be much injured and Great Britain would not only be much detrimented
thereby, but must be dependent on foreign States for a Supply of Lumber 687
Both McNutt and the Kennebec proprietors proposed that the mast tree issue would be
best resolved by giving property owners more, not fewer, rights over their lands. The
proprietors, for example, argued that the present situation incentivized landowners to
quickly cut down potential mast trees before they became a nuisance. Instead, they
argued, landowners should receive a bounty and be charged with procuring the trees
themselves. 688

The combination of concerns over preserving mast trees and discomfort with
giving Massachusetts more political power meant that no new townships outside the
bounds of already-established proprietary grants could be made by any governmental
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body in the Sagadahock country. As a result, most Euramerican settlers in the region
lived in illegal squatter communities, recognized by no one, and with no governmental
institutions or even Justices of the Peace. Free of the geopolitical reins imagined by
proponents of weaponized settlement, these settlers were considered a nuisance at best
and a threat at worst by both the imperial government and the Wabanaki. 689 As a result
of their presence, Penobscot country was by far the hardest hit of the Wabanaki
homelands in this era.690 However, it does not seem likely that there were more than
5,000 Europeans thinly distributed east of Penobscot by the outbreak of the Revolution,
and probably considerably less.691
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total population. The “regional metropolis” of Machias, the largest community in
Downeast Maine before the war, had less than 700 people at the outbreak of the
Revolution, and an analysis of surviving township books for the Penobscot Townships
reveals a population that was barely more than a handful. The 1790 census counted
12,308 people living in the two Transcpenobscotan counties of Hancock and Washington,
with only 2,759 living in the easternmost county of Washington, almost certainly a
dramatic increase from the pre-war era for reasons explored in the final chapter of this

244
Many of the residents of the eastward townships were displeased with their quasilegal status. The residents of still unconfirmed township number 5 petitioned the General
Court for a Justice of the Peace, writing dramatically that
upwards of Sixty Families and neither Law no Gospel embraced among us, every
one doing whats right in his own Eyes and a great spirit of Mobbing and Rioting
prevails, Cursing, Swearing, fighting, threatening, Stealing, pulling down Houses
and the like as we cant sleep a nights without fear692
Governor Hutchinson of Massachusetts seemed to share their opinion of the state of the
eastward. He wrote to Hillsborough in 1770 that he had urged the sheriff of Lincoln
County to appoint a deputy at the rapidly growing squatter township of Machias. “If these
Settlers are suffered to go on without check,” he continued, “there is danger of their being
as troublesome as the Regulators in North Carolina.” 693 He took it upon himself to
update Hillsborough with the goings on in the eastward as often as he could. 694
Hutchinson was cautious over the value and practicality of ejecting “squatters” in
the eastward, but nevertheless expressed frustration that the opposition party in the
General Court had, among other things, “declined taking any measures for ejecting the
Intruders upon the Lands East of Sagadehoc.” 695 Despite their disinterest in eastward
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affairs just a few years before, Massachusetts’ rabble-rousing popular party was now
aligning their cause with the Sagadahock’s disaffected settlers.
Unsurprisingly, conflict over control of the Sagadahock and Transpenobscotan
lands continued into the Revolutionary war years. The Declaration of Independence did
nothing to convince the Crown and Board of Trade of Massachusetts’ claim to the
eastward, and they continued to view the region east of Penobscot as actual or potential
Crown territory. As the war began to turn against the British after Saratoga and the
American alliance with the French, concerns over the fate of displaced loyalists became
increasingly pressing. Creating a new colony in the eastward was far from a new idea,
although two individuals seem to be most responsible for the creation of what became
known as New Ireland. John Calef had, before the war, been employed by Thomas
Hutchinson in his quest to get legal recognition for the Transpenobscotan settlers. Just
before the outbreak of hostilities between Massachusetts and the Crown, Calef had
contacted Francis Bernard and informed him that the Penobscot settlers were asking for
their own government, an idea that must have delighted him. After the war began,
Bernard then passed this information on to Lord Dartmouth, suggesting that this new
government could act as a haven for New England loyalists. 696John Nutting, a lumber
merchant, was also a booster of the project in the right place at the right time. 697
In 1778, the King agreed to finally take action on the Sagadahock issue and erect
the region into a new loyalist province. British Secretary of State George Germain wrote
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to Commander-in-chief Henry Clinton in fall announcing the decision and giving
guidance for land grant terms. Looking to capitalize on the precarious legal status of
Penobscot settlers that had in part been created by the Crown, Germain instructed Clinton
to promise existing settlers who signed a loyalty oath that their lands would be legally
secured to them once a civil government had been formed.698 Boosters of the nascent
province of “New Ireland” even sought to have the capital as far south as Falmouth,
modern Portland Maine, far west of the contested Penobscot country. 699
The installation at Penobscot was meant not just as a humanitarian project for
refugee families. Supporters pointed to the deep harbors, capacity for naval stores, and, in
particular, timber—in other words, the features that had long made the region attractive
to the planning class—as boons to the flagging war effort. 700 Securing these resources by
bringing in a loyal population would not only ensure that the British had access, but
would also ensure that Massachusetts and the other rebelling colonies did not. Germain,
for instance, wrote to Clinton in April of 1779 on the settlement efforts that “increasing
the Distress of the rebellious Inhabitants of the New England Provinces…is the only
means of making them sensible of the ruinous consequences of their attempts at
Independancy.” 701
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The British detachment under the command of Francis McLean arrived at
Penobscot in early June of 1779.702 Finding a hostile population who assumed the fleet
were privateers sent to raid in their communities, McLean immediately released a
proclamation announcing the King’s intention to confirm grants to settlers who signed
loyalty oaths.703 This tactic worked. By the end of the month, McLean wrote to Clinton
that around 500 settlers in the surrounding area had signed on. 704 McLean felt that Fort
Pownall was far too small for his needs, and so set about building new defenses,
employing locals to help speed the work.705
This new military installation would be needed very soon. United States forces
had quickly learned about the new activity at Penobscot, and began planning an attack.
The fleet arrived in late July and immediately began an assault on the British position. 706
In addition to this military action, American leaders also took aim at inhabitants who had
responded positively to McLean’s proclamation and signed loyalty oaths. American
Brigadier-General Solomon Lovell released a proclamation of his own, threating settlers
who sided with the British and demanding that all inhabitants show themselves at the
American camp or be branded traitors.707 Despite these efforts, however, the American
efforts to retake Penobscot were a catastrophic failure. McLean was able to hold back the
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fleet until a support squadron appeared. The Americans were routed and the land forces
forced to flee on foot. 708
Not to be outdone, McNutt resurfaced during the war to comment directly on the
New Ireland scheme. Perhaps unsurprisingly given his political leanings, he was a
staunch supporter of the American cause. He spent most of the period from 1778 to end
of the war living in Salem Massachusetts, frequently traveling to Philadelphia to petition
the Continental Congress, which had replaced the Board of Trade as his preferred target.
Mentally, however, he never left Nova Scotia. Several of his petitions to Congress were
meant to bring the province into the war on the side of the Americans. 709 In 1780, shortly
after the siege of Penobscot, he wrote a series of pamphlets in which he laid out his vision
for an independent Nova Scotia.710 In what seems like a direct parallel with the failed
loyalist colony, he re-named the region—which included Prince Edward Island, Cape
Breton, and Newfoundland—“New Ireland.”711 Instead of a loyalist haven, however, the
Bill of Rights, Constitution and Frame of Government written by McNutt were modeled
on the ultra-democratic Pennsylvania constitution of 1776, using much of the same
language and lifting whole passages verbatim. Like that constitution, McNutt envisioned
a republic with a massively expanded franchise, direct voting for most positions, and a
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plural executive consisting of a twelve-member “supreme council.”712 But McNutt, of
course, added his own twist. New Ireland was to be an explicitly Christian republic, in
which state power was directly interested in the behavior and morality of its citizens.
Nothing came of his pamphlets, and it is unclear if he meant them as a serious call to
action or as some kind of semi-satirical project.

Figure 14. Frontispiece from McNutt, “Considerations.” Houghton Library copy.
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Neither vision of New Ireland, however, would come to pass. Despite their
military success, The British in New Ireland did not show much sympathy for the
beleaguered inhabitants and showed little enthusiasm for the New Ireland project. George
Collier wrote to Clinton that “I can’t perceive one single end a Settlement here will
answer; all the inhabitants are Rebels who take an oath to the King one day, & another to
Congress tomorrow.” 713 Collier, who was also ill and feverish, expressed distaste for the
landscape as well as the people. “The face of the whole country is as dreary as can be
imagined,” he wrote, “and the greatest part uncleared and fit for nothing but wild
beasts.” 714 The loyalist settlers who had come to Penobscot were evacuated to
Passamaquoddy Bay at the end of the war, where they would ultimately create a
settlement that would shore up the power of the British Empire — though in a way far
different than originally intended.
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Epilogue: Loyalist Colonies and Native Dispossession
Twenty years after Anthony Wayne surveyed New Jerusalem, McNutt’s
ambitions for a new city at Port Roseway were suddenly realized. Practically overnight,
between 10,000 and 14,000 settlers arrived to make a new home on Nova Scotia’s south
shore. 715 The new settlement they made, Shelburne, was briefly the largest city in British
North America. Then again, there was no longer much competition: The American
Revolution, finally over after eight long years, had decimated Great Britain’s colonial
holdings and removed the largest centers of Euramerican population on the continent
from British control. In the process, the Dawnland was split in two, with a new
international boundary running straight through the heart of Passamaquoddy country.
The unprecedented settler influx on both sides of this new border in the years
immediately after 1783 in many ways represented the fulfillment of plans that had been
laid many years previously. Viewed with the efforts to settle the far northeast from the
siege of Acadia onwards, the arrival of 30,000 loyalist refugees in the Dawnland
following the 1783 evacuation of New York, and the dire conditions this influx created
for the region’s Native people, represented a fulfillment of British and Anglo-American
plans. Loyalist settlement in the far northeast filled out a map that had been sketched long
before the 1760s. The majority of loyalists moved into the regions that previous schemes
had failed to attract. Much of the land granted post-1783 was newly escheated from
1760s grantees. 716 Across the border in Maine, post-war conditions led to a similar
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population boom, finally filling up the proprietary townships and inspiring new
speculative schemes in the far northeast. The new international border finally resolved
conflicts over who controlled the Sagadahock Country. Ironically, it took the destruction
of the North American empire to achieve the level of Euramerican population in the
Dawnland that imperial planners had been calling for as a security measure for decades.
For Wabanaki people, the arrival of so many settlers at the same time dramatically
altered their political realities. Although shaken by the departure of the French and
exhausted after generations of war, the lack of Euramerican settlers — and, with them,
Euramerican on-the-ground power — had allowed Wabanaki nations to adjust and
maintain their de facto sovereignty. Now, just as planners had predicted for decades,
being surrounded by settler families made controlling their ancestral lands next to
impossible.
Most — if not all — of the 30,000 new settlers in Nova Scotia and the newer
colonies of Prince Edward Island and New Brunswick were loyalist refugees. Lord
Sydney wrote to Nova Scotian governor John Parr in 1785 that the province would soon
become “the envy of the subjects of the neighbouring states,” an assessment echoed by
some prominent loyalist refugees such as Edward Winslow. 717 Even before the peace and
the evacuation of New York, Sir Guy Carleton, in many ways the architect of loyalist
resettlement, wrote to Parr that the future of Nova Scotia was now of the “highest
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consequence” to the empire and that “much future good may be expected to arise” from
the region.718
This greatness was predicated on the arrival of settlers fleeing the newly
independent states. The war left 60,000 people as exiles, largely men and their families
who had tied their fortunes to occupying British armies who faced retaliation if they
stayed in what was now the United States.719 About half of these refugees arrived in
Nova Scotia in 1783 and 1784, nearly tripling the European population of the colony. To
manage the arrival of so many new families, mainland Nova Scotia was erected into a
new colony, New Brunswick. 720 Much of the recent American work on the loyalist
diaspora has focused on elites, who were able to draw on their pre-existing Atlantic
connections to create new lives for themselves. Many of the men, women, and children
who had been left homeless by the war, however, were destitute and desperate. Most
dramatically, this population included the so-called “Black loyalists,” former slaves who
had been given their freedom in exchange for loyalty to the British Crown. There were
also many middling families — generally from the mid-Atlantic states — who hoped to
recreate the lives they had before the war as a new loyalist elite. 721
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Loyalist resettlement was a logistical nightmare. Seen through the lens of
weaponized settlement, however, it was also a tremendous opportunity. Like the
Germans, New Englanders, and Scots Irish of earlier generations, planners re-imagined
refugee families as a strategic asset that could — when settled properly — strengthen
borders, tie remaining colonies more closely to the mother country, and accomplish older
dreams of British power in the far northeast. 722 Unlike those earlier potential settler
families, however, loyalists, landless, often penniless, and beholden to imperial officials,
could be directed and controlled in unprecedented ways — at least initially.
Carleton well understood that potential. He wrote to Parr in April 1783
encouraging the creation of a “strong frontier” on the St. Croix and St. John Rivers. This
involved the erection of forts, but more crucially, Carleton imagined a series of
permanent and self-reproducing military settlements, composed of disbanded military
men and their families. In case Parr missed his intention, Carleton suggested that
individual grants in these settlements be laid out
as may resemble in some degree the cantonments of an army, with such
distinction of favor to the Officers as will enable them to preserve their authority,
and collect the whole, if need should require, into all the arrangements requisite
for defence.723
By fall of that year, seven government surveyors were hard at work on the St. John River,
and three at St. Croix and Passamaquoddy. 724
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In peninsular Nova Scotia, loyalists were settled in the very regions that planners
had hoped to develop in the 1750s and 1760s. Most of the incoming loyalists would be
settled on land originally promised to McNutt and his Philadelphian friends. These were
regions that had long been considered to have strategic importance, and that lay outside
of the pale of Halifax and the old Acadian heartland. As in the 1760s land boom, for
example, there was a particular emphasis on the St. John River Valley—consistently
proposed as the ideal site for military settlement from the 1750s on—and the southwest
Atlantic coast, particularly Port Roseway/Shelburne. 725
Although Passamaquoddy country did not receive the bulk of Loyalist refugees,
its transformation in the immediate post war years is one of the most dramatic examples
of how British planners were able to use weaponized settlement to fulfil geopolitical
ambitions, as well as the disastrous effect this had on Dawnland people and nations.
When the 1783 Treaty of Paris declared the St. Croix River to be the border between the
United States and British North America, the old debate over which waterway was
actually the St. Croix had not been resolved. The situation remained as it had been after
the 1764/5 surveys, with Massachusetts and Nova Scotia claiming, respectively, the
Maguagadavic and Cobscook as the true St. Croix.
However, perhaps because it promised easier navigation into the continent as well
as the ability to better command the Bay itself, the surveyors and planners sent to
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Passamaquoddy to lay out Carleton’s “strong frontier” unilaterally decided that the
Schoodic was the true border and planned accordingly. As the heart of Peskotomuhkatik,
Passamaquoddy people had been actively working to maintain their sovereignty by
controlling how Euramericans interacted with the river and by ensuring it did not become
a contested border. Once the decision had been made that the Schoodic was the St. Croix,
however, loyalist settlers arrived so quickly that neither Passamaquoddies nor
Massachusetts officials could effectively oppose the decision. Planning must have begun
even before the treaty was signed. Within a month and a half of the treaty, three
surveyors were hard at work laying out a settlement on top of the Passamaquoddy
gathering place and burial ground at Qonasqamkuk. This new settlement was to be called
St. Andrews, and forty families had already arrived. 726 By 1788, an anonymous pamphlet
writer claimed that there were over six hundred houses in the town, and “upwards of
three thousand” Loyalists and other British subjects living along the eastern bank of the
Schoodic. 727
Passamaquoddies threatened—and, on at least one occasion, captured—surveyors,
attempting to slow or halt the progress of the settlement. The sheer number of refugees,
however, meant that there was little they could do short of re-launching a war, something
all sides were loath to do after many years of hardship during the Revolution. 728
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American wartime Indian Superintendent John Allan wrote several letters to surveyors,
prominent newcomers, and the Continental Congress, to little effect. 729 To add insult to
injury, in 1784 some residents of St. Andrews in a “drunken frolick” pulled down a cross
at Qonasqamkuk. Although British officials erected a new cross for them,
Passamaquoddies were forced to refocus their religious life at Sipayik on the other side of
the border.730 Continuing the disastrous Nova Scotian land policy developed in the 1760s,
British officials did not believe that Native title was valid and held no conferences or
treaties as they occupied the Passamaquoddy homeland.
From a Passamaquoddy perspective, the ensuing diplomatic battle between the
British and Americans over the identity of the St. Croix—and, therefore, the location of
the new international border—was further complicated by deep divisions that had
occurred during the Revolution. Louis Neptune, evidently upset that the sachemship had
passed to his nephew Francis Joseph, had stolen the latter’s medal — evidently a symbol
of his authority — and sided with the British, who recognized his claim. 731 Most the rest
of the nation, like the Penobscots and many Mi’kmaq and Wolastoqiyik, had sided with
the Americans and spent the war years fighting with Allan around Machias and
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Penobscot. Both John Baptiste Neptune and Francis Joseph Neptune were prominent
Patriot allies in the northeastern theater of the war.732
After Louis Neptune’s death sometime around 1784, loyalist officials claimed that
it was he who had told them that the Schoodic was the St. Croix, contradicting his
identification of the Maguagadavic during the 1764 Massachusetts survey. Several
individuals reported that during the early planning for loyalist settlement in
Passamaquoddy, Louis Neptune made “a sketch or plan of the river with a piece of coal
on the floor” that was copied and sent directly to the Nova Scotian governor. 733 It is
unclear if this episode was misinterpreted, made up, or was born of Louis Neptune’s
bitterness over his exile from the Passamaquoddy nation, but his actions became an
important source of legitimacy for the British claims during later negotiations.
Other Passamaquoddies, at least those whose voices can be heard in the archives,
uniformly supported the American claim that the Magaguadavic was the true St. Croix.734
Louis Neptune’s actions and the partisan climate, however, significantly reduced their
ability to make unequivocal claims that the British would accept. What is more, the very
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presence of a significant Loyalist community at St. Andrews constrained the ability of
both Passamaquoddies and Americans to renegotiate the location of the border. Loyalist
officials, for their part, seem to have been unconcerned about the threat posed by the
Passamaquoddy. In December of 1784 Edward Winslow wrote to Sir John Wentworth
that while “Allen[sic] the drunken partizan” had “thrown out some threats that he will
employ the Indians to remove” the people at St. Andrews, Winslow’s contacts in the
region were “under no apprehension from him or his adherents.” 735
American diplomatic efforts were similarly frustrated by the sudden arrival of so
many Loyalists. Allan wrote to John Hancock in December of 1783 worriedly pointing
out that most of the newcomers were former soldiers, just as Carleton had intended. He
speculated that the settlement was a deliberate attempt to re-draw the border, writing that
“they mean to take possession, and once fixed suppose they cannot be removed, weather
the land falls easter or westward of the line.”736 These concerns proved well founded.
Benjamin Lincoln and Henry Knox were sent by Massachusetts in fall 1784 to investigate
Allan’s reports. While unflagging in their belief that the Magaguadavic was the St. Croix,
their report to Governor Hancock expressed concerns that the necessity of removing the
Loyalists already established along the Schoodic “would always embarrass a settlement
of the line agreeable to the Treaty of Peace.” 737 Congress requested that the British
remove their settlers from the contested land later in the year, to no effect. 738
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Concerns over which river was the border simmered until 1794. The Jay Treaty,
signed in that year, mandated the creation of an official commission to finally resolve the
issue. These commissioners descended on the Passamaquoddy in 1796. The practical
problem posed by the quasi-military British settlement erected on Passamaquoddy land at
St. Andrews, however, had only grown more entrenched. American commissioner James
Sullivan wrote secretly to Secretary of State Timothy Pickering that he feared that
Loyalist settlement in the contested region between the Schoodic and Magaguadavic had
hopelessly complicated negotiations. 739 Nevertheless, Americans—not to mention
Passamaquoddies—continued to insist that the Maguagadavic was the proper boundary,
and both sides went about collecting depositions from longtime inhabitants they hoped
would prove their arguments.
While surveyors in the 1760s had relied almost entirely on knowledge from living
Native informants, in the 1790s the commissioners mostly interviewed white men about
the supposed opinions of dead Passamaquoddies, particularly Louis Neptune, JeanBaptiste Neptune, and Bagulwet. 740 Somewhat suspiciously, deponents recalled that
Bahgulwet and Jean-Baptiste Neptune had expressed opinions that lined up rather too
well with the deponent’s current political affiliation. For instance, John Curry, who had
been part of Campbell and Owen’s nascent Nova Scotia establishment on Campobello in
the 1770s and remained loyal during the war, remembered both men telling him the
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Schoodic was the St. Croix. 741 Meanwhile, deponents who found themselves on the
American side of the line or allied with the Patriot cause during the war remembered
those same men always insisting on the Magaguadavic. 742 Curiously, none of the
deponents recalled any Native person identifying the Cobscook as the St. Croix, a
position that had been quickly discredited following the arrival of the Loyalists despite
being the foundation of Nova Scotia’s claims in the 1760s and 1770s.743 Passamaquoddy
flexibility about the location of the St. Croix, which had worked so well in the 1760s,
now came back to haunt them.
The depositions and other evidence collected by the 1790s border commission
also reveal how the long-dead claims and failed settlements of the seventeenth century
suddenly took new importance in the emerging context of settler control. The texts of
Champlain’s Voyages and Alexander’s grant became perhaps the two most important
documents for the commission, along with other early documents such as the French
King’s 1632 charter to Isaac de Razilly, Charles II’s 1662 grant to his brother the Duke of
York, and early letters between the Governors of Massachusetts and the Board of
Trade.744 These texts had had almost no effect on the people of Passamaquoddy Bay for,
in some cases, nearly 200 years. But now, as the arrival of a mass of white settlers filled

741

Deposition of John Curry, 19 July 1797, NBP.
See i.e. William Ricker Deposition, 8 Nov 1797, NBP; James Boyd Deposition, 10
Aug 1798, WP.
743
For the discrediting of the Cobscook see Deposition of Charles Morris, Jr., 17 July
1797, WP; Robert Morse to Guy Carleton, 15 Aug 1783, #8723, BHP.
744
Moore, International Adjudications, 2:425–431.
742

262
out the spectral outlines of the grants, they suddenly became more important than the
people who had been shaping the land for centuries.
In the place of the Passamaquoddy testimony that had influenced the contours of
colonial control for over a generation, it was an amateur archeological dig that finally
decided the issue. Armed with a rare copy of Champlain’s plan of St. Croix island,
Robert Pagan, a prominent St. Andrews Loyalist, turned up evidence of Champlain’s
camp on a small island in the Schoodic. He and five other Loyalists “discovered” a
number of ruins on Mehtonuwesk island which they claimed were a perfect match with
the plan.745 Turning his dig into a gentlemanly spectacle, Pagan returned that Friday with
“a large party of pleasure.” Unsurprisingly for a place Passamaquoddies had named after
its use as a “place like a store where we put things in to be safe,” when the men of the
party took “a few minutes” to dig into the earth they found a number of artifacts that
spoke to the scattered yet persistent European presence in the bay. 746 The combination of
physical evidence and seventeenth century map sealed the Schoodic’s new permanent
identity as both the St. Croix and the new international border. 747 This discovery
effectively nullified Passamaquoddy testimony and took the future of their homeland out
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of their hands and placed it squarely into those of a long-dead French explorer, as
channeled by contemporary British settlers.
The combination of the arrival of so many new settlers and official disavowal of
Native land tenure also proved to a nearly insurmountable challenge to Wabanaki nations
elsewhere in the territory. In the heartland of Wolastoqiyik, the St. John River Valley, so
many loyalists arrived at once that in 1784 a new colony, New Brunswick, was created to
support the massively expanded population. The Wolastoqiyik were forced move their
main village after New Brunswick’s new capital, Fredericton, was built practically on top
of it. 748 Many Native people appear to have simply left, either for more interior parts of
the region or Newfoundland. 749 John Reid, one of the foremost scholars of Mi’kmaq and
Wolastoqiyik interaction with the British Empire, argues that despite new hardships,
native people in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick retained enough power in the first
loyalist generation to continue to extract significant concessions and attention. 750 While it
is true that Mi’kmaw and Wolastoqiyik people did not disappear after the arrival of the
loyalists and continued to demand reciprocal relations, the crucial first ten years of
loyalist settlement demonstrate a striking lack of official interest in Wabanaki people and
the effect of so many new Anglo-American settlers on them.

748

Erikson, “Maliseet-Passamaquoddy,” 124.
John Allan to John Hancock, 15 December 1783, PCC.
750
For variations on this argument, see Reid, “Pax Britannica or Pax Indigena?”; John G.
Reid, “Imperial-Aboriginal Friendship in Eighteenth-Century Mi’kmaq’ki/Wulstukwik,”
in The Loyal Atlantic: Remaking the British Atlantic in the Revolutionary Era, ed. Jerry
Bannister and Liam Riordan (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012), 75–103; John
G. Reid, “Empire, the Maritime Colonies, and the Supplanting of
Mi’kma’ki/Wulstukwik, 1780-1820,” Acadiensis 38, no. 2 (Summer/Autumn 2009): 78–
97.
749

264
The Board of Trade, for example, did not receive a single surviving letter
concerning the region’s native inhabitants for over ten years after the 1782 death of
Superintendent for Indian Affairs Michael Francklin. 751 Francklin’s successor George
Henry Monk was appointed in summer 1783, but his earliest surviving letter to the Board
of Trade was not sent until 1794. 752 In fact, there are hardly any mentions of Native
people at all in the Colonial Office records between the declaration of Peace in 1783 and
the outbreak of war with France in the early 1790s. 753 This stands in stark contrast to the
previous thirty or so years, when correspondence with the governor regularly included
Native American topics. 754

751

Francklin’s last missive was 16 June 1782: Francklin to Shelburne, 16 June 1782, CO
217, LAC; For Francklin’s death, see Parr to Townshend, 12 November 1782, CO 217,
LAC; For Monk’s appointment in his place, see North to Parr, 8 August 1783, CO 217,
LAC.
752
George Henry Monk to John Wentworth, 24 Jan 1794, in Wentworth to Dundas, 19
May 1794, CO 217, LAC.
753
This observation is based on a search of the calendar for CO 217, the incoming and
outgoing correspondence between Nova Scotia and the Board of Trade. The calendar for
CO 217 can be found published in Douglas Brymer, Report on Canadian Archives for
1894 (Ottawa: S .E. Dawnson, 1895). For the reappearance of Native people in the
context of the new war, see for example Wentworth to Dundas, 3 May 1793, CO 217,
LAC; Wentworth to Dundas, 27 August 1793, CO 217, LAC
754
For the importance of Native people in colonial correspondence during the late 1750s
and 1760s, see Reid, “Pax Britannica or Pax Indigena?”; Plank, An Unsettled Conquest;
That the well-being or even existence of Native people was only considered important
during times of war, when they could be either allies or, as the popular fear went,
mobilized by enemies as easily-manipulated mercenaries, is consistent with larger
findings by scholars on Indian policy in post-Revolutionary British North America: J. R.
Miller, Skyscrapers Hide the Heavens : A History of Indian-White Relations in Canada,
Rev. ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991), 104.

265
This absence is also reflected in Monk’s own letterbook and record of his
interactions with Native people.755 Monk, unlike Francklin, had little experience prior to
his appointment with either Native people or Native diplomacy and seemed very
unwilling to learn. Between 1784 and 1793 there is no record that he met with any
Mi’kmaw leaders or communities, and he tended to treat Native people as disagreeable
charity cases rather than as powerful allies whose displeasure was not to be risked—a far
cry from the period prior to the loyalists’ arrival.
Monk’s lack of knowledge or interest in Native diplomacy, as well as the
increasingly dire position of peninsular Mi’kmaw communities, is revealed in an episode
from January of 1794 worth examining at length. A group of four Mi’kmaw orators
appeared at Monk’s home in Windsor and attempted to initiate a conference in order to
air the grievances of their communities and access customary gifts and supplies, things
increasingly necessary as settler pressure had excluded them from much of their
homeland. Monk, however, was baffled by the ritual protocol invoked by the men,
complaining in his notes that they made “made a long set speech in Indian” with one man
acting as an interpreter despite the fact that the orators “both speak English enough to
make known their wants.” 756
Monk distributed a few small parcels of cloth and shot, given specifically to the
men’s families and not the community at large. Frustrated, the men remarked that they
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“did not believe [Monk] wrote to the Gov’r as [he] ought to do” to inform him of their
circumstances—which, indeed, appears to be true. Monk responded that he was only a
servant of the King and could only do as he was told, which did not include giving the
men any food or support for their communities. John Paul, a younger man and son of the
sachem of one of the most important Mi’kmaw communities, had clearly had enough of
Monk. “If King George was so poor that he could give no more to Indians,” he burst out
in English, “the Indians better take nothing.” Monk’s reaction is telling:
at this I expressed regret at having given him any thing and some inclination to
take from them all what I had given them — upon which they hastily took up their
packs & went away without the usual acknowledgements of thank ye & gooday as
others had made — and John Paul on going out of the house said I won’t trouble
you again, the Indians must take care of themselves — I told him that such young
stout men as he was were well able to take care of themselves & ought to learn
how to behave themselves. 757
Clearly, the Anglo-Mi’kmaq friendship pact was strained nearly to the breaking point.
Shortly after this encounter Monk forwarded a petition from the Mi’kmaq of
peninsular Nova Scotia to the Governor that reflected this near total neglect of the Native
population. The petitioners recalled that between the early 1760s and the death of
Francklin, they had had regular meetings with imperial officials and received the supplies
and provisions that were both increasingly necessary for Mi’kmaq subsistence and a
marker of a healthy reciprocal relationship as defined by treaties that had been made
between the two peoples—the very process so hastily disregarded by Monk. 758 Before the
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loyalists, stated the petitioners, there had been “country enough in Nova Scotia for all the
English, French, and Indians then in the province.” But “while the Indians were getting
supplies, the English were taking all their country; and when the English had taken all,
the Indians got no more supplies.” Not until the appointment of Governor John
Wentworth in 1792, they stated, had they once again begun to receive some assistance;
but this was meagre indeed, and did not address the central issue of unfettered land loss
and restricted access to hunting and fishing grounds. 759
Nor were governors and the Board of Trade the only people uninterested in
Native responses to settler expansion in the early loyalist period. Settler reports could
also be quite dismissive. Edward Winslow, a prominent loyalist, met with
representatives of a Wolastoqiyik community in the summer of 1783 while he was in the
St. John River Valley promoting his plans for the separate loyalist province that
eventually became New Brunswick. Winslow, however, clearly did not take the presence
of Native peoples in the region seriously, or consider the meeting to be an important part
of his ongoing campaign to remake the region into a loyalist haven. Recounting the event
to his friend Ward Chipman, he wrote that meeting the “three Indian Chiefs a High Priest
Squaws & attendants” had been “ridiculous enough,” noting that “a relation of the

the end of formal hostilities between the Mi’kmaq and English rather than one of the
earlier treaties which promised, but failed, to do so. For Mi’kmaw perceptions of the
treaties between the 1720s and early 20th century, see Wicken, Treaties on Trial; William
Wicken, The Colonization of Mi’kmaw Memory and History, 1794-1928: The King v.
Gabriel Sylliboy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012).
759
“The Petition of the Mickmack Indians,” in Wentworth to Dundas, 19 May 1794, CO
217, LAC.

268
particulars may afford fun at some future day.”760 In the context of peacetime settlement,
Mi’kmaq and Wolastoqiyik were barely considered an issue.
Governmental inaction is unsurprising when previous discussions over the role of
Native people in Nova Scotia are considered. Francklin himself had written to the Board
of Trade in 1766 when he was acting governor of the province that concessions to Native
people in Nova Scotia would last only until British “settlements can be so formed round
them” as to neutralize them as a military threat. 761 The loyalist influx allowed this vision
of a British settler Nova Scotia unbeholden to the region’s first inhabitants to finally
come to fruition, leaving the Mi’kmaq and Wolastoqiyik communities of Nova Scotia
and New Brunswick with, in the words of one petition, “no brothers, except among
themselves.” 762
Conditions outside peninsular Nova Scotia and the densely settled St. John River
Valley varied. Particularly in Cape Breton, where loyalist immigration was only a trickle,
Native people found it much easier to control white settlement and obtain official
recognition for a least some of their land holdings.763 Even in these regions, however,
over-hunting and -fishing by profit-minded colonials soon began to take a serious toll on
the health of Native communities. Miramichi, in what is today northern New Brunswick,
experienced relatively little settlement compared to the loyalist hot spots in Shelburne, St.
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John, and Annapolis. But competition over the salmon fishery—one of the few
potentially profitable industries in the region as seen through European eyes—made it
much more difficult for Native bands and households to feed themselves. Writing to
Winslow from Miramichi in summer 1785, Benjamin Marston reported that salmon nets
had been “extended fairly quite accross the River to the better exclusion of the poor
Savages above,” suggesting a deliberate attempt to block Native access. 764
The provincial and imperial response to the Native distress rediscovered in the
1790s was to push a policy that urged Mi’kmaq and Wolastoqiyik bands to become
sedentary agriculturalists and send their children to Protestant mission schools. 765 These
programs, however, were decidedly unsystematic, and had little positive effect. Efforts to
transform peninsular Mi’kmaq into farmers, for example, did not come along with grants
of land or the creation of reserves. This situation led reformer Walter Bromley to observe
in 1822 that “You will scarcely meet an Indian, but who will tell you that he has cleared
and cultivated land sometime or other, but that the white men have taken it from him.”766
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Downeast and mid-Maine were also transformed. The population of
Massachusetts’s most northern counties doubled between 1770 and 1780, and grew by
another 50% to 96,540 by the time of the first federal census in 1790. The loyalist
refugee migration has obvious connections to the conditions of the American Revolution,
but Maine’s population growth was also linked to the events of the war. As Alan Taylor
has demonstrated, it represented a northeastern front of the massive movement of
Americans into previously uncolonized lands immediately before and after the war. 767
Maine also received a small, if significant, number of patriot refugees, largely from Nova
Scotia. 768 Most important, however, were the activities of land speculators operating in a
particular post-war environment, when millions of acres of Maine land were sold to pay
off Massachusetts war debts.
The settlement of Downeast and interior Maine became a major priority for the
new state government of Massachusetts for reasons both geopolitical and financial. Like
the British, the Americans understood that borders had little meaning without a loyal
population to back them up, and they were deeply concerned by reports of British
encroachment in the years immediately following the peace. 769 Perhaps equally
compelling, however, was Massachusetts’ massive war debt. Selling eastern lands to
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individual settlers and land companies was believed to the best, and, possibly, only,
means to paying down this debt, through both immediate revenue from the sales
themselves and future returns from an increased tax base. 770 While sales to individual
settlers were slow, this soon resulted in a run on Maine lands by speculative companies
and the transfer of millions of acres of Maine lands into private hands, particularly in the
sparsely settled and previously little visited far east and interior of the state.771
This approach to Maine land actually exacerbated the geopolitical effects of the
heavy loyalist presence in Charlotte County, New Brunswick. While British commanders
viewed settlement on the border as a geopolitical issue, Americans did not. Rather than
emphasizing the creation of a well-settled border as itself an immediate geopolitical
priority, the settlement of Massachusetts’ border lands was seen as a state-level issue that
was primarily economic. The sale of eastern lands, it was hoped, would pay off the state’s
not-inconsiderable war debt. 772 While Great Britain granted land to loyalists free of
charge as a compensation for what they had lost, Massachusetts needed to sell land for a
profit. The state pursued a populist land sales tactic, at first by eschewing speculators and
attempting to sell directly to individuals and, later, by dividing up the easternmost part of
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the district into six-mile-square townships that would be sold at a lottery. But a lack of
interest led to the majority of the territory being sold off in huge tracts to wealthy
speculators, including Henry Knox and Benjamin Lincoln. 773
These men did make attempts to settle their lands and make terms with squatters,
but going was slower than expected, and the population of Washington County—while
roughly comparable to Charlotte County on the other side of the border—remained
clustered around better-established Machias, further to the south, rather than around
Passamaquoddy. 774 Indeed, the locations of the lottery townships themselves are a good
indicator of the effect of aggressive loyalist settlement in the region. While Americans
maintained until 1798 that the “true” St. Croix—and therefore the international
boundary—was the Magaguadavic, the lottery lands nevertheless stopped at the
Schoodic, a tacit admission that those lands had already been granted under British
auspices and had determined the de facto border already. The few Americans who lived
in the Bay, particularly those on the islands, found their navigation routes compromised
and their titles in question as the British also took the language of the treaty to mean that
all the Bay islands were under the jurisdiction of New Brunswick. 775
Further south in mid-Maine, the importance of older land granting schemes meant
to transform the region into a white Protestant stronghold is reflected in the renewed
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importance and development of proprietary land grants. 776 The post-Revolutionary boom
should have been the moment the proprietary companies had been waiting for since 1710.
Many of the pre-war members of the companies, however, had fled the United States as
loyalist refugees, leaving their claims to be taken up by a new generation of would-be
landed elites. Henry Knox, for example, was able gain control of the old Waldo patent
through his marriage to Samuel Waldo’s granddaughter, Lucy Flucker. Flucker’s loyalist
parents, who had controlled the majority of the grant before the war, had their property
confiscated by the state of Massachusetts. Knox was able to use his high status in postRevolutionary America to both gain control of the grant—theoretically on his wife’s
behalf—and get the state legislature to confirm it.777 Reflecting on the chaotic state of the
grant, he remarked that until he had gotten it reunited and confirmed, “there did not
appear to be any estate at all.”778 Like many proprietors and planners before them,
however, the revitalized Waldo, Kennebec, and Pejepscot proprietors would learn that
settler families did not share the goals and concerns of large landowners. As Taylor has
argued in Liberty Men and Great Proprietors, old tensions over land title merged with
questions about the meaning of liberty, erupting into violence on the Maine frontier.
As in Nova Scotia, these new settlers arrived in a region profoundly affected by
the legacy of older settlement schemes. While the land regime that emerged in postRevolutionary Maine was different in many respects from loyalist New Brunswick and

776

For the post-Revolutionary grants in general, see Taylor, Liberty Men and Great
Proprietors.
777
Ibid., 37-39.
778
Quoted in Ibid., 39.

274
Nova Scotia, from a Native perspective the results were similar. While Indian title—and
how to best extinguish it—remained a much more live issue on the U.S. than on the
British side of the border, many believed Massachusetts Governor Pownall’s 1759 cruise
up the Penobscot to be an act of conquest that had extinguished Penobscot land title.779
The French conquest theory also found supporters in Maine. Despite his reputation as
supporter of Indian land title, an anonymous history of the ownership of the Waldo Patent
found in Knox’s papers—and most likely written by him—argued that previous French
possession and British conquest of 1710 had “defeat[ed] the Indian title” throughout
Maine. 780 While Knox never acted on this view—which directly contradicted his view on
Indian land ownership elsewhere in the country—in his negotiations with the Penobscot
people he made it clear that in his view they were merely “permitted to occupy” lands in
Massachusetts, a view anticipating the ruling of John Marshall in Johnson v McIntosh
some thirty years later.781
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As in the Maritime provinces, Maine Wabanakis struggled to cope with the arrival
of so many new settlers and fought to have their own boundaries recognized. Both
Penobscots and Passamaquoddies, as well as many Wolastoqiyik and Mi’kmaw people,
had fought on the side of the Americans in the Revolution. Penobscots, under Chief
Joseph Orono, had pledged to help the American cause in exchange for the permanent
recognition of their land claims. Specifically, they asserted that the region above the head
of the tide on the Penobscot river (near modern Bangor) and the six miles on either side
of it were and should always remain Penobscot country. This agreement, known as the
Watertown Resolve, reversed Pownall’s “conquest” of the Penobscot and reintroduced
the issue of Native title.782 Yet as soon as the war was over, Orono and his people were
visited by Knox, whose land claims abutted Penobscot territory, and Benjamin Lincoln,
who would soon buy a massive tract at Passamaquoddy, acting as representatives of
Massachusetts and seeking to re-negotiate. 783 Knox and Lincoln—claiming that the
“lands you occupy far exceed the quantity necessary for your own use”—pushed the
Penobscot to exchange their claim for “all what may be necessary for you to occupy on
one side of the river or on both aides higher up, so that the interest of the state shall be
promoted.”784 Orono, invoking the Watertown Resolve, responded that
The General desired that we would not suffer any person to come on our land.
The Almighty placed us on the land and it is ours. The General said that no person
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should interfere and take any of our lands but that we should have them. Now
why should we not hold the Lands as the Almighty gave them to us. The General
Court fixed the bounds at the head of the falls up to the head of the river. The
English will come on us from before and you on the other side so that we shall
have but little left. 785

Orono ended his speech by repeatedly stating that the Penobscots wanted the state to
survey and mark out the bounds of their country, “that we may know what we
possess.” 786 They refused to renegotiate, and, in turn, Massachusetts refused to respect or
mark Penobscot boundaries. Indeed, a few years later Knox attempted to buy claims to
Penobscot land on the east side of the river from the state, attempting to the use as yet unextinguished Indian claim as leverage to get a cheaper price. 787
However, it was not until 1796, squeezed by the ever-rising numbers of white
settlers and facing a Massachusetts government entirely unwilling to enforce the
boundaries of the Watertown Resolve, that Orono and his people sold the vast majority of
their homeland in exchange for a yearly supply of provisions and more secure rights to
the Penobscot river and islands. 788 Faced with overwhelming settler encroachment
unleashed by the war and facing a government actively disinterested in preserving
Indigenous borders, Penobscots, like the Mi’kmaq and Wolastoqiyik further north and
east, were forced to find new strategies for survival within, not beside, a white settler
world.
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In 1783, Allan wrote to John Hancock that the end of the war had brought “great
distress” to the Wabanakis. “Their principal complaynt,” he noted, “is that between both
countrys they are deprived of” their homelands. 789 When he met with representatives of
the Mi’kmaq, Penobscot, Wolastoqiyik and Passamaquoddy communities shortly after
the announcement of peace, speaker Nicholas Hawwawwas—observing the settlement at
St. Andrews, the loyalist arrival in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, and the newly
active land market in Maine—despaired at what he saw already saw as a division of their
homelands, disavowal of their sovereignty, and an obstruction of their way of life. Before
and even during the war, he said,
the road was open from our villages, to the other towns in America. There was
nothing to stop us. But it is now shut up. A number of people have come among
us whom we don’t know and taken our lands and streams. You say it is peace
with America and England, but we don’t hear any thing is done for us, no mention
made of the Indians in this country. We have been fighting for you and secured
for America all the lands of this Eastward Country to the River St. Croix, and
always been ready to take up the hatchet when you called. You promised to
secure for us our hunting ground, with an extensive right to the bever hunting.
How must we live now. We know nothing but hunting. You White Men can live
otherways. 790
Before the war Wabanakis had been embattled, but still able to enforce many of their
boundaries and their status as communities to be treated with as equals. After, in the
words of ethnohistorian Harald Prins, they were “reduced to powerless ethnic minority
status,” within, not apart, from the white settler world. 791 This was only made possible by
the massive demographic upheaval created by the American Revolution.
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Furthermore, it was accomplished not simply by the fact that white settlers
wanted Indian land. Instead, it was the result of a long process by which imperial,
colonial, and, later, state and national governments took clear steps to both encourage and
place settlers in the region and diminish the legal importance of Native land rights.
Before the Revolution, this had been but one dream among many; after, it became lived
reality. In the case of the border commission, it was not that Indian testimony,
knowledge, and land rights had suddenly become less respected; instead, the
demographic shifts created by the American Revolution combined with the plans of the
colonial era meant that the old empire and the young republic finally had the power to
safely ignore them.

279
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Published Sources
Acts and Resolves of Massachusetts, 1784-1785. Boston: Wright & Potter, 1890.
The Acts and Resolves, Public and Private, of the Province of the Massachusetts Bay.
Vol. 9. Boston: Wright & Potter Printing Co., 1902.
The Acts and Resolves, Public and Private, of the Province of the Massachusetts Bay.
Vol. 17. Boston: Wright & Potter Printing Co., 1910.
Alline, Henry. The Life and Journal of the Rev. Mr. Henry Alline. Boston, 1806.
Anderson, Fred. The Crucible of War: The Seven Years’ War and the Fate of Empire in
British North America, 1754-1766. New York: Vintage Books, 2001.
Anderson, Virginia DeJohn. New England’s Generation: The Great Migration and the
Formation of Society and Culture in the Seventeenth Century. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1991.
Andrews, Charles McLean. The Colonial Period of American History. Vol. 4, England’s
Commercial and Colonial Policy. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1938.
Armitage, David. The Ideological Origins of the British Empire. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2000.
Atkins, Thomas Beamish ed. Selections from the Public Documents of the Province of
Nova Scotia. Halifax, NS: Charles Annand, 1869.
Bahar, Matthew R. “People of the Dawn, People of the Door: Indian Pirates and the
Violent Theft of an Atlantic World.” The Journal of American History 101, no. 2
(September 2014): 401–26.
Bailyn, Bernard and Barbara DeWolfe. Voyagers to the West: A Passage in the Peopling
of North America on the Eve of the Revolution. New York: Vintage books, 1988.
Baker, Emerson W. “Finding the Almouchiquois: Native American Families, Territories,
and Land Sales in Southern Maine.” Ethnohistory 51, no. 1 (Winter 2004): 73–
100.
Baker, Emerson W. and John G. Reid. “Amerindian Power in the Early Modern
Northeast: A Reappraisal.” William & Mary Quarterly 61, no. 1 (January 2004):
77-106.
Banner, Stuart. How the Indians Lost Their Land: Law and Power on the Frontier.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007.
Bannister, Jerry and Liam Riordan, eds. The Loyal Atlantic: Remaking the British
Atlantic in the Revolutionary Era. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012.

280
Baxter, James Phinney ed. Documentary History of the State of Maine. Vol. 24. Portland,
ME: Maine Historical Society, 1916.
Beaumont, Andrew D. M. Colonial America and the Earl of Halifax, 1748-1761. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2015.
Bell, D. G. Early Loyalist Saint John: The Origin of New Brunswick Politics, 1783-1786.
Fredericton: New Ireland Press, 1983.
Bell, Winthrop Pickard. The “Foreign Protestants” and the Settlement of Nova Scotia:
The History of a Piece of Arrested British Colonial Policy in the Eighteenth
Century. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961.
Berthoff, Rowland and John Murrin. “Feudalism, Communalism, and the Yeoman
Freeholder: The American Revolution Considered as a Social Accident.” In John
Murrin, Rethinking America: From Empire to Republic, 131-160. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2018.
Bilodeau, Christopher. “The Paradox of Sagadahoc: The Popham Colony, 1607-1608.”
Early American Studies 12, no. 1 (Winter 2014), 1-35.
Bingham, William and Benjamin Lincoln. A Description of the Situation, Climate, Soil,
and Productions of Certain Tracts of Land in the District of Maine and
Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Philadelphia[?], 1793.
Blaakman, Michael. “Speculation Nation: Land and Mania in the Revolutionary
American Republic, 1776-1803.” PhD diss., Yale University, 2016.
Blakeley, Phyllis R. “Morris, Charles (1711-1781).” In Canadian Dictionary of National
Biography, vol. 4. University of Toronto/Université Laval, 2003–.
http://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/morris_charles_1711_81_4E.html.
Bonomi, Patricia U. The Lord Cornbury Scandal: The Politics of Reputation in British
America. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998.
Bourque, Bruce J. “Ethnicity on the Maritime Peninsula, 1600-1759.” Ethnohistory 36,
no. 3 (Summer 1989): 257-284.
Boyd, William P. History of the Boyd Family, and Descendants, with Historical Sketches.
Rochester, NY: John P. Smith Printing Company, 1912.
Bradburn, Douglas. “The Visible Fist: The Chesapeake Tobacco Trade in War and the
Purpose of Empire, 1690-1715.” The William and Mary Quarterly 68, no. 3 (July
2011): 361–386.
Brebner, John Bartlet. The Neutral Yankees of Nova Scotia: A Marginal Colony during
the Revolutionary Years. New York: Columbia University Press, 1937.
Breen, T. H. “An Empire of Goods: The Anglicization of Colonial America, 1690-1776.”
Journal of British Studies 25, no. 4 (October 1986): 467-499.

281
Breen, T. H. “Ideology and Nationalism on the Eve of the American Revolution:
Revisions Once More in Need of Revising.” The Journal of American History 84,
no. 1 (June 1, 1997): 13–39.
Brodhead, John Romeyn and E. B O’Callaghan, eds. Documents Relative to the Colonial
History of the State of New-York. Vol. 5, London Documents. Albany: Weed
Parsons Printers, 1855.
Burbank, Jane and Frederick Cooper. Empires in World History: Power and the Politics
of Difference. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011.
“By the King, a Proclamation.” London, 1763.
Calloway, Colin G. “Introduction: Surviving the Dark Ages.” In After King Philip’s War:
Presence and Persistence in Indian New England, edited by Colin G. Calloway,
1-28. Hanover: University Press of New England, 1997.
Calloway, Colin G. The Scratch of a Pen: 1763 and the Transformation of North
America. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.
Champlain, Samuel. Les Voyages de La Nouvelle-France Occidentale, Dicte Canada.
Paris, 1632.
Chard, Donald F. “Nelson, John.” In Dictionary of Canadian Biography, vol.2.
University of Toronto/Université Laval, 2003–.
http://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/nelson_john_2E.html.
“The Charter of Massachusetts Bay – 1691.” In William C. Fray and Lisa A. Spar, CoDirectors, The Avalon Project At the Yale Law School: Documents in Law,
History and Diplomacy. New Haven: The Avalon Project, 1996.
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/mass07.asp.
Church, Benjamin. Entertaining Passages Relating to King Philip’s War…As Also of
Expeditions More Lately Made Against the Common Enemy, and Indian Rebels,
in New England. Boston, 1716.
Chute, Janet E. “Frank G. Speck’s Contributions to the Understanding of Mi’kmaq Land
Use, Leadership, and Land Management.” Ethnohistory 46, no. 3 (1999): 481540.
Clark, Dora Mae. The Rise of the British Treasury: Colonial Administration in the
Eighteenth Century. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960.
Coleman, Emma Lewis. New England Captives Carried to Canada Between 1677 and
1760 During the French and Indian Wars. 2 vols. Boston: New England Historic
Genealogical Society, 1924.
Condon, Ann Gorman. The Envy of the American States: The Loyalist Dream for New
Brunswick. Fredericton: New Ireland Press, 1984.
The Conference with the Eastern Indians. Boston, 1726.

282
Conrad, Margaret ed. They Planted Well: New England Planters in Maritime Canada.
Fredericton, NB: Acadiensis Press, 1988.
Conrad, Margaret ed. Making Adjustments: Change and Continuity in Planter Nova
Scotia, 1759-1800. Fredericton, NB: Acadiensis Press, 1991.
Conrad, Margaret ed. Intimate Relations: Family and Community in Planter Nova Scotia,
1759-1800. Fredericton, NB: Acadiensis Press, 1995.
Conrad, Margaret and Barry Moody, eds. Planter Links: Community and Culture in
Colonial Nova Scotia. Fredericton, NB: Acadiensis Press, 2001.
Crowley, T. A. “Raymond, Jean-Louis de, Comte de Raymond.” In Dictionary of
Canadian Biography, vol. 4. University of Toronto/Université Laval, 2003–.
http://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/raymond_jean_louis_de_4E.html.
Daigle, Jean. “Nos amis les ennemis: relations commerciales de l’Acadie avec le
Massachusetts, 1670-1711.” PhD diss., University of Maine, 1975.
De Berdt, Dennys. Letters of Dennys de Berdt, 1757-1770, edited by Albert Matthews.
Cambridge, MA: J. Wilson & Son, 1911.
Demeritt, David. “Representing the ‘True’ St. Croix: Knowledge and Power in the
Partition of the Northeast.” The William and Mary Quarterly 54, no. 3 (July
1997): 515-548.
Dowd, Gregory. War Under Heaven: Pontiac, the Indian Nations, and the British
Empire. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004.
Eaton, Wentworth Hamilton. “Alexander McNutt, The Colonizer.” Americana 8, no. 2
(1913): 1065-1106.
Eckstorm, Fannie Hardy. “History of the Chadwick Survey from Fort Pownal in the
District of Maine to the Province of Québec in Canada in 1764.” Sprague’s
Journal of Maine History 14, no. 2 (June 1926): 63-89.
Eckstorm, Fannie Hardy. “Indian Place-Names of the Penobscot Valley and the Maine
Coast.” The Maine Bulletin, 44, no. 4 (November 1941): 1-272.
Eckstorm, Fannie Hardy. Old John Neptune and Other Maine Indian Shamans. Portland,
ME: The Southworth-Anthoensen Press, 1945.
Edelson, S. Max. The New Map of Empire: How Britain Imagined America before
Independence. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017.
Ells, Margaret. “Clearing the Decks for the Loyalists.” Report of the Annual Meeting of
the Canadian Historical Association / Rapports Annuels de La Société Historique
Du Canada 12, no. 1 (1933): 43–58.
“An Essay Towards Establishing Some Undertakings...” The Gentleman’s Magazine, 18
(July 1748): 293-5.

283
Faragher, John Mack. A Great and Noble Scheme: The Tragic Story of the Expulsion of
the French Acadians from Their Homeland. New York & London: W. W. Norton
and Company, 2005.
Fingard, Judith. The Anglican Design in Loyalist Nova Scotia, 1783-1816. London:
SPCK, 1972.
Fischer, David Hackett. Champlain’s Dream. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2008.
Francis, Bernie and Trudy Sable. The Language of This Land, Mi’kma’ki. Sydney, NS:
Cape Breton University Press, 2012.
Franklin, Benjamin. The Interest of Great Britain Considered. London, 1760.
Franklin, Benjamin. Observations Concerning the Increase of Mankind. Boston, 1751.
Franklin, Benjamin. The Papers of Benjamin Franklin. New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1959–2014.
Galvin, John R. Three Men of Boston. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1976.
Ghere, David L. “Myths and Methods in Abenaki Demography: Abenaki Population
Recovery, 1725-1750.” Ethnohistory 44, no. 3 (Summer 1997): 511-534.
Griffiths, Naomi E.S. From Migrant to Acadian: A North American Border People,
1604-1755. Montréal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005.
Gwyn, Julian. Excessive Expectations: Maritime Commerce and the Economic
Development of Nova Scotia, 1740-1870. Montréal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s
University Press, 1998.
Hall, John. Memoirs of Matthew Clarkson of Philadelphia, 1735-1800. Philadelphia,
1890.
Hansen, Marcus Lee. The Mingling of the Canadian and American Peoples. New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1940.
Headlam, Cecil, ed. Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, America and West Indies,
1710-June, 1711. London, 1924.
Henderson, T. Stephen and Wendy G Robicheau, eds. The Nova Scotia Planters in the
Atlantic World, 1759-1830. Fredericton, NB: Acadiensis Press, 2012.
Hinderaker, Eric. Elusive Empires: Constructing Colonialism in the Ohio Valley, 16731800. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
Hinderaker, Eric. The Two Hendricks: Unraveling a Mohawk Mystery. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 2010.
Hofstra, Warren R. The Planting of New Virginia: Settlement and Landscape in the
Shenandoah Valley. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005.
Hutson, James H. “Benjamin Franklin and William Smith: More Light on an Old
Philadelphia Quarrel.” The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography 93,
no. 1 (January 1969): 109–113.

284
“The Importance of Nova Scotia.” The Gentleman’s Magazine, 18 (January 1748): 28-30.
Jaffee, David. People of the Wachusett: Greater New England in History and Memory,
1630-1860. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999.
Jasanoff, Maya. Liberty’s Exiles: American Loyalists in the Revolutionary World. New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2011.
Johnson, A. J. B. “Before the Loyalists: Acadians in the Sydney Area, 1749-1754.” Cape
Breton’s Magazine, 48 (1988): 59-64.
Johnston, A. J. B. Control and Order in French Colonial Louisbourg, 1713–1758. East
Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2001.
Johnson, A. J. B. Endgame 1758: The Promise, the Glory, and the Despair of
Louisbourg’s Last Decade. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2007.
Johnston, A. J. B. Storied Shores: St. Peter’s, Isle Madame, and Chapel Island in the
17th and 18th Centuries. Sydney, NS: University College of Cape Breton Press,
2004.
Kawashima, Yasuhide. Igniting King Philip’s War: The John Sassamon Murder Trial.
Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2001.
Kennedy, Gregory M. W. Something of a Peasant Paradise? Comparing Rural Societies
in Acadie and the Loudunais, 1605-1755. Montréal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s
University Press, 2014.
Kernaghan, Lois. “Nesbitt, William.” In Dictionary of Canadian Biography, vol. 4.
University of Toronto/Université Laval, 2003–.
http://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/nesbitt_william_4E.html.
Ketcham, Ralph L. “Benjamin Franklin and William Smith: New Light on an Old
Philadelphia Quarrel.” The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography 88,
no. 2 (April 1964): 142–163.
Kidder, Frederic, ed. Military Operations in Eastern Maine and Nova Scotia during the
Revolution, Chiefly Compiled from the Journals and Letters of Col. John Allan.
Albany: Joel Munsell, 1867.
Kilby, William Henry. Eastport and Passamaquoddy: A Collection of Historical and
Biographical Sketches. Eastport, ME: Edward E. Shead & Company, 1888.
Kimber, Stephen. Loyalists and Layabouts: The Rapid Rise and Faster Fall of Shelburne,
Nova Scotia 1783-1792. Toronto: Doubleday Canada, 2008.
Kolodny, Annette. In Search of First Contact: The Vikings of Vinland, the Peoples of the
Dawnland, and the Anglo-American Anxiety of Discovery. Durham: Duke
University Press, 2012.
Kowaleski, Maryanne. “The Expansion of the South-Western Fisheries in Late Medieval
England.” Economic History Review 53, no. 3 (August 2000): 429-454.

285
Leamon, James S. Revolution Downeast: The War for American Independence in Maine.
Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 1995.
LeBlanc, Ronnie-Gilles. “Les réfugiés acadiens au camp d'Espérance de la Miramichi en
1756-1761: un épisode méconnu du Grand Dérangement.” Acadiensis 41, no. 1
(Winter/Spring-Hiver/Printemps, 2012): 128-168.
Lennox, Jeffers. Homelands and Empires: Indigenous Spaces, Imperial Fictions, And
Competition for Territory in Northeastern North America, 1690-1763. Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2017.
Little, Ann M. Abraham in Arms: War and Gender in Colonial New England.
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007.
Little, Otis. A State of the Trade in the Northern Colonies Considered, with an Account of
the Produce, and a Particular Description of Nova Scotia. London, 1748.
MacKay, Donald. Scotland Farewell: The People of the Hector. Toronto: Natural
Heritage/Natural History Inc., 2006.
MacKenzie, George Norbury, ed. Colonial Families of the United States of America, vol.
5. Baltimore: The Seaforth Press, 1912.
MacKinnon, Neil. This Unfriendly Soil: The Loyalist Experience in Nova Scotia, 17831791. Montréal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1986.
Mancke, Elizabeth. The Fault Lines of Empire: Political Differentiation in Massachusetts
and Nova Scotia, Ca. 1760-1830. New York: Routledge, 2005.
Marshall, P. J. The Making and Unmaking of Empires: Britain, India, and America, C.
1750–1783. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.
McMillan, Leslie Jane. “Mi’kmawey Mawio’mi: Changing Roles of the Mi’kmaq Grand
Council From the Early Seventeenth Century to the Present.” Master’s thesis,
Dalhousie University, 1996.
McNutt, Alexander. Considerations on the Sovereignty, Independence, Trade and
Fisheries of New Ireland. Philadelphia, c.1780.
McNutt, Alexander. The Constitution and Frame of Government of the Free and
Independent State of New Ireland. Philadelphia, c.1780.
Merrell, James. Into the American Woods: Negotiators on the Pennsylvania Frontier. New
York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1999.
Merritt, Jane T. At the Crossroads: Indians and Empires on a Mid-Atlantic Frontier.
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003.
Miles, William R. “The Newfoundland Convoy, 1711.” Northern Mariner / Le Marin Du
Nord 18, no. 2 (April 2008): 61–83.
Miller, J. R. Shingwauk’s Vision: A History of Native Residential Schools. Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1996.

286
Miller, J. R. Skyscrapers Hide the Heavens: A History of Indian-White Relations in
Canada, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991.
Montgomery, Alexandra. “An Unsettled Plantation: Nova Scotia’s New Englanders and
the Creation of a British Colony, 1759-1776.” Master’s thesis, Dalhousie
University, 2012.
Moore, John Bassett ed. International Adjudications: Ancient and Modern History and
Documents, Together With Mediatorial Reports, Advisory Opinions, and the
Decisions of Domestic Commissions, on International Claims. Vol. 2, St. Croix
River Arbitrations. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1930.
Morrison, Kenneth M. The Embattled Northeast: The Elusive Ideal of Alliance in
Abenaki-Euramerican Relations. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984.
Nicholson, Francis. “Journal of Colonel Nicholson at the Capture of Annapolis, 1710.”
Collections of the Nova Scotia Historical Society, 1 (1879): 59-104.
Nicolar, Joseph. The Life and Traditions of the Red Man. Durham: Duke University
Press, 2007.
O’Brien, Jean M. Dispossession by Degrees: Indian Land and Identity in Natick,
Massachusetts, 1650-1790. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
O’Connor, Daniel and United Society for the Propagation of the Gospel. Three Centuries
of Mission: The United Society for the Propagation of the Gospel, 1701-2000.
London: Continuum, 2000.
Paltsits, Victor Hugo ed. “Narrative of American Voyages and Travels of Captain
William Owen, R.N., and the Settlement of the Island of Campobello in the Bay
of Fundy, 1766-1771 (Part 5).” Bulletin of the New York Public Library 35, no. 10
(October 1931): 705-758.
Paul, Daniel N. First Nations History: We Were Not the Savages: Collision between
European and Native American Civilizations. Halifax, NS: Fernwood, 2006.
Peace, Thomas G. M. “Two Conquests: Aboriginal Experiences of the Fall of New
France and Acadia.” PhD diss., York University, 2011.
Perley, Bernard C. Defying Maliseet Language Death: Emergent Vitalities of Language,
Culture, and Identity in Eastern Canada. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska
Press, 2011.
Pincus, Steven. 1688: The First Modern Revolution. New Haven: Yale University Press,
2011.
Pincus, Steven. The Heart of the Declaration: The Founders' Case for an Activist
Government. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016.
Plank, Geoffrey. An Unsettled Conquest: The British Campaign Against the Peoples of
Acadia. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003.

287
Preston, David L. The Texture of Contact: European and Settler Communities on the
Frontiers of Iroquoia, 1667-1783. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press,
2009.
Prins, Harald E.L. “Children of Gluskap: Wabanaki Indians on the Eve of the European
Invasion.” In American Beginnings: Exploration, Culture, and Cartography in the
Land of Norumbega edited by E.W. Baker, E.A. Churchill, R.S. D’Abate, K.L.
Jones, V.A. Konrad, and H.E.L. Prins, 95-118. Lincoln, NE: University of
Nebraska Press, 1994.
Prins, Harald E. L. and Bunny McBride. Asticou’s Island Domain: Wabanaki Peoples at
Mount Desert Island, 1500-2000. Boston: Northeast Region Ethnography
Program, National Park Service, 2007.
Pritchard, James. In Search of Empire: The French in the Americas, 1670-1730.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
Pulsipher, Jenny Hale. Subjects Unto the Same King: Indians, English, and the Contest
for Authority in Colonial New England. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 2005.
Quinn, David Beers. “The Argument for the English Discovery of America Between
1480 and 1494.” The Geographical Journal 127, no. 3 (Sept 1961): 277-285.
Rakestraw, William. Tribute to Caesar, How Paid by the Best Christians, and to What
Purpose. With Some Remarks on the Late Vigourous Expedition Against Canada.
Philadelphia, 1713.
Rand, Silas Tertius. Legends of the Micmacs. New York and London: Longmans, Green,
and Co, 1894.
Rawlyk, George A. “Eddy, Jonathan.” In Dictionary of Canadian Biography, vol. 5.
University of Toronto/Université Laval, 2003–.
http://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/eddy_jonathan_5E.html.
Rawlyk, George. Nova Scotia’s Massachusetts. Montréal & Toronto: McGill-Queen’s
University Press, 1973.
Rawlyk, George A. Yankees at Louisbourg. Orono, ME: University of Maine Press, 1967.
Rawlyk, George A. and Gordon Thomas Stewart. A People Highly Favoured of God: The
Nova Scotia Yankees and the American Revolution. Toronto: Macmillan of
Canada, 1972.
Reid, John G. Acadia, Maine, and New Scotland: Marginal Colonies in the Seventeenth
Century. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1976.
Reid, John G. “Empire, the Maritime Colonies, and the Supplanting of
Mi’kma’ki/Wulstukwik, 1780-1820.” Acadiensis 38, no. 2 (Summer/Autumn
2009): 78–97.

288
Reid, John G. “Pax Britannica or Pax Indigena? Planter Nova Scotia (1760-1782) and
Competing Strategies of Pacification.” In Essays on Northeastern North America,
Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries. Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
2008.
“Remarks on the Foregoing Resolutions.” The Gentleman’s Magazine, 38 (Oct 1768):
467-468.
The Report of a Committee of the Honourable the Council and House of Representatives
of Massachusetts-Bay, Appointed to Consider of the Petitions of Sundry Persons
Proprietors of Lands at the Eastward Who Have Lately Been Disturbed in the
Possession and Settlement Thereof, by Col. Dunbar. Boston, 1731.
Richter, Daniel K. Facing East from Indian Country a Native History of Early America.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003.
Sanger, David. “Pre-European Dawnland: Archaeology of the Maritime Peninsula.” In
New England and the Maritime Provinces: Connections and Comparisons, edited
by Stephen Hornsby and John G. Reid, 15-31. Montréal & Kingston: McGillQueen’s University Press, 2005.
Sargent, William M., ed. York Deeds. Vol. 8. Portland, ME: Brown and Thurston
Company, 1892.
Sawtelle, William Otis. “Acadia: The Pre-Loyalist Migration and the Philadelphia
Plantation.” The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography 51, no.3
(1927): 244-285.
Saxine, Ian. “The Performance of Peace: Indians, Speculators, and the Politics of
Property on the Maine Frontier, 1735-1737.” The New England Quarterly 86, no.
3 (September 2014): 379-411.
Saxine, Ian. “Properties of Empire: Indians, Colonists, and Land Speculators on the
Maine Frontier, 1713-1763.” PhD diss., Northwestern University, 2016.
Saxine, Ian. Properties of Empire: Indians, Colonists, and Land Speculators on the
Maine Frontier, 1713-1763. New York: University of New York Press, 2019.
Schuyler-Lighthall, W. D. The “Glorious Enterprise:” The Plan of Campaign for the
Conquest of New France; Its Origin, History and Connection with the Invasions
of Canada. Montréal: C.A. Marchand, For the Nuministic and Antiquarian
Society of Montreal, 1902.
Sewell, Rufus K. “Popham’s Town of Fort St. George.” Collections of the Maine
Historical Society, 7 (1876): 291-322.
Silver, Peter. Our Savage Neighbors: How Indian War Transformed Early America. New
York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2009.
Sloan, Robert Wesley. “New Ireland: Loyalists in Eastern Maine during the American
Revolution.” PhD diss., Michigan State University, 1971.

289
Stanwood, Owen. The Empire Reformed: English America in the Age of the Glorious
Revolution. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011.
Taylor, Alan. Liberty Men and Great Proprietors: The Revolutionary Settlement on the
Maine Frontier, 1760-1820. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press,
1990.
Thirsk, Joan. The Agrarian History of England and Wales. Vol. 5, 1640-1750, Regional
Farming Systems. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
Trigger, Bruce ed. Northeast. Vol. 15 of Handbook of North American Indians.
Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution, 1978.
Vickers, Daniel. “Competency and Competition: Economic Culture in Early America.”
William & Mary Quarterly 47, no. 1 (January 1990): 3–29.
Webb, Stephen Saunders. 1676: The End of American Independence. New York: Knopf,
1985.
Wherry, James. Documents Relating to the History of the Passamaquoddy Indian
Presence in Charlotte County, New Brunswick. Fredericton, NB: Arctician Books,
1981.
Whitfield, Harvey Amani. North to Bondage: Loyalist Slavery in the Maritimes.
Vancouver: University of British Colombia Press, 2016.
Whitehead, Ruth Holmes. Black Loyalists: Southern Settlers of Nova Scotia’s first Free
Black Communities. Halifax, NS: Nimbus Publishing, 2013.
Wicken, William Craig. “26 August 1726: A Case Study in Mi’kmaq-New England
Relations in the Early 18th Century.” Acadiensis 23, no. 1 (Autumn/Automne
1993): 5–22.
Wicken, William Craig. The Colonization of Mi’kmaw Memory and History, 1794-1928:
The King v. Gabriel Sylliboy. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012.
Wicken, William Craig. Mi’kmaq Treaties on Trial: History, Land and Donald Marshall
Junior. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001.
Wickman, Thomas. “‘Winters Embittered with Hardships’: Severe Cold, Wabanaki
Power, and English Adjustments, 1690–1710.” The William and Mary Quarterly
72, no. 1 (2015): 56-89.
Wiseman, Frederick Matthew. Reclaiming the Ancestors: Decolonizing a Taken
Prehistory of the Far Northeast. Lebanon, NH: University Press of New England,
2005.
Witgen, Michael. An Infinity of Nations: How the Native New World Shaped Early
America. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013.
Wright, Esther Clark. The Loyalists of New Brunswick. Fredericton, NB: 1955.
Wright, Esther Clark. The Petitcodiac: A Study of the New Brunswick River and the
People Who Settled Along It. Sackville, NB: Tribune Press, 1945.

290

Unpublished Sources
Adams, Samuel. Papers. New York Public Library. New York, NY.
Ball Families. Papers, 1676-1879. Historical Society of Pennsylvania. Philadelphia, PA.
Bernard, Francis. Papers. Houghton Library. Cambridge, MA.
Brinton, Jasper Yeates. Papers. William Smith Land Papers. Papers. Historical Society of
Pennsylvania. Philadelphia, PA.
British Headquarters Papers. New York Public Library. New York, NY.
Chalmers, George. Papers. Papers Relating to Nova Scotia. New York Public Library.
New York, NY.
Colonial Office Records (CO). The National Archives. Kew, UK.
Commissioner of Public Records Fonds (RG 1). Nova Scotia Archives. Halifax, NS.
Continental Congress. Papers. National Archives and Records Administration.
Washington, DC.
Eastern Lands Record Group (EA). Massachusetts State Archives. Boston, MA.
Egmont Papers. Estate Papers. British Library. London, UK.
France. National Archives fonds: C11B Series. General correspondence. Transcriptions.
Library and Archives Canada. Ottawa, ON.
Great Britain. Colonial Office: colonial papers, Nova Scotia and Cape Breton, original
correspondence (CO 217). Transcriptions. Library and Archives Canada. Ottawa,
ON.
Hall, David. Papers. American Philosophical Society. Philadelphia, PA.
Hughes, John. Papers. Historical Society of Pennsylvania. Philadelphia, PA.
Jacobs Family. Papers. Letters, 1744-1769. Historical Society of Pennsylvania.
Philadelphia, PA.
Kennebec Proprietors’ Papers. Maine Historical Society. Portland, ME.
Knox, Henry. Papers. Gilder Lehrman Institute. New York, NY.
Lincoln, Benjamin. Papers. Massachusetts Historical Society. Boston, MA.
Massachusetts Archives Collection. Massachusetts State Archives. Boston, MA.
Monk, James. Family Papers. George Henry Monk Indian Affairs Letter Book. Library
and Archives Canada. Ottawa, ON.
Northeast Boundary Papers. Massachusetts Historical Society. Boston, MA.
Nova Scotia Military Papers. New York Public Library. New York, NY.

291
Nova Scotia Township Records. New England Historic Genealogical Society. Boston,
MA.
Orland, Maine, Vital Records. New England Historic Genealogical Society. Boston, MA.
Pejepscot Proprietors’ Papers. Maine Historical Society. Portland, ME.
Petition of Kennebec Proprietors and Settlers, 22 April 1755. Mss A 916. New England
Historic Genealogical Society. Boston, MA.
Southack, Cyprian. Papers. New York Public Library. New York, NY.
Storer, John. Papers Concerning the Louisbourg Campaign. Houghton Library. Harvard
University. Cambridge, MA.
Temple, Thomas. Correspondence Concerning Nova Scotia. Houghton Library. Harvard
University. Cambridge, MA.
Townshend Papers. British Library. London, UK.
Vetch, Samuel. Letterbook. Museum of the City of New York. New York, NY.
Vetch, Samuel. Papers. New-York Historical Society. New York, NY.
Waldo, Samuel. Papers. Maine Historical Society. Portland, ME.
Wayne, Anthony. Papers. Historical Society of Pennsylvania. Philadelphia, PA.
Winslow, John. Papers. University of New Brunswick. Fredericton, NB.
Woodruff Family Papers. Kislak Center for Rare Books and Manuscripts. University of
Pennsylvania. Philadelphia, PA.

